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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

LISA ANDERSON explores the reasons for the unusually high number of monarchies in the Middle East, denying that it is an attribute of regional political culture. Instead she argues that these monarchies are the results of British imperial policy and the political utility of absolutism in meeting the demands of state formation.

BARRY M. BLECHMAN shows that Congress has both a constitutional basis and political incentives to play a role in forming U.S. military policy. He argues that acceptance of these roles by the executive branch could steamline the congressional process, reduce negative aspects of congressional interventions, and permit the legislature to carry out its constitutional responsibilities more effectively.

ALONZO L. HAMBY offers an eclectic interpretation of Harry S. Truman's personality. He asserts that American democracy allows a "commoner" such as Truman to reach the presidency. He argues that as a commoner, Truman was a less successful leader than those presidents who were either born to high status or had reached it outside of politics.

BRUCE W. JENTLESON analyzes the uses and limitations of a strategy of coercive diplomacy as seen in five principal cases drawn from the Reagan years. He argues that coercive diplomacy is much more effective as a strategy for restraining rather than remaking governments.

BEN L. MARTIN examines the movement by some black American opinionmakers to adopt the term "African American" in referring to themselves. He finds analogues in the successful imposition of "black" over "Negro" twenty years earlier.

ALEXANDER J. GROTH and RICHARD G. RANDALL reevaluate the conventional meaning of "alliance" from the perspective of the Franco-British response to Nazi military incursion into the Rhineland in 1936. They suggest that alliances may occasionally become demagogic substitutes for national defense.

WARREN I. COHEN reviews former secretary of state Dean Rusk's memoir, as told to his son. Cohen compares the information Richard Rusk obtained with the conclusions of Cohen's own biography of Rusk, written ten years earlier.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East

LISA ANDERSON

The only major ruling monarchs in the world today reside in the Arab world, and they are conspicuous by their importance there. They rule more than a third of the countries of the Arab League. Taken together, the kings in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the sultan of Oman, and the amirs of the smaller Gulf states—Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates—have almost forty million subjects. They influence access to important strategic waterways—the Straits of Gibraltar, the Persian/Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea—and dispose of staggering financial resources. Several are major oil-producing states, of course, but even the non-oil-producing monarchies are recipients of substantial subventions from foreign friends and patrons. And these are only the survivors; just a few years ago the Middle East fairly bristled with crowns. Non-Arab Iran's shah did not fall until 1979, and kings reigned in Egypt until 1952, Iraq until 1958, Yemen until 1962, Libya until 1969.

Despite the importance of this type of regime in the Middle East and North Africa, few political scientists have given it serious attention, exploring what its prevalence might suggest about politics in the region or about political development more generally. This neglect, all the more striking in light of the lavish attention accorded the military regimes and one-party states of the area, is partly a result of the ease and frequency with which political scientists dismiss the Middle East as an exotic and intractable region, hardly responsive to ordinary comparative analysis. No doubt the neglect is also partly attributable to the largely unspoken consensus among political scientists that monarchy is passé. The inclina-

LISA ANDERSON is associate professor of political science and director of the Middle East Institute at Columbia University. She recently published *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830–1980* and is currently working on a book on liberal politics in the Arab world.

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tion on the part of American social scientists to write off the world's kings is probably increased by the peculiarly American skepticism about monarchy: for over two hundred years Americans have believed that monarchy is outmoded and that efforts on the British model to retain the form while changing the substance are as likely as not to fail.

This article constitutes an effort to suggest that even the most alien and unusual aspects of Middle East politics are in fact amenable to comparative analysis, with results both revealing about the region and illuminating theoretically. After all, many of the world's industrial democracies – from Britain to Japan – retain vestiges of once powerful monarchies and there is ample historical evidence that monarchies played important roles in nation building and state formation even where the regimes were subsequently replaced.

Twenty years ago, in one of the few efforts to address ruling monarchies in modern American political science, Samuel Huntington expressed the prevailing skepticism about monarchy as a viable regime type in the modern world. He argued that what he called "the king's dilemma" bodes poorly for the longevity of such a system. The centralization of power required to undertake social and economic transformation discourages monarchs from expanding their social base and prevents them from accommodating the political demands of the new social groups that are produced by the very same social and economic change. Thus he concluded that short of preventing economic and social change (which is ultimately impossible) monarchies are doomed to extinction. Manfred Halpern's earlier examination of the Middle Eastern cases themselves suggested more flexibility in principle: the monarchs have the option to limit their own prerogatives by constitutional restraints and to share powers, thereby retaining the right to reign if not to rule. Halpern was not optimistic, however, that any of the dynasts of the day would do so.[1]

How might the unexpected resilience of monarchy in the Middle East be explained? The conventional argument rests on a sort of regional exceptionalism and cultural determinism: monarchy is a traditional and therefore congenial type of regime in the Islamic world. Indeed, Hisham Sharabi has recently suggested that what he calls "neopatriarchy" characterizes Arab politics; and "the neopatriarchal state, regardless of its legal and political forms and structures, is in many ways no more than a modernized version of the traditional patriarchal sultanate."[2] Michael Hudson has also relied on cultural explanation in his treatment of the monarchies of the Arab world, although he begins to broach the argument advocated here:

> The . . . monarchies . . . are peculiarly vulnerable to the tensions of modernization. Their legitimizing values are essentially rooted in kinship, religion, and custom. But they

[1] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[2] Hisham Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 7.

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are by no means wholly traditional; they do not conform precisely to the classical Middle Eastern patriarchy. In fact, we observe strong attributes of modernity in the legitimacy formulas of even the most traditional kingdoms, just as we shall discover persistent strands of traditional identifications in the systems that have crossed the revolutionary divide.[3]

Intuitively plausible as cultural explanations of the adaptability of monarchy in the Middle East may be, they are empirically unsatisfactory on two grounds. First, monarchy as currently understood in the Middle East is no more indigenous than liberal democracy. Second, even if it were a traditional regime type, its alleged historical authenticity fails to explain the apparent ability of Middle Eastern monarchs to accommodate and even foster nontraditional—not to say modern—social and political change.

A variant of the cultural explanation emphasizes the specific circumstances of the region in the postwar era in a sort of musical chairs theory of politics. The continued existence of the monarchies of the Middle East is said to reflect the relative stability of all the incumbent regimes of the region since 1970; governments that survived the turbulent postindependence era of the 1950s and 1960s won a relatively permanent place at the party. Certainly the degree of political upheaval in the Middle East declined markedly during the 1970s and 1980s, but this accounts for neither the relatively high proportion of monarchies among the survivors nor particular character of the major regime change of the later period—the spectacular collapse of the Iranian monarchy in 1978–1979.

The prevalence of monarchy in the Middle East is best understood as a reflection of the vagaries of historical accident—particularly British imperial policy—and the imperatives of historical process—notably the formation of new states and the building of new nations in the realms until recently ruled by the Ottoman Empire and its neighbors. That is to say, the monarchies of the region were initially instruments of European imperial policy. In contrast to most of the rest of their imperial domains, notably sub-Saharan Africa, the Europeans, taken with what they believed to be political and cultural precedent, endowed the Middle East with an unusually large number of monarchies. These monarchies took root not because of such putative precedents, however, but because there is an affinity between monarchy as a regime type and the projects of nation building and state formation. This affinity was apparent in Europe in the age of absolutism, as it was in nineteenth-century Brazil and Japan, and it appears again in today's Middle East—so much so that many of the region's so-called presidential regimes mimic monarchies. Far from hindering change, certain characteristics of absolutist monarchy appear to be very useful in nation building and state formation. Thus, to put it baldly, there is a functional explanation that serves where cultural arguments fail to account for the resilience of monarchy in the Middle East.

It is well to remember that almost all the monarchies of the Middle East and North Africa are creations of the twentieth century. Only the Moroccan and Omani dynasties can claim a genuine centuries-long pedigree in power, and they reflect

[3] Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 165.

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the imposition of foreign, largely European, political templates. What seems traditional to western eyes is, in fact, as much western as Middle Eastern tradition. By and large, both the existence and the character of the monarchies of the Middle East reflect British imperial policy in the region. Indeed, with the exception of Morocco, the closer the French were to influencing the political fortunes of a country, the less likely it was to retain or regain its independence as a monarchy. In all cases, including Morocco, monarchies were installed, retained, and refurbished because to a greater or lesser degree they served European imperial purposes.

Yet, if only because many former colonies in the Third World abandoned the regimes bequeathed them at independence, the resilience of the remaining monarchies in the Middle East merits further explanation. The American assumption that the monarchies would meet a fate similar to that of their postcolonial parliamentary counterparts and give way to military regimes was not entirely unwarranted, of course, and a lot of them did. Monarchy showed a higher survival rate than the presumably more modern parliamentary systems, however. In general, absolutist monarchies lasted longer than constitutional monarchies, such as those bequeathed Egypt and Iraq.

The relative strength of monarchy in the Middle East is not due to its evocation of regional traditions—hereditary monarchy as understood today is not a traditional regime type in the Middle East—but to its affinity with the projects of nation building and state formation, which consume the attention of all the rulers of the Middle East and North Africa. Huntington may be right that monarchy is ultimately too brittle and restrictive a regime to accommodate the political demands of new social groups. In the less than long run, however, monarchy is particularly well suited to the requirements of state formation, especially in its early stages. As Perry Anderson has shown, centralization of authority, destruction of old intermediate groups, establishment of nationwide conscription, taxation, and market relations can be effectively accomplished by absolutist monarchs ostensibly acting to preserve the historical prerogatives of the wealthy and powerful.[4]

Indeed, the sleight of hand implicit in modernizing monarchies may permit change to take place more incrementally and less disruptively than do the loud protestations of revolutionary intentions from equally authoritarian but ostensibly nationalist or socialist republican regimes. For monarchs, the availability of support from the old elite may allow substantially greater levels of voluntary compliance with the state's new extractive ambitions than would rule by "the people" or "the proletariat" that alienates the old elite before a new one is available to take its place.

Successful absolutist rulers presumably make themselves obsolete, revolutionary dictators no less than authoritarian monarchs. The second stage of state formation—the creation of durable bonds between the ruler and the ruled after old ties and relationships have been destroyed—is probably more easily negotiated

[4] Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: Vergo, 1974), 17–18.

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by regimes with already established commitments to popular sovereignty. Thus, monarchy does not provide the solution to all the dilemmas of state formation, but its affinity with the project's early stages may well account for its otherwise surprising resilience in the Middle East and North Africa.

Before examining the nature of the modern monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa, it is useful to survey how they came into being. Almost all the states of the region are products of the twentieth century—the monarchies no less than the republics—and fashioning a unified, loyal populace from the populations allotted them has been the paramount task of nearly all the region's rulers, kings and presidents alike.

The Creation of States in the Modern Middle East

During the nineteenth century, the French and British nibbled away at the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, all the while claiming fidelity to its integrity and independence. Having been chased from Egypt by the British twenty-five years earlier, the French began occupying Algeria in 1830. For the next fifty years, the British remained primarily concerned with access to India. Their interest in the Persian/Arabian Gulf eventually led to the antipiracy treaties with locally powerful families who were thereby elevated to the status of rulers along the Trucial (that is, regulated by truces) Coast. By the 1880s, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire had been severely compromised as the British occupied Egypt and the French declared a protectorate in Tunisia. In both cases, local dynasties that were formally representatives of the Ottoman sultan were retained, "protected" by the foreign power. (Britain transformed its de facto occupation of Egypt into a de jure protectorate in 1914.)

In the first decade of the twentieth century, revolutions combining elements of anti-imperialism, nationalism, and constitutionalism broke out in both the Ottoman and Persian Empires. The resulting regimes were short-lived, however, because the Europeans were not sympathetic to what they viewed as assaults on the stability of the region. World War I and its aftermath definitively and permanently changed the face of the Middle East, constituting the single most important political event in the area since the consolidation of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century.

When the dust settled after 1918, Ottoman Anatolia and Istanbul retained their independence as Turkey, a tribute to the military acumen and nationalist zeal of a number of former Ottoman military officers, notably Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Iran also retained its independence, although the crippled Qajar dynasty was overthrown by a military officer much like Turkey's Ataturk, Reza Khan. Reza declared himself the first Pahlevi shah in 1926. Most of the rest of the region fell under European rule.

Ottoman Libya had already been occupied by Italy in 1911, and the Moroccan sultan had agreed to French protection in 1912. The remaining Arab provinces

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of the Ottoman Empire were divided between Britain and France. France was given responsibility for the League of Nations mandates in Lebanon and Syria, leaving Britain in control of what became Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. Already installed in Egypt and the Gulf sheikdoms, the British enjoyed substantial influence in the nominally independent interior of the Arabian peninsula, where the Saud family from the Najd, the central region, chased the ruling Hashemite family from the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the western Hijaz region in the early 1920s. By the beginning of the 1930s, domestic rebellions had been put down and the architect of the state, 'Abd al-'Aziz, known as Ibn Saud, adopted the title King of Saudi Arabia.

The French appear never to have considered establishing monarchies in their mandated territories; both Syria and Lebanon were destined from the outset to lives as republics. The British, however, because of promises made to the Hashemite rulers of the holy cities in the heat of World War I—and presumably because they found it a congenial regime—established Hashemite monarchies in both Transjordan and Iraq, ruled by the Hashemite patriarch's sons, Abdallah and Faisal. By 1926, when Reza Khan chose to declare himself shah instead of president of Iran, monarchies accounted for all but one of the independent countries of the region (the exception is Turkey) and well over half of the rest: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, North Yemem, Oman, the Trucial States, Kuwait, Iraq, and Jordan. There was still one to come, for just as the dynasts of Egypt (overthrown in 1952) and Tunisia (deposed at independence in 1956) were seeing their last days in power, the British were shepherding Libya to independence in 1951 under King Idris, the leader of a religious brotherhood that had opposed the Italians and who had been in exile in British-ruled Cairo for thirty years.

Thus, of the monarchies that saw independence in the 1950s, only those in Morocco, Oman, Egypt, and North Yemen existed independently in the nineteenth century (and the latter two would shortly be overthrown). Several had disappeared in the interim, most importantly the Ottoman sultan but also the Tunisian bey; and a number had been created—in Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Trucial States. In non-Arab Iran, the monarchy remained but the dynasty changed.

From Sultans to Kings: The Installation of "Traditional" Regimes

These twentieth-century monarchies are only tenuously related to earlier Middle Eastern regimes. While we need not examine indigenous theories of politics and statecraft in depth, several features of classical Islamic political theory and practice will suggest the novelty of the modern monarchies.

The European theory of rule that undergirds monarchy is, as might be expected of the birthplace of capitalism, intimately linked to property. In the European past, according to Reinhard Bendix:

> the exercise of governmental authority was an aspect of family and property. The various functions of government were appropriated on a hereditary basis by a governing

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> class consisting of a king, his high officials, the magnates of the realm, and privileged corporations which controlled their respective territories and thus ruled the country.[5]

This is in marked contrast to the Middle Eastern past. Since the coming of Islam in the seventh century A.D. and its subsequent dispersion throughout the Middle East and North Africa, political authority has been exercised and justified not as an aspect of family or property but on religious grounds. The Arabic word used today for king—*malik*—connotes property or possession in addition to rule. Although it had been a common title for rulers in the pre-Islamic era, in the early years of Islam it was reserved for God, the "Possessor [*malik*] of Heaven and Earth." Pious rulers were called *khalifa* [caliph, "deputy" or "successor" of the Prophet Muhammad] or *imam* [(prayer) leader] and *malik* was a term of contempt reserved for nonbelievers. In later centuries, *malik* regained some favor but it was not as majestic as *sultan*, which also denotes secular power or authority (though not ownership); and it had again fallen out of use by the twentieth century.[6]

The sole acknowledged rationale for rule was the welfare of the community of the faithful. Unlike a merely secular ruler, the *khalifa* or *imam* is responsible for the well-being of his charges. Islam provides a model of political authority that emphasizes preservation of the community. Albert Hourani has described the ruler thus:

> The ideal of the absolute ruler, standing apart from the society as he rules, responsible only to God or to his own highest self; regulating the different orders of that society in the light of the principles of justice, so as to enable each to act in accordance with its own nature, to live in harmony with others, and to contribute its share to the general good.[7]

How that might be accomplished was variously interpreted and the standards for selection of and fidelity to the ruler were not uniform from time to time or place to place. Unquestioned, however, was the religious obligation of the ruler: there could be no separation of the realms of God and Caesar if the purpose of human society was to fulfill religious imperatives. The notion that the ruler's responsibility to God could only be met by fulfillment of his responsibility to safeguard the community was borne out in several characteristics of early modern politics in the region.

First, selection to the office of ruler was not fixed. Hereditary monarchy was not formally admitted, since in principle the ruler was selected not merely because he was his predecessor's son and heir or the senior member of the ruling family,

[5] Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 228.

[6] G. A. Ayalon, "Malik," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. VI (Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1987), 261–262.

[7] Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 3. That this kind of political theory is not unique to Islam but shared, at least in part, by other religious traditions as they seek to advise on regulation of social life in this world is suggested by the parallels with Catholic political theory as described by Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).

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but because he was the best qualified to lead. In practice, of course, the ruler was usually a member of his predecessor's family (though, on the principle of family seniority, as often as not a brother, uncle, or nephew rather than first-born son). But his assumption of the throne had to be ratified: the *bay'a* or pledge of allegiance by the community or its representatives was an integral part of the installation of a new ruler. Similarly, the ruler was enjoined to seek the advice of representatives of the community in a process of *shura*, or consultation.

The combination of religious and worldly authority created a fluid and ambiguous system for determining succession. Sometimes religious institutions elected a spiritual leader for the community; sometimes—more often in fact—heredity determined the identity of the ruler and the religious establishment merely ratified his accession. The two principles were variously emphasized depending on the relative strength of the ruler and the religious establishment.

Virtually since its inception, western observers of this system have assumed that the religious authorities constituted a weak constraint on the arbitrary powers of the ruler: their moral authority was assumed to be no match for the force exercised by the ruler. Thus, for example, have Max Weber and his followers made "sultanism" and "qadi justice" synonymous with the arbitrary and capricious exercise of power.[8] In fact, however, the primacy of the ruler was by no means a foregone conclusion. Because Islamic law, unlike Roman Catholic canon law, is supposed to regulate the ordinary life of the believer, one of the primary responsibilities of the ruler is to ensure application of the *shari'ah*, as the legal system is known, in both the public and private lives of the believers. As a result, the political power and social prestige of the religious officials as the staff of the judiciary often allowed religious authorities to exercise control and demand accountability from the secular rulers.

Nonetheless, the shifting fortunes of the secular and religious authorities began to tilt decisively in favor of the former by the time the gunpowder empires were established in the sixteenth century and the limits the religious authorities imposed on the rulers waned.[9] This had an important consequence for politics. As J. C. Hurewitz has suggested:

> The absence of fixed rules of succession was an important generator of military politics in Islam. The principle of primogeniture, almost uniformly applied in Europe, was not recognized in Islam, least of all among the Muslim dynasties of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. All male members of an extended royal family were acceptable candidates for the throne—brothers, nephews, and uncles as well as sons and grandsons. In theory the successor was elected, but a mode of orderly election never became institutionalized. As a consequence, Islamic polities, hovering between hereditary and "elective" monarchies, became inured to violent and disorderly succession whenever the reigning monarch's wishes were not honored after his death.[10]

[8] See, for example, Talcott Parsons, "Introduction" in Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Free Press, 1947), 62.

[9] Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. III, *The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

[10] J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Octagon Press, 1974), 18.

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By the nineteenth century, the European imperial powers began to see this pattern as detrimental to their own interest in regional stability. Thus did they attempt to regulate succession. This was one of the principal aims of the British in their treaties with the "royal families" of the Gulf sheikdoms, with the result that families who had been no more than *primus inter pares* were recognized—and protected—as ruling families with dynastic rights. It was also, along with other westernizing provisions, a significant element in the constitutions promulgated in the region in the last third of the century.

The institution of hereditary succession by European powers dramatically increased the monarch's arena of arbitrary prerogatives, even for those families already well established as dynasties, as in Morocco. As a Moroccan scholar suggests in discussing the Moroccan monarchy's legal foundation after independence:

> [b]y separating the idea of representation from that of election, the constitution made the monarchy the expression of national sovereignty . . . [T]he hereditary monarchy envisaged in the constitutional draft of 1908 was introduced [in the post-independence constitutions], consummating the break with the tradition of the *bei'a* [*bay'a*] and assuring monarchical succession. Even though the *bei'a* had been limited in fact by the role of other elements such as the royal family and the army, it did imply a responsibility of the monarch to his people. . . . This fact was seized upon by Allal al-Fassi [leader of the nationalist party] to justify his conception of a constitutional monarchy where the king reigned but did not govern, and responsibility fell to the ministers.[11]

The Moroccan monarchs did not find al-Fassi's suggestion appealing. They chose instead to use the ritual of the *bay'a* in an annual ceremony to symbolize the allegiance of the kingdom's elite to the person and institution of the monarch. The Moroccan kings replaced the contractual link between monarch and people broken with the supplanting of the *bay'a* by heredity with a novel, metaphysical tie between ruler and ruled:

> In 1970, it was added to the constitution that the king is the "supreme representative of the nation." This concept has nothing to do with either the Islamic tradition or Western constitutional law. It stems rather from European monarchical theories of the eighteenth century, which saw the king as the incarnation of the whole nation.[12]

Indeed, in one of the more ironic twists in this tale, it was the militantly modernist and republican nationalist movement that gave the Moroccan monarch the position from which he eventually challenged and defeated them after independence. As Mark Tessler points out, it was the nationalists who "made the sultan a symbol of opposition to the French and began to refer to him as the 'king' of Morocco."[13]

By that time, the modern connotations of the title king or *malik* had been rec-

[11] Rkia el-Mossadeq, "Political Parties and Power-Sharing" in I. William Zartman, ed., *The Political Economy of Morocco* (New York: Praeger, 1987), 66.

[12] Alain Claisse, "Makhzen Traditions and Administrative Channels" in Zartman, ed., *The Political Economy of Morocco*, 39.

[13] Mark Tessler, "Image and Reality in Moroccan Political Economy" in Zartman, ed., *The Political Economy of Morocco*, 225.

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ognized elsewhere in the Arab world as well. As G. A. Ayalon suggests, at the beginning of the twentieth century,

> following more than a century of contacts with European monarchies, the idea of kingship acquired new respect in the Islamic countries and *malik* lost whatever was left of its uncomplimentary associations. Its reappearance was, thus, not a revitalization of the old title but rather a calque of "king" or "roi" in the modern European sense.[14]

The first to use the title was the Hashemite ruler of Mecca and Medina, Hussein, who in the excitement of the British-fostered Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire of World War I declared himself "King of the Hijaz," a title he held until 1926, when the Saudi leader Ibn Saud conquered the region and took the title "Sultan of Najd and King [*malik*] of Hijaz." In 1932, Ibn Saud consolidated his realms and declared himself "king of Saudi Arabia." In the meantime, Hussein's son had briefly declared himself king of Syria in 1921 before being chased out by the French authorities and installed by Britain as king of Iraq. In 1922 the sultan of Egypt traded his title to become king; in 1946, Amir ["commander," sometimes "prince"] Abdallah became "King of Transjordan," a country renamed several years later the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In 1951 Idris took the throne as king in newly independent Libya; and in 1957, the Moroccan sultan took the title *malik*, thus making known "his intention to introduce a modern type of government."[15]

Among the implications of the change in title was a change in the mechanisms by which the ruler's obligation to protect the spiritual welfare of his subjects would be fulfilled. Although all monarchs in the Arab world acknowledge this as one of their principal duties—there is no entirely secular monarchy—it is now rarely interpreted as requiring consultation with an independent religious establishment. On the contrary, most of the monarchies have vigorously asserted the primacy of secular principles, programs, or patrons.

The Saudi regime, for example, while still more solicitous of religious sentiment and obligation than most, decisively established its paramount status in crushing a religious rebellion in the early 1930s. The Saud family had been prominent in peninsular politics since their alliance in the mid-eighteenth century with the founder of a religious reform movement, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. Although Saudi political fortunes waned for a time in the nineteenth century, the Wahhabis, as they were known in the West, and their exponents among the Saud family continued to make common cause. Together they triumphed in much of the peninsula by the mid-1920s. Before they did so, however, a reform-within-the-reform movement appeared—the Ikhwan—that was determined to prevent a relaxation of the austerity of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's legacy. When in the 1930s they believed themselves and their cause threatened, they revolted. The Saud family decisively crushed that challenge, and while it has made a show of its continued ties with the descendants of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab since, it is the religious officials or *ulama* who are closely supervised by the government rather than the reverse.

[14] Ayalon, "Malik."
[15] Ibid.

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An even more effective resolution of the ruler's residual religious obligation is, for those who can claim it, combining in the monarch both political and religious authority. Two rulers who can do so are the kings of Morocco and Jordan, both of whom are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Although this in itself is no indication of special powers, both Hassan and Hussein have gone out of their way to remind their subjects of this status and thereby suggest that they take their obligations as religious leaders seriously.

Like virtually all the other rulers in the Islamic world, the kings of the Middle East and North Africa have taken advantage of the ideological and structural dictates of modernization to rid themselves of an independent religious establishment. Even the conservative monarchies that failed to embrace the secularization of politics advocated so vocally by the ostensibly socialist regimes of the 1950s and 1960s have taken pains to limit the financial independence of the religious establishment. Most religious officials are now salaried employees of the state. Their traditional sources of income for religious purposes such as mosque upkeep came from property endowments known as *waqf*. These lands—which sometimes accounted for as much as a third of all agricultural land—have been taken over by the state either to be directly administered or dissolved altogether as archaic impediments to economic modernization. As a result of these kinds of policies, the rulers of the region today—kings and presidents alike—are freer of constraints imposed by social organizations and institutions than at any time in the past.

Absolutism and the Imperatives of State Formation

As we have seen, few of the monarchies of the Middle East are endowed with deeper historical roots or greater traditional legitimacy than their avowedly liberal or socialist republican counterparts. In many other respects as well, the republican regimes mimic the monarchies. Indeed, the region is rife with "presidential monarchies," regimes in which a strongman dominates a state with relatively few stable political institutions. From Algeria's Houari Boumedienne, Tunisia's Habib Bourguiba, Libya's Muammar el-Qaddafi, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat, Syria's Hafiz el-Asad to Iraq's Saddam Hussein, postindependence politics in the Arab world has been typified by highly centralized and personalized regimes. King Farouk of Egypt is said to have remarked, "My good Pasha, the will of the people emanates from my will!" Tunisia's President Bourguiba is said to have answered an American researcher's query, "What system? I *am* the system!"[16]

As in the formal monarchies in almost all of these governments the family of the ruler has been prominent in the ruling circles: Bourguiba's son, Qaddafi's cousins, Asad's brother, Saddam's in-laws have all played important roles in the policy-making and security establishments. Moreover, in recent years and after

[16] Farouk quoted by P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), 39. Bourguiba quoted in Clement Henry Moore, *Tunisia Since Independence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).

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several decades of instability in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the Fertile Crescent, the president's designated successor has usually assumed power upon the death or disability of the ruler. In Algeria, where Boumedienne appeared to have had no favorite, his successor was selected by the elite of the ruling party and the army. By and large, ratification of the ruler's selection by his predecessor – or at most his election by a small elite – constitutes the procedure for succession, one little different in substance from King Hussein's designation of his brother, or King Hassan's of his son, or the Saud family princes' agreement on an order of succession.

Typically, these patterns of recruitment and succession, like the resilience of the formal monarchies themselves, are attributed to regional traditions. In an influential text, James Bill and Carl Leiden argue, for example:

> Despite all the differences that separate Middle Eastern leaders and elites, there are in the Muslim world a number of deep seated and persisting similarities in rule. These similarities . . . have existed throughout Islamic history and can be traced to the days of the Prophet Muhammad, himself the model par excellence of political leadership. . . . Today, throughout the Islamic world, millions of Muslims continue to pattern their lives after his. It is not surprising, therefore, that twentieth-century Muslim political leaders often have styles and use strategies that are very similar to those instituted by the Prophet Muhammad in Arabia some 1,400 years ago.[17]

Yet, in many important respects, the modern Middle Eastern monarchs are more similar to European nation builders and state makers than to Middle Eastern prophets. As Charles Tilly has argued:

> our study of the European experience suggests that most of the transformations European states accomplished until late in their histories were by-products of the consolidation of central control; that the forms of government themselves resulted largely from the way coercion and extraction were carried on; that most members of the populations over which the managers of states were trying to extend their control resisted the state-making efforts; and that the major forms of political participation which westerners now complacently refer to as "modern" are for the most part unintended outcomes of the efforts of European state-makers to build their armies, keep the taxes coming in, form effective coalitions against their rivals, hold their nominal subordinates and allies in line, and fend off the threat of rebellion on the part of ordinary people.[18]

The regimes that are typical of such periods of state formation and nation building are centralizing or centralized, repressive, and poorly institutionalized. Old privileges are under challenge and new rights are still unsecured; old institutions are ignored and new procedures are still undetermined. Indeed, precisely because of the magnitude of the transformation, this is a period of unusual uncertainty. The reliance on personal relationships, on friends and family, which is so often noted in politics in the Middle East, is less a reflection of tradition than it is a result of the

[17] James Bill and Carl Leiden, *Politics in the Middle East*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 133.

[18] Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 663.

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novelty and instability of formal, impersonal institutions and relations. As Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg suggest in discussing sub-Saharan Africa:

> In general personal regimes may be thought of as typical of transitional periods, when one institutionalized order has broken down and another has not yet replaced it. In early modern European history, good examples of such a transition are states which emerged out of the late medieval period; during the Renaissance and the civil and religious wars that followed, the boundaries, structures, and institutions of these states were not yet settled in the minds of the people; as a result, absolutism became a widespread system of rule.[19]

Obviously, state formation in today's Africa or Middle East is not the same as that of Europe centuries ago. The international environment is entirely different and the impetus to state formation today is largely external to society. As a result, social change follows as often as it forces change in the state. Moreover, as Bendix points out, for all the violence for which the Middle East is so well-known, it pales by European standard, where

> the institutions of the state were formed not only over centuries, but specifically through organization for war. . . . Sabotage, armed struggle, nonviolent resistance, and all the other devices of [twentieth century] independence movements did not help build state institutions as did the system of vassalage and later the collection of taxes or the control of civilian populations for the organization of military supplies and the deployment of military forces.[20]

The monarchies no less than the republics in the Middle East reflect the imperatives of state formation where state institutions are few and weak. The monarchies provide a regime compatible with (though not, obviously, required by) those imperatives—centralized, personalistic, actually or potentially coercive. Moreover—and here the analogy with Perry Anderson's absolutist rulers is quite striking—the monarchs of the Middle East can oversee vast changes in the name of preservation, inventing traditions as they go along. Indeed, one of the interesting recent preoccupations of the oil-rich Arab states around the Gulf has been in academic research that contributes to "reconstruction of the local heritage [*turath*]."[21] Finally, insofar as state formation requires building coalitions with representatives of social groups, monarchies are relatively well equipped to reassure the previously privileged, a stratum often of particular importance in the early stages of national transformation.

[19] Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 5.

[20] Bendix, *Kings or People*, 602.

[21] The utility of shared traditions in nation-building is often remarked in the literature on nationalism and nation building, but there has been little attention to the ease with which such traditions may be concocted when they are absent "in nature," as it were. One of the exceptions is *The Invention of Tradition* edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1983). An effort to examine this phenomenon in the Middle East is made in the forthcoming *Power and Representation: State Formation and Intellectual Paradigms in Arab Oil-Producing Countries* edited by Eric Davis and Nicolas Gavrielides.

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The relative weakness of institutions at this stage of state formation amplifies the importance of statecraft. Thus have many rulers in the Middle East, monarchs and presidents alike, proven unable to keep themselves in power. Mediocrity in a monarch usually heralds the end of the monarchy and so draws more attention than the collapse of yet another military regime; but it oftentimes means little more. The monarchs who have been able to sustain and build their own power are neither more nor less adept at the politics of state formation than their republican counterparts: Kings Hassan of Morocco and Hussein of Jordan are master politicians, as were Turkey's Ataturk, Egypt's Nasser, and Tunisia's Bourguiba.

Adroitly handled, monarchy presents some advantages to the state maker in the Middle East. By European standards, the historical claims on the monarchs on the part of powerful groups in society are neither numerous nor onerous. Obviously, many of the monarchies themselves are new and therefore unburdened by bargains made with social groups in the distant past, but even those that are not young have benefited from the influence of European expansion in weakening rival claimants to power. Not only is the local bourgeoisie likely to be small and timorous, and the local proletariat virtually nonexistent, but even the landed elite constitutes a negligible challenge. In most of the region, the landed elite enjoys a pedigree no older than a century, as title to collectively-held agricultural land was systematically assigned to individuals only in the middle of the nineteenth century, at the behest of European real estate speculators.[22] Thus the danger that the landed nobility might capture the state and retard or prevent capitalist development and democratization is considerably diminished; the monarch risks little in an alliance of convenience with the rural notables while presumably laying the groundwork for the growth of bourgeois capitalism. This has been the strategy of the Moroccan monarch and, if tribes can be understood as comparable to rural notables, of the Jordanian and Saudi kings as well. In the meantime the monarch, unlike his republican counterparts, has not admitted any ideological rationale for challenging his centralized authoritarian rule.

By contrast, the republican state maker, in appealing to notions of popular sovereignty to justify his rule, finds much sentimental support among the previously disadvantaged. But he also lays himself open to challenge as an autocrat betraying his own principles. Certainly the populist regimes in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria have all faced serious criticism as traitors to the egalitarian ideals they so fervently espouse. Moreover and perhaps more importantly, as a class, the previously disadvantaged are not necessarily a coherent, reliable, or even useful ally. The privileges acquired in the last thirty or forty years by the lower middle classes in all these countries—food subsidies, free education, guaranteed employment—have swollen the state budgets and bureaucracies beyond the capacity of the local economies to sustain and have proved quite as difficult to reverse as any of the classic privileges of Europe's landed aristocracy.

[22] Haim Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987).

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Of course, there are disadvantages to monarchy. Ambiguous or nonexistent reference to popular sovereignty in the legal or theoretical foundations of these regimes and their half-hearted commitment to egalitarian values does ultimately raise the question of who is to benefit from the transformation. In early European state formation, such a question never came up; few would have argued with the right of the monarch to profit, and in any event, there were few alternate models of politics that might have challenged the absolutist path. Yet apart from personal greed and historical ambition—traits by no means limited to monarchs, of course—there is little incentive for kings to look to the future development of their countries except dynastic solidarity: presumably no king wants himself or his successor to be the end of the dynasty. This is no doubt a very powerful motive for the monarch himself, but as a rationale for popular sacrifice it pales before the nationalism and egalitarianism implied in popular sovereignty.

Political regimes based on ideological formulations of politics, on the promise of a better future, and on notions of popular participation and egalitarian representation are able to accommodate new groups with new demands. As Huntington suggests, this probably makes them better suited to the later stages of nation building and state formation, when durable ties between the new state and citizens are forged. When so many countries of the Middle East are only decades old, however, and when popular loyalties are uncertain and political institutions untried, the advantages of legitimated absolutism are considerable. The ability of a monarch to appeal to traditions, albeit often invented, to reassure the existing elite, to rely on his own kinsmen—perhaps even to hobnob with international bankers and ride horseback with presidents—is useful indeed.*

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The Congressional Role in U.S. Military Policy

BARRY M. BLECHMAN

The sharp dispute in late 1990 between President George Bush and a number of Democratic and Republican legislators over the Congress's proper role in the Persian Gulf situation brings to mind a story about the 1968 *Pueblo* crisis told originally by John P. Roche, who served in the White House as a special consultant to President Lyndon Johnson. The anecdote illustrates the typical executive branch view of the congressional role in U.S. defense policy.

The *Pueblo* was a U.S. Navy "environmental research" ship, which was attacked on 23 January 1968 by North Korean gunboats and aircraft while spying electronically from international waters. Virtually unarmed, the ship was surrendered after a very brief exchange and taken to a North Korean port, where its crew was held for nearly a year. The international humiliation that attended the incident was matched in its negative effects for the United States by the compromise of previously secret cryptographic equipment and procedures. Coming just before the Tet offensive, the turning point in the Vietnam War, the incident contributed significantly to the nation's increasingly pessimistic outlook, as well as to President Johnson's decision not to seek reelection.

The incident relayed by Roche occurred soon after the outbreak of the crisis. The president and key aides were gathered in the Oval Office, trying desperately to determine the facts of the situation. It was unclear at the time, Roche says, whether or not the ship had already been seized and, if so, whether it might still be at a location where a rescue mission could be attempted. Officials conversed

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frantically on the telephone with the Pentagon and other agencies to determine what U.S. forces were in the vicinity and what options might be available. Aides dashed in and out, some bringing maps, others photos and messages. The information available to the Oval Office was fragmentary at best.

In the midst of this chaos, a message was passed to President Johnson from Senator John Stennis, chairman of the Armed Services Committee. According to Roche, the senator wanted to be sure, the message said, that the president understood that, coming in an election year and on top of the war, the *Pueblo* incident could be a political disaster. If the ship were not rescued or something else done to seize the high ground, Johnson and the rest of the Democratic Party would be made to look like weak and incompetent fools. "For God's sake, do *something*," the message concluded. Looking up from the map board, Johnson is said to have sighed in exasperation. Shaking his head with resignation, he muttered sarcastically, "Please thank the senator for his helpful advice."[1]

This picture of the congressional role is encountered commonly in the executive branch. More often than not, national security officials see the Congress's impact as irrelevant at best and distinctly bothersome on more frequent occasions. Like the senator in the *Pueblo* story, members' concerns are seen to focus narrowly on elections and politics. Their incentives are said to incorporate the national interest only indirectly, if at all. The Congress is seen further as being unrealistic and naive about international affairs, ignorant really. "Do something," they say, without having a clue about what might or might not be done, and what the consequences of action or inaction might be.

Is this depiction of the Congress valid? A recently completed research project by the author, which is based primarily on interviews with members of Congress and their staffs during 1987–1988, suggests not. It draws far too simplistic a picture of congressional motives, information, and objectives. If anything, it's a rather quaint view, more appropriate perhaps for a time when Washington was a sleepy little southern town than for recent decades. Thinking back to such giants as Arthur Vandenberg (R-Mich.), one wonders the degree to which the image was ever valid. Yet this negative caricature of congressional approaches to international affairs persists, poisoning the atmosphere for a reconciliation between the branches on defense policy and thus prolonging the struggle between them. This serves the interests of neither the legislature nor the executive and certainly not the interests of the nation as a whole.

It may be the case, as suggested by one House aide, that most members of Congress have few strong feelings on substantive defense policy issues. The majority of senators and representatives may be motivated primarily by personal agendas, congressional relationships, and national and constituency politics. "Policy commitments," the aide said, "are very distant to them." A particularly candid congressman reiterated the view: "When I look at these issues I ask, first, what's good for the Democrats. Unless the Russians are at the gates, and that hasn't happened

[1] Letter from John P. Roche to author, 27 June 1988.

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yet, the substance of the issue has to take second place." This lack of policy commitment is far from universal, however, particularly among the members who sit on relevant committees. It is in the committee context, moreover, that the bulk of the real action on defense questions takes place.

Eighteen years ago, a study by Richard Fenno found that the members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee tended to be motivated by policy considerations to a far greater extent than members of other House committees.[2] Based on my interviews, the assessment appears to be valid for other relevant committees as well. Congressman Howard Berman (D-Calif.) for example, said that he received very little constituent pressures on defense policy questions, leaving him a relatively free hand. What motivated him then? "I have views on these issues, and I pursue them. I came here for a reason . . . an ability to influence government policy is one of the few advantages of being a congressman."[3]

Steven Solarz (D-N.Y.), a senior member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, echoed the view:

> I came to Washington in order to have an impact on policy and how we [the nation] conduct ourselves. . . . I have no interest in being a glorified councilman. . . . The Congress has a role to play in determining the nation's defense posture, and I do what I can to implement my beliefs about what that role should be.[4]

Members of relevant committees differ substantially from their colleagues in their knowledge of the issues, as well. When it comes to their specialties, many Foreign Affairs Committee members can more than hold their own with senior executive branch officials. Indeed, someone like Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.), for example, who has chaired the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East for twelve years, is likely to be more knowledgeable than his senior counterparts in the executive branch or even working level "experts." The former, more likely than not, are political appointees with only limited relevant experience. The latter, whether a military officer, foreign service officer, or civilian bureaucrat, typically has been in his or her current job only a few years, having been rotated through a series of assignments intended to "broaden" officials' backgrounds.

Senior members of the Armed Services Committees can similarly claim greater longevity in dealing with their issues than most executive branch officials with whom they interact. Chairmen Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Les Aspin (D-Wis.) are among the very top experts in Washington on defense questions, while ranking minority members John Warner (R-Va.) and William Dickinson (R-Pa.) have a depth of experience that few executive branch officials can match. By most accounts, members serving on the Intelligence Committees have tended to take their responsibilities especially seriously, working hard to come up to speed on relevant issues.

One should not try to draw too clear a distinction between members and non-

[2] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 9-13.
[3] Author's interview with Congressman Howard J. Berman, 9 October 1987.
[4] Author's interview with Congressman Stephen Solarz, 17 November 1987.

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members of the relevant committees. Committee members are not motivated solely by policy preferences; nor are non-members always interested only in political considerations. It depends on the issue and on the circumstances. As in the executive branch, the resolution of any issue in the Congress will depend on a mixture of institutional, personal, and substantive considerations. Similarly, committee members are not always well-informed, nor the rank-and-file always ignorant. Individual members develop special interests in particular topics for a variety of reasons, often pertaining to their committee assignments, but sometimes based on previous employment, family members' or friends' or constituents' suggestions, or even whim. As in the executive branch, the individuals involved in making congressional decisions on defense policy vary widely in the depth of their substantive knowledge.

Often, what's taken in the executive branch as congressional ignorance or malfeasance is in fact simply disagreement over facts or differences in judgment about the likely results of alternative courses of action. Neither branch has a monopoly on knowledge or on virtue. Individuals in the executive branch, as in the Congress, sometimes pursue personal and institutional agendas, just as they both believe that in fact they are seeking to advance the nation's interests overall. What each is doing, of course, is seeking to advance his or her perception of the national interest; and these perceptions are shaped by personal and institutional factors as much as by the facts of the situation. The concept of national interest is such an intangible and subjective phenomenon that even the most sincere and well-informed individuals can disagree upon its definition in any specific situation.

Considerations of politics are certainly not far from mind in the Speaker's office when defense policy issues are evaluated; but they are constantly in view in the White House as well. Officials in the Pentagon have been known to act at times on the basis of parochial interests—just as have members of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees. If the Armed Services Committees have been known sometimes to take a short-sighted view, well so too has the State Department.

One certainly shouldn't be a Pollyanna about the Congress's role. There are lazy and indifferent members and ones whose priorities simply won't allow time for defense questions. None of these members will invest the energy necessary to learn the facts of defense policy issues. There are venal members as well—individuals determined to advance their own interests and those of certain constituents or financial backers, regardless of the effect on the national interest. The Congress as a whole, moreover, can sometimes act in a wholly irrational way. When events cause a specific issue to seize the public consciousness, hordes of members spring to their feet in a fierce competition to out-demagogue one another. It reminds one of the feeding frenzies that sometimes seize schools of fish. At such times, although flamboyant rhetoric usually suffices to permit the mania to run its course, there is always a risk that totally irresponsible actions will be taken.

Still, these are exceptions. Most of the time, most members are serious and responsible, hard-working, reasonably well informed on most issues, and extremely knowledgeable about their specialties. The majority, moreover, seek, within the

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confines of their personal and institutional positions, to do the "right" thing—for themselves, for their party, and for their country. The differences between the motives of members of the Congress and officials of the executive branch are differences of degree and style; they are neither fundamental nor irreconciliable.

The Congress, moreover, brings certain special perspectives to the resolution of defense issues that permit it to make a unique contribution. The House, with its two year election cycle, clearly is in closer touch with the national mood, an important factor in determining which policies can and cannot be sustained. The concerns about the possibility of a ground war in the Persian Gulf expressed by the Congress when it returned from Thanksgiving recess in 1990 did not spring magically from too much turkey and dressing. They reflected the concerns heard by the Congress from constituents. The fact that until the historic vote to support the president in January 1991 the Congress differed from the administration on the need to give sanctions more time to work was a barometer of the intensity of the worries expressed to the members as they visited friends, backers, and local officials in their home districts.

The Congress can take more explicit account of competing American interests as well. For many defense issues, there is not one position that serves the national interest and others that do not. Rather, different outcomes serve different elements in American society. From the special interests of ethnic groups to decisions about the allocation of the defense budget, the Congress's ability to resolve diverse interests in a democratic fashion is an essential feature of representative government. As Mac Destler, a noted scholar of executive/congressional relations, has pointed out, national security issues are rarely simple struggles between the two branches. More often, advocates of a certain policy in one branch conspire with like-minded allies in the other branch against similar crossbranch coalitions favoring alternative policies. The military services, for example, are notorious for seeking to sidestep decisions by the secretary of defense by appealing to friends on the Armed Services or Appropriations Committees. But the services are not alone among executive agencies in finding common cause with like-minded members of Congress against the preferences of senior officials or even the president. Anyone who has served successfully in the executive branch quickly learns these tricks, if only for self-defense. Deliberate leaks of information, forewarnings to congressional allies about forthcoming decisions, carefully rehearsed lines of questioning during congressional testimony intended to draw certain information from a "reluctant" official, wired-up congressional requests for studies or other specific actions, and many other techniques reside happily in every successful bureaucrat's bag of tricks.[5]

In any event, in a more fundamental sense, these debates about the appropriateness of the congressional role in defense policy and about the Congress's ability to play that role are irrelevant. Congress has been asserting a more intrusive role

[5] I.M. Destler, "Executive-Congressional Conflict in Foreign Policy: Explaining It, Coping With It" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 3rd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1977), 345.

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in the determination of American defense policy for twenty years now, nearly a generation. Many of the members who fought those battles have left the legislature, but others are in the most senior positions. Every two years new members who presume an influence in defense policy to be their due enter each chamber. For these younger members, the notion that they should defer to the executive branch on defense issues is totally foreign. For better or worse, for reasons of both politics and personal preferences, the Congress now insists on playing a major role in defense policy issues and seems certain to continue to play such roles in the future.

First, the Constitution gives great powers to the Congress with respect to defense policy. The power to declare war is the most solemn, while the power of the purse is the most readily used. Second, the incentives provided by politics and personal ambitions support continuation of assertive congressional roles. There is political resonance in many defense issues. They command media time; they inspire campaign workers; they can be used to please important constituent groups and other potential supporters; they can be used to help create nation-wide fund-raising networks. Within the Congress positions on defense policy can be essential to members' ambitions for committee assignments, for moving up the leadership ladder in each party caucus, and for relationships with other members.

But political motives are not really dominant in driving the Congress to assert itself in defense policy; the primary reasons for the Congress's new assertiveness are more fundamental, less calculating. The culture on the Hill has changed. Members expect to be involved in these issues. They view them as their due, as part of the job, as part of the reason for running for election. With this expectation has come far greater confidence in the Congress's ability to deal with defense issues in a reasonable manner and far less reluctance to challenge the executive branch. After the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, the aborted 1980s defense build-up, the Iran/contra scandal, so may other lesser incidents of executive branch malfeasance—the Congress believes that it can't possibly do as much damage to American interests as the executive branch already has.

John Tower, former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and chairman of the commission established by President Reagan in 1987 to investigate the Iran/contra scandal, laments this greater congressional activism. He asserts, however, that the attitude on the Hill has been transformed fundamentally, and will not be reversed: "The Iran/Contra incident reinforced the belief that the Executive cannot be trusted. The Congress now believes that oversight is no longer sufficient; the Congress must be active and engaged."[6]

A Compact between the Legislature and the Executive

The continuing conflict between the branches about responsibilities for defense policy is lamentable. They each have strengths to help solve the nation's problems

[6] Presentation by Senator John Tower at Georgetown University, 14 April 1988.

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and contributions to make. By being involved in these issues together, they can reconcile the basic dilemma in the American approach to international affairs—the conflict between the desires for democratic government, on the one hand, and for effective policy, on the other. The former requires a process to resolve competing interests and perspectives. The latter needs coherence and constancy. By sharing power, the branches can narrow the gap. Mac Destler has described this eloquently:

> In general, the genius of Congress is democracy, diversity, debate. Often Congress nurtures creativity. Nelson Polsby describes the Senate as, "a great incubator of policy innovation in the American system," . . . The executive, by contrast, offers the hierarchy and concentrated formal authority that make coherent policy execution at least possible . . . there is a need for "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch" which only the president and his senior advisors can supply.[7]

When the two can work cooperatively, the results can be impressive. During the latter parts of the so-called Tanker War in the Persian Gulf, for example, the two branches cooperated to an unprecedented degree in a matter requiring uses of American military power overseas. Genuine consultations between the administration and congressional leaders were held prior to decisions in April 1988 to retaliate against Iranian facilities in the Persian Gulf and to expand the scope of protection offered to neutral foreign shipping by the U.S. Navy. The talks resulted in wide-ranging support for the retaliation, which conveyed a far stronger political signal than the action itself. U.S. allies were able to take comfort in the fact that for once, presaging the widespread support for the 1991 war against Iraq, the Americans were united in support of a military operation, and thus the threat of a sudden withdrawal could be put to rest. One cannot know what the Iranians made of the outpouring of congressional support for the executive's action, but it almost certainly could not be described as comforting.

Two other recent examples of executive/congressional collaboration are worth mentioning, one pertaining to the defense budget, the second to arms control. During the period 1984 to 1988, the administration repeatedly proposed defense budgets far exceeding the totals that a bipartisan consensus on Capitol Hill was willing to support. As the debate on fiscal policy and the allocation of government spending became more acrimonious, the Congress became more assertive in its annual mark-up of the defense budget, altering increasing numbers of line items and departing markedly from the administration's spending priorities. The conflict peaked in Fall 1988, with the Congress moving inexorably toward a budget that the president convincingly had vowed to veto. After a lengthy period of exquisitely delicate maneuvers, intended largely to avoid responsibility for any tax increases that might be forthcoming, a budget summit was held shortly before the president's international summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

The outcome of the domestic summit was agreement between the president and

[7] Destler, "Executive-Congressional Conflict in Foreign Policy," 345.

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congressional leaders on a fiscal package for both 1988 and 1989 envisioning a modest increase in revenues, some cuts in domestic programs, and substantial reductions in the planned defense budget. Neither branch achieved all its objectives, and the resulting deficit reduction fell short of the total that many economists and financiers had hoped for, but the agreement was a true compromise between competing perspectives on the nation's economic needs. As a result of the agreement, the Defense Department had to cut $33 billion (12 percent) from its planned 1989 request, a sum that most observers thought regrettable but also necessary in view of the overall fiscal situation.

The effect on congressional consideration of the fiscal 1989 defense budget was electrifying. The process went far more smoothly than had been the case for many years, and the adjustments imposed by the Congress were far fewer. The fiscal 1988 Defense Authorization bill, for example, had not been passed by the Congress until November, well into the new fiscal year. The fiscal 1989 bill, on the other hand, was completed in July, in plenty of time for the authorization to serve as the basis for the work of the appropriating committee. In fiscal 1988, moreover, the Congress had adjusted more than one-half of the line items in the defense budget; roughly one-third the line items were adjusted in fiscal 1989.

The Congress certainly did not abdicate its review and oversight function in fiscal 1989. However, by bringing the overall budget into line with the consensus on the total amount that could be spent, the executive provided far less leeway for congressional changes. When the Congress had to cut up to 10 percent of the budget, as it did in fiscal 1987 and 1988, all items were up for grabs. In 1989, however, when changes had to be kept in balance because of the summit agreement, when every increase in a weapons program had to be offset by decreases in other programs, the room for initiative was constrained. If this practice could be continued, not only would the Pentagon be more likely to see its programs ratified during the appropriating process, but greater stability would be imparted to U.S. defense planning, permitting far greater efficiency in the management of American defense resources.

A 1988 example of collaboration in arms control has also been little noticed. The Committee on Foreign Relations reported favorably on the U.S./Soviet Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Missiles in March. In late April, prior to the treaty being considered on the floor, it became known in the Congress that differences had emerged in U.S./Soviet technical discussions about the details of how to implement the treaty's inspection provisions. Despite weeks of intense, secret discussions between U.S. and Soviet negotiators, nine specific issues remained unresolved, four of which were considered extremely important. The administration had kept the problem from congressional attention for several weeks, assuring interested members that the technical talks were going well, largely out of concern that the impasse would give weight to opponents' claims that the original treaty negotiations had been rushed to conclusion to be ready for the previously planned summit meeting in Washington.

On 29 April then-Senate majority leader Robert Byrd (D-W.V.), with the chairs

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of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence committees at his side, as well as Minority Leader Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.), announced that the start of floor debate on ratification would be delayed at least two days until 11 May to permit resolution of the inspection issues, as well as a previously known problem on futuristic systems, and to gain a commitment from the administration to fund new intelligence systems.

The Soviet response to the U.S. demands was made in an 8 May letter to Secretary of State George Shultz, conveyed by Ambassador Yuri Dubinin. The response was far from satisfactory, however; the Soviets linked resolution of one problem to satisfaction of a wholly new demand on their part. The Intelligence Committee was briefed on the unsatisfactory results the next day, and after a meeting between administration officials and Senate leaders intended to show a united front, Senator Byrd announced that floor debate on ratification would be delayed indefinitely.

The new delay was announced two days prior to a previously scheduled meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Edouard Shevardnadze in Geneva, the last meeting between the two prior to the planned Moscow summit. The inspection issues immediately rose to the top of the agenda. As a result of the Senate action, Shultz left for the meeting in a greatly strengthened bargaining position; he took with him the implicit threat that if the issues were not resolved to the Americans' satisfaction, the treaty would not be ratified prior to the summit, and Gorbachev would be denied the political fruits of this major accomplishment in foreign policy. Facing a crucial party conference the following month, Gorbachev could hardly have contemplated the prospect with equanimity.

Indeed, Shultz proved triumphant at Geneva. The Soviet negotiators relented on virtually every point raised by the American side. The then-National Security Adviser Colin Powell flew back to Washington with the agreement on 13 May, and after a brief meeting the Senate leaders agreed to bring the treaty to the floor. After some further pyrotechnics, the treaty passed overwhelmingly just prior to the summit, and Senators Byrd and Dole were able to fly to Moscow to deliver the document to a beaming Gorbachev and President Reagan.

The incident represents a clear case of the Congress conspiring with the executive branch to put pressure on the Soviet negotiators. Both Republican and Democratic senators were pleased to take credit for the result. Given Gorbachev's desire to celebrate the agreement at the summit, the Senate's refusal to consider the treaty until the implementation issues were resolved was an effective way to put strength in the American positions. Collaboration between the branches not only improved the outcome from the U.S. perspective, but it led to a smoother ratification process once the treaty reached the floor. Given the last minute concessions on the Soviets' part, the few possibly effective arguments against ratification had been effectively undermined.

In this case, the Senate carried out its advisory role extremely effectively, just as the executive branch carried out the actual conduct of the negotiations with great competence. Cooperation permitted each branch to fulfill its responsibilities, bringing its unique perspectives and talents to a problem with a result that

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greatly enhanced the American interest. In the words of Senator David Boren (D-Okla.), chairman of the Intelligence Committee, "The Senate's firmness in this regard was crucial, I am certain, in convincing the Soviet Union to meet all U.S. concerns on these issues. The success in Geneva on this matter is an example of what can be achieved when executive and legislative branches work together and speak with a single voice."[8]

There is a lesson in these three examples. American interests are best advanced when the branches exercise a degree of comity. They will continue to have differences of interest, perspective, and substance. But these disagreements can be worked out in their mutual interest and in the greater interest of the nation as a whole. What is required is a degree of tolerance and understanding and a recognition of the legitimacy of the other's perspective—not its correctness, only the legitimacy of its existence—along with recognition of the need for the two branches to take account of each other's perspectives.

Such collaboration was intended by the Framers of the Constitution. As stated by Lloyd Cutler, consul to President Jimmy Carter and a noted constitutional expert, "Contrary to popular belief, the powers are not separated in the foreign policy-national security area; they are shared for the most part, and neither Congress nor the President can do much without the other."[9]

Unfortunately, the relative cooperation between the branches that marked the final year or two of the Reagan administration proved to be short-lived. By the second year of the Bush presidency, the conflicts between the executive and the legislature—on budgetary issues, as on arms control and war powers—were sharper than ever. If anything, Bush has proven to have tougher views on the president's prerogatives in foreign policy than any of his predecessors. Yet, circumstances have proven such views incompatible with the politics of the 1990s.

Time and again over the past few years, the Congress has demonstrated that it remains unwilling to relinquish the more assertive roles in U.S. defense policy that it seized in the wake of the Vietnam war. Moreover, the outcomes of events have proven that such an assertive role for the legislature reflects the realities of the American political system—the American people want the Congress to continue playing this expanded role. So long as the executive simply rejects these congressional prerogatives, it will have little to say about the way they are exercised. If, however, the administration would accept the new congressional functions as legitimate, it could work with the Congress to reshape the way the legislature uses its powers.

There are certainly reforms worth making. In the flush of asserting its prerogatives, it is natural that the Congress may have overstepped reasonable boundaries. Essentially, it is to be hoped that the procedures through which the Congress now approaches the various aspects of defense policy can be altered to minimize opportunities for the shadowy side of the legislature's motives—those associated with

[8] *Congressional Record*, 26 May 1988, S6710.
[9] *Washington Post*, 17 May 1988.

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parochial and short-term interests – to dominate decisions. Pragmatic means can be devised to ensure that the Congress can exercise effective oversight of the broad outlines of U.S. defense policy and carry out the other specific functions assigned to it by the Constitution without needlessly complicating the efficient day-to-day management of the nation's defense resources by the executive branch.

Such reforms are more likely to be forthcoming in the context of a positive affirmation by a future president of the legitimacy of the congressional role in defense policy. Presidents have acted in recent years, particularly with respect to war powers, as if they believed relevant constitutional passages were no longer valid. Only when it no longer faces allegations of having broken constitutional strictures, only when the executive branch no longer disputes the fundamental legitimacy of the congressional role and no longer threatens to reverse hard-fought gains, could the Congress ever relax its guard; and only then is the legislature likely to make a serious reappraisal of the way it approaches defense policy issues. Confidence – borne of an acceptance yet to be forthcoming in the case of the Congress and defense policy – is necessary for any institution to reform itself. What may be necessary, therefore, is a compact – an informal understanding between the branches that they share responsibility for the formulation and conduct of American defense policy and that it is in the nation's best interest that their respective roles be defined in collaboration. On such a basis, the two branches might move over time to review the various aspects of defense policy with an eye toward improving the effectiveness of current laws and procedures.

A Collaborative Process

The key to effective relations between the branches on defense issues is collaboration. Existing institutions and procedures must be modified to take account of the reality of the distribution of power mandated by the Constitution: when it comes to national security affairs, power is not separated; the executive and the legislature share it. Neither can function effectively without a degree of collaboration with the other. In pragmatic terms, achieving greater collaboration means that in each area of defense policy procedures should be established to ensure more frequent and more genuine consultations between the two branches. Moreover, emerging informal arrangements for discussions and agreement between the branches in several areas might be be institutionalized to ensure that they survive changes of administration and the passing of congressional leaders. Specific guidelines for these changes might include the four described below.

When required, congressional decisions should be sought prior to executive actions

As often as possible, consultations with the Congress should take place prior to reaching a generalized decision by the executive branch, and certainly prior to the determination of the specific course of action to be followed in a situation. If the

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Congress is required to act on an issue, the procedures also should encourage legislative action prior to or in conjunction with the executive decision. Nothing is more disruptive for the effective conduct of the nation's defense policy than the reversal of an executive initiative after it has been launched. Even when the Congress chooses not to act following an executive decision, the possibility of such action can have adverse effects on the impact of the executive decision, by encouraging the perception of a lack of resoluteness and constancy of purpose in American policy.

A tightening of the requirement for prior congressional notification of covert operations would be a good step in the direction of this guideline. Changes could be made to the War Powers Resolution to shift congressional participation from evaluations following a presidential decision to commit American forces in hostile situations to participation in the decision itself. Obviously, this is not always possible; no one suggests congressional deliberation when American forces or citizens are already under attack. But in most situations, as in the Persian Gulf conflict, there is plenty of time for a collaborative approach by the two branches.

Congress should avoid revisiting decisions as much as possible

Procedures for congressional action on defense policy issues should seek as much as possible to reduce the frequency of congressional interventions, while preserving the possibility of extraordinary action if conditions change markedly or if the original action is demonstrated to have been a mistake. The revisiting of decisions is one of the least desirable characteristics of congressional behavior. To the degree it impinges on defense policy, revisited decisions make it more difficult for the executive to impart coherence and constancy to American policy. The practice of revisiting decisions also undermines the effectiveness of American policy by encouraging those who seek alternative outcomes to think that if they can only persevere the decision might be reversed.

There are other negative effects of the tendency toward frequent congressional interventions on single issues. It gives more leeway for parochial interests, for example, and also encourages the practice of micromanagement, excessive congressional involvement in the details of programs. Defenders of the system note correctly that decisions frequently must be revisited because conditions have changed or because new information becomes available. Such contingencies can be accommodated, however, by preserving the possibility, although not the expectation, of congressional action to adjust established policies.

One such change would have the Congress legislate a comprehensive list of prospective arms transfers each year, rather than rule routinely on individual transactions. As suggested by the first guideline above, this change also would shift congressional involvement in arms transfer decisions from its current focus on denying transfers already initiated by the executive branch to participation with the executive branch in the original decisions.

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Changes in the way the Congress considers the defense budget process are even more important with respect to the implementation of this guideline on repetitive decisions. Shifting from an annual to a biennial defense budget and distinguishing more clearly between the authorizing and the appropriating process would have the effect of reducing the frequency with which most defense programs were subject to congressional votes. In making such reforms, specific provisions must be made for the Congress to adjust its previous decision as circumstances change. But the presumption attending such actions would be altered – from a presumption that all programs must be reviewed several times a year to a presumption that programs should be reviewed only when there is compelling reason to do so. The net effect should be far greater stability and efficiency in the defense program.

Congress should be encouraged to take a longer-term view

Most significant initiatives in defense policy take a long time to implement. Weapon programs now require an average of twelve to fifteen years to develop from a concept in the laboratory to an operational capability on a potential battlefield. The SALT I agreements required three years to negotiate; SALT II took seven; the talks in Vienna on conventional military forces in Europe went on for sixteen years before a new Soviet leadership with a radically new approach made agreement feasible. The American involvement in Vietnam continued for seven years; the Russians stayed nine years in Afghanistan; the Iran-Iraq war lasted eight years.

The Congress, particularly the House of Representatives, operates on a relatively brief time horizon, however. So, too, for that matter, does the executive branch. Both branches are anxious for short-term results to influence electoral prospects. If they cannot hope to complete a defense initiative in a year or two, they want at least to be able to show rapid movement in the desired direction. This short-term focus skews decisions on the types of initiatives that should receive the highest level attention. It also causes an unwise search for short cuts, risky options that often backfire. And it leads to frequent changes in American policies that bewilder friends and enemies alike. To the degree that the Congress can be encouraged to take a longer-term view of defense policies, it would add constancy and deliberateness to American policy. The effect could be dramatic, as it would encourage the executive branch to take long-term planning more seriously as well.

Fulfilling this guideline for the most part is a matter of altering individual outlooks. The national interest would be well served if members of Congress and executive branch officials were willing to deemphasize possible short-term gains in favor of more fundamental, longer-term achievements. A few specific procedural changes could facilitate such an idealistic alteration in attitudes. With respect to the defense budget, for example, the adoption of a biennial budget would be a step in the right direction. So, too, would be a refocus of deliberations in the Armed Services Committees from the budget itself to the Six Year Defense Program. This latter action might be particularly effective in imparting stability in U.S. defense planning.

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Greater responsibility should be given to specialized groups

Finally, experience has shown that members of Congress tend to be much better informed and to behave more responsibly with regard to subjects within the jurisdictions of their committee assignments. This alone is good reason to depend, to the degree possible, on committees to carry out much of the work of the Congress in defense policy. There are other reasons as well, including the need for secrecy in many defense initiatives and the need for rapid decisions in many others.

To a large extent, this is already the case. The Intelligence Committees, of course, exercise the Congress's sole authority over covert operations. Most congressional actions on the defense budget take place in committee settings as well. The proposal to legislate a comprehensive annual list of prospective arms sales would give the Foreign Relations Committees a greater role in this area of defense policy.

On the other hand, war powers and arms control span the jurisdictions of several standing committees, requiring innovative organizational schemes. Several legislative initiatives have sensibly proposed the creation of standing consultative groups for war powers. These proposals envision creating a large consultative body consisting of the majority and minority leaders of each chamber and the chairs and ranking members of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence committees, as well as a smaller group consisting solely of each chamber's leadership.

If the Congress as a whole is to accept and invest trust in the creation of such elite units, however, care must be taken on two accounts. First, emphasis should be placed on consulting with the larger body; the smaller group should be used only in the most extraordinary situations, when the need for rapid action or some other truly exceptional circumstance rule out convening the larger body. Second, the larger body should be expanded to give representation to the Congress's less senior members. Additional representatives to the larger consultative body should be elected by each party's caucus in each chamber. There have been situations in the past, notably Vietnam, when the Congress's leadership was as much out of touch with the popular will and with the will of the Congress as was the executive branch. A voice for the hoi polloi, as it were, could be an effective safety valve, should a similar situation develop in the future.

Although it would be created in the context of the War Powers Resolution, the consultative body could be used for a wider variety of tasks. Some proposals already suggest that the group receive regular briefings on world trouble spots so that, should a war powers contingency arise, they could consider the matter from an informed vantage point.

The executive branch might also wish to utilize the larger consultative group for consultations on arms control, although it might want to initiate such discussions in the smaller leadership body at first. The original intent of the Framers of the Constitution was that the Senate's advice on treaties should be given prior to their negotiation. If the president accepted that advice and negotiated an agreement that implemented it faithfully, the presumption would be that the Senate would ratify the agreement without modification. Serious consultations with the

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larger group, in the sense of genuinely seeking congressional views with a real possibility of altering executive branch dispositions to accommodate them, could help to restore such a collaborative process.

Former Senator John Tower suggests the creation of a Cabinet Council, consisting of the individuals also proposed for the War Powers Consultative Group. Establishing the group on this broader basis might encourage a wide-ranging consultative process, including not only war powers contingencies, but also international situations short of open conflict, arms control, and other international negotiations. The council could even be used as the instrument for regular budget summits, although in this event it would have to be expanded to include the chairs and ranking members of the Appropriations, Budget, and Finance committees.

Others have proposed creating a Joint Committee on National Security, patterned after the Joint Economic Committee, which would serve as the focus for all consultations on defense issues. As Mac Destler and others have pointed out, however, excessive centralization can be as harmful as excessive proliferation of contact points. Not least of the dangers would be a rising danger of cooption by the executive branch. A more differentiated approach, building on the functional specialties of the different standing committees, is probably the wiser course.

The Role of Congress

The Constitution has given great powers to Congress in the area of national security affairs. The power to declare war, to issue letters of marque and reprisal, to raise an army, to provide and maintain a navy, to regulate land and naval forces, to tax and spend for the common defense, to regulate commerce between nations, to provide advice and consent on appointments, to ratify treaties, among others, confer great authority to the Congress and the potential for tremendous influence in all aspects of defense policy. These powers cannot be implemented independently, however. The Congress requires the executive branch to execute whatever it decides and to execute those decisions faithfully.

Similarly, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the nation's chief diplomat, the initiator of most policies, and the operator of all the instruments of the nation's defense, the president — de facto — has tremendous powers. Yet the president cannot spend money for any of these activities unless the Congress has appropriated it. He cannot make treaties or appoint officials without the Senate's consent. And in principle he cannot make war without congressional authorization.

Clearly, for the nation's interests and security to be protected, the two branches must operate together. The national interest will be protected most effectively when this collaboration is carried out harmoniously. The two branches represent complementary approaches to national security affairs, not conflictual ones. Louis Henkin recently put it this way:

> In foreign affairs, the president represents the United States, and the people of the United States, to the world. Congress represents the people at home, the sum of different groups,

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constituencies, interest (general and specific). The president leads; Congress legislates. The president represents needs for expertise, secrecy, speed, efficiency. Congress provides wider, soberer, more deliberate, more cautious, longer-term values and judgments.[10]

As the branch of government most directly attuned and necessarily responsive to currents in public opinion, the Congress has a very special role to play in the determination of all aspects of defense policy. Congress is in the best position to ensure that there is some conformity between the public's expectations and the government's actions. This is not to say that the whims of public opinion should be followed slavishly by the government; particularly in view of the complexity of national security issues, it is often desirable for politicians to help lead the public to more enlightened positions.

Still, it is clear that the government most often errs when the executive exceeds the boundaries of public tolerance, as in Jimmy Carter's misjudgment about the public's acceptance of Soviet inroads in the Third World or in Ronald Reagan's misunderstanding of the public's concern about nuclear war. In cases like these, executive policies have been tailored closer to ideological preconceptions or to abstract conceptions of international politics than to the realities of contemporary circumstances at home and abroad. In such cases, the Congress has an absolutely crucial role to play in articulating the public's concerns and, if necessary, in compelling the executive to modify its course. And when the Congress speaks, presidents would be well advised to listen. Both they and the nation can benefit from the Congress's contribution to the formulation of U.S. defense policy.*

[10] Louis Henkin, "Foreign Affairs and the Constitution," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1987/88), 67: 307.

* This article is adapted and updated from Barry M. Blechman, *The Politics of National Security and U.S. Defense Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

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An American Democrat: A Reevaluation of the Personality of Harry S. Truman

ALONZO L. HAMBY

Biographers must not simply recount what their subjects did but must also explain character and motivation. Inevitably, their analyses must be more speculative than empirical, more intuitive than definitive; but the goal of understanding a personality whose decisions affected millions of lives can be rejected only at the cost of ignoring a crucial aspect of the historical process. No approach to human personality can be dismissed entirely, but it appears fair to conclude that the most successful interpretations have been eclectic rather than rigidly Freudian.[1]

One may draw on a few widely understood propositions. Most scholars would agree that numerous childhood experiences—especially those involving relationships with parents, peers, and the opposite gender—play crucial roles in personality formation. Personality development, however, does not stop after the onset of puberty. Surely an adult subject's mesh with the dominant culture has a powerful impact, as do rhythms of success and failure. Attitudes and behavioral patterns

[1] James David Barber, *The Presidential Character* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), is the most widely cited study of presidential personality in our times. It is, however, too reliant on published sources to be truly authoritative, and its personality types are presented in a fashion rather clearer than reality.

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that David Reisman long ago described in *The Lonely Crowd* as inner-directedness and other-directedness are frequently revealing. Negative or positive feelings about oneself obviously are of great interest and may well stem from adult experiences.

If personality is in some significant fashion a product of an individual's interaction with a dominant culture, then a biographical analysis necessarily conveys something about that culture. Specifically, the study of an American leader should tell us something about American democracy and the democratic character. In his short book *Power and Personality* and his essay "Democratic Character," Harold Lasswell, perhaps the preeminent analyst of the intersection between personality and democracy, posited a set of ideal democratic values and generalized about the "character" of the model democrat. The values were personal freedom, suspicion of power, respect and tolerance for others, high standards of public morality, opportunity for and recognition of merit, and a commitment to minimum standards of wealth and education for all. The "democratic character" possessed an "open ego" that was warm and caring toward others, a "multi-valued" disposition, an optimistic faith in human potential, and a freedom from destructive inner anxieties.[2]

Lasswell doubtless fully understood that he was talking about ideal types rather than imperfect reality; and however trite they may sound when reduced to a few phrases, his ideals assuredly were admirable. Nonetheless, it strikes one that something important is missing from his formulation—a sense of the way in which democracy itself may impose formidable obstacles to its ideal realization, especially in the imposition of counterproductive anxieties about one's identity. As Lasswell observed, "The elite of democracy ('the ruling class') is society-wide."[3] A democracy has no legitimated, hereditary ruling class or rigid class structure. By its nature, it forces its citizens to define their identities, frequently at a price of considerable psychic stress.

Liberal democracy may be the best of all polities, but for all its virtues it can place considerable demands on the individual. Those born to its elite classes can generally expect a measure of wealth, power, and deference. Those born to its underclasses often adapt with little questioning to poverty and relative powerlessness. Those born somewhere in the large middle face the task of defining an identity and striving for success. They must, to use a term of special applicability to the turn-of-the-century, neofrontier society in which Harry S. Truman grew to maturity, become "self-made men."

More than any other chief executive of this century, Truman is enshrined in our folklore as a representative product of American democracy. His career illustrates not only the strengths of a liberal democratic social and political system but also the tensions it can inflict upon those who rise within it. Democracy allowed a commoner such as Truman to achieve the presidency, but his difficulties in defining

[2] Harold Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: Norton, 1948); and Lasswell, "Democratic Character" in *The Political Writings of Harold Lasswell* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), 463–525. David Reisman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

[3] Lasswell, *Power and Personality*, 109.

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a satisfactory identity left him a less successful leader than those presidents who were either born to high status or had reached it outside of politics. In a general way, Truman provides an example of the tribulations of the self-made man in the modern presidency.

The Two Trumans

Among working historians the image of Harry S. Truman has been relatively precise. Critics and admirers alike tend to depict him as a straightforward, simple personality who exhibited either the weaknesses or the strengths of the ordinary American. Biographies and accounts of his administration, predominantly positive, have emphasized his decisiveness, energy, optimism, fundamental goodwill, and patient handling of subordinates. Dean Acheson, Truman's secretary of state, developed the picture well when he described an inspirational and inexhaustible leader:

> Mr. Truman could work, reading and absorbing endless papers, and at times play, until well past midnight and be up at six o'clock walking deserted streets with hardy Secret Service men and reporters. He slept, so he told us, as soon as his head touched the pillow, never worrying, because he could not stay awake long enough to do so.[4]

Scholars more often than not have agreed. Harold Gosnell, for example, writes of Truman's "incurable optimism" and attributes it to his "oral tendencies."[5] James David Barber has left us with a clearly defined image of Truman as an "active-positive" chief executive, "displaying high self-esteem and continual enjoyment in the exercise of power."[6]

Barber nonetheless appends to his characterization a mild caveat stating that "Truman's aggressiveness places him near the active-negative end of his category," thereby implying that in some ways or at some times his self-esteem appeared low and his activity in the presidency sought to compensate for a poor self-image. Other writers, moreover, have found Truman a rather complex personality. Robert J. Donovan gives us a picture of a president who possessed a decidedly erratic personality and who on rare occasion imbibed a bit too much bourbon. Donald R. McCoy presents his subject as a man of five different personalities: Little Harry, Truman the Politician, Captain Harry, Truman the President, and Dirty Harry. Richard L. Miller in his study of Truman's prepresidential years leaves a debunking impression of an individual attempting to balance shady machine associations with a sense of public service.[7]

[4] Dean Acheson, "The Greatness of Harry Truman," *Esquire*, September 1969, 125–27, 34–36, excerpted from Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969).

[5] Harold Gosnell, *Truman's Crises* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1980), 542.

[6] Barber, *Presidential Character*, 292.

[7] Ibid., 292; Robert J. Donovan, *Tumultuous Years* (New York: Norton, 1982), 14, 298; Donald R. McCoy, *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984), 143–44; McCoy, "Harry S. Truman: Personality, Politics, and the Presidency," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 12 (Spring 1982): 216–25; Richard L. Miller, *Truman: The Rise to Power* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985).

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In a brief but very perceptive review essay published in 1981, Robert Griffith has suggested an appealing explanation of the contradictions in Truman's personality. They stemmed, he argues, from the efforts of a man brought up with the values and aspirations of an earlier America to come to grips with "the burden of modernity"—"the consolidation of economic and political power, the uneasy rise of American empire, the decline of rural life and the triumph of metropolitan culture, the pervasive ethic of success and the hidden injuries of failure."[8]

Few students of Truman's life and personality would deny Griffith's insight, but it is only a partial explanation at best. A close look at Truman's career as a county administrator and a senator reveals that like many Midwestern progressives of his time, he enthusiastically embraced many of the values that scholars associate with the term modernity—efficiency, centralization in both organization and decision making, reliance on professional expertise, and bureaucratic regulation, to name a few. Such a blend of the traditional and the modern was common among insurgent Midwestern progressives in the first half of the twentieth century. Moreover, the key to Truman's political success was his ability to come to terms with the urban cultures that provided the decisive margins of victory in every election campaign he waged from 1926 through 1948.[9]

It is the thesis of this article that Truman's character and personality had more fundamental sources. Foremost among them were aspects of Truman's difficulty in achieving a satisfactory adjustment to the society into which he was born, a difficulty that in his early life affected his relationship with his parents, his sense of gender identity, and his ability to relate to the opposite sex. In many respects, he entered full adulthood at the age of 30, only after the death of his father in 1914. Subsequent negative experiences included one business failure after another, a midlife career change into the precarious world of politics, and an ethically awkward—if politically necessary—association with a corrupt machine. All were facets of a more general problem with little relation to the concept of modernity—the difficulty of establishing and maintaining a secure identity in a fluid, liberal democratic society.

There were positive experiences in Truman's life, to be sure, but they failed to balance the negative ones, leaving him with a sense of insecurity and frustration throughout his life, calling forth recurrent fears of failure and feelings of anger, and leading to frequently bungling efforts at compensation. Politics and the presidency added their own special set of insecurities and deepened the syndrome. Gosnell is correct in his observation that Truman was an incurable optimist; he was

[8] Robert Griffith, "Harry S. Truman and the Burden of Modernity," *Reviews in American History* 9 (September 1981): 295–306.

[9] For Truman's interest in efficiency, organization, and expertise, see especially the record of his collaboration with the Kansas City Public Service Institute (later Civic Research Institute), involving such matters as road building, the establishment of sewer districts, and governmental reorganization. Civic Research Institute Papers, Western Historical Collection, University of Missouri–Kansas City. See also the N.T. Veatch Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo. (hereafter HSTL) for documentation of the use of expertise and implementation of professional standards in the construction of the Jackson County road system.

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after all the product of a culture that both connected worldly success to personal virtue and envisioned it as accessible to almost everyone. A close student of his life, however, cannot fail to detect a certain desperate determination behind his optimism. Moreover, Truman clearly oscillated between negative and positive images of himself.

Truman assuredly was a more complex—and therefore a more real and interesting—character than the one-dimensional portrait commonly presented before the mid-1970s. On the one hand, he was a faithful husband and loving father, a man who lived according to a simple and virtuous ethic built on concepts of personal honesty, loyalty, and dedication to the public welfare. He was a volunteer army officer who conducted himself courageously on World War I battlefields, a considerate employer, and a thoughtful, reflective, disinterested political leader.

On the other hand, he often damaged his public image by appearing petty. As a county administrator, he was in many respects a typical machine politician loading down the public payrolls with patronage henchmen, indulging in nepotism, and using his public office to evade payment of lawful debts. As a senator he refused to renounce a corrupt organization. As president he maintained associations with some of the more disreputable elements of the world of professional politics, while engaging in snappish public outbursts against targets as diverse as Senator J. William Fulbright, muckraking columnist Drew Pearson, and music critic Paul Hume. His personal papers reveal him as a man who felt constantly unappreciated and harassed by others, was frequently suspicious of many of those around him, at times uncaring for loyal helpers, vindictive, seething with unfocused hostility, beset by stress and anxiety.

It will not do to ask which was the real Harry Truman. Both were the real Harry Truman.

Personality Formation in a Neofrontier Society

An investigation of Truman's personality must begin with an understanding of the society into which he was born in 1884, little more than fifty years after Alexis de Tocqueville's tour of America. Pseudoegalitarian, it seldom openly acknowledged but covertly recognized social distinctions based on wealth, family, and church affiliation. It exalted the self-made man and assumed that every person had an opportunity to get ahead in the world.

Scarcely removed from frontier days, the town of Independence, Missouri to which Harry Truman's parents moved in 1890 had no paved streets, water system, or electrical lighting. Its inhabitants possessed bitter memories of the way in which the Civil War had ravaged western Missouri. Adult men still commonly carried knives or guns; fistfights were commonplace. Harry Truman learned about the behavior expected of males in a setting that prized the manly virtues and the inner-directed personality.[10]

[10] Jonathan Daniels, *Man of Independence* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1950), chaps. 2–3, is probably the most successful of all the Truman works in evoking the atmosphere of Truman's early life;

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Young Harry's early life displays a long, unsuccessful struggle with those values. As a child, he had to come to grips with eyesight problems that amounted in that time and place to a serious physical disability for a male youth. Medical records reveal that as a grown man he was legally blind without those thick eyeglasses that he always wore, and what we know of his childhood would seem to confirm that he was nearly so then. Remembering his schooldays after half a century, he once candidly remarked to a crowd of children at the Truman Library: "I was never popular. The popular boys were the ones who were good at games and had big, tight fists. . . . I was kind of a sissy."[11]

His boyhood—despite his Tom Sawyer-style version of it in his *Memoirs*—was difficult. The eyeglasses and the piano lessons he took for several years constitute the surface representation of the difficulty. At bottom, there may have been something close to a confusion of gender identity. Despite later efforts to obscure it, he was his mother's boy; apparently able to do only limited outdoor work as a child, he functioned as her helper. (Even as a man in his twenties working on the farm, he seems frequently to have helped with the kitchen chores when his family had company.) Ordered to run away from fights, he occasionally had to do so.

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but see also Alfred Steinberg, *The Man from Missouri* (New York: Putnam's, 1962), chaps. 1–5; Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking* (New York: Berkeley, 1973; paperback ed., 1974), chaps. 1–5; Richard Miller, *Rise to Power*, chaps. 1–5; and, of course, Truman, *Memoirs: Year of Decisions* [hereafter, *Memoirs*, I] (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), esp. chap. 9. All, however, contain numerous inaccuracies, none of which are corrected in Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman* (New York: Morrow, 1973). For a fascinating reminiscence of Independence as it was in the late nineteenth century, see the "Solomon Wise" (William Southern, Jr.) column in the *Jackson Examiner*, (Independence, Missouri), 23 September 1927. Harry Truman wrote several autobiographical documents during his lifetime: "Two Years in the Army," actually a short reminiscence of his childhood and early adulthood that never gets beyond his National Guard experience, Truman Papers, Family, Business, Personal File [hereafter FBP], HSTL; several items written on Pickwick Hotel stationery, 1931–34, including a long reminiscence dated 14 May 1934 (hereafter Pickwick memos), Truman Papers, copies in Presiding Judge File and Post-Presidential File; "My Impressions of the Senate, the House, . . ." [1935], Truman Papers, Senatorial-Vice Presidential File [hereafter SVP]; "The Military Career of a Missourian," ibid.; Handwritten Autobiography [1945] and Handwritten Autobiography [1951], both in Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File [PSF]. Other valuable material may be found throughout the PSF and FBP Files. A substantial amount has been published by Robert Ferrell, ed., *Off the Record* (New York: Harper, 1980); *The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman* (Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1980); and "*Dear Bess*" (New York: Norton, 1983). The 1951 autobiography and some other valuable material may be found in William Hillman, eds., *Mr. President* (New York: Farrar, 1952). See also Monte M. Poen, *Strictly Personal and Confidential* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982); and *Letters Home by Harry S. Truman* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1984).

[11] On Truman's eyesight, see Medical Records, 1917–55, in Harry S. Truman, Army Military Personnel Records, HSTL, esp. National Guard physical, 9 August 1917, and Army–Navy Hospital examination, September 1937. The routine Army Reserve physicals in this file appear to have been either faked or carelessly administered; the more serious examinations reveal the seriousness of Truman's vision difficulties. All accounts of Truman's childhood years agree that he could read only very large print without eyeglasses. See author's interview with Rufus Burrus, 17 February 1984. A representative example of first impressions of Truman as a sissy may be found in Eddie McKim's oral history memoir, HSTL, cited in Charles Robbins, *Last of His Kind* (New York: Morrow, 1979), 29. His own "I was a sissy" remark is in Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking*, 31–32.

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His father, John Truman, while a good parent, favored Harry's younger brother, John Vivian, who took up livestock trading at thirteen, displayed little interest in book learning or cultural activities, and adopted farming as his life's vocation. Harry was his brother's opposite in each respect. As late as 1913, at the age of twenty-nine, he was capable of describing himself in a letter to his fiancée as "a guy with spectacles and a girl mouth."[12]

Harry was also affected by his father's financial failure. In the fall of 1900, when he began his senior year in high school, the Trumans appeared on the verge of new riches and status after years of hard work. Instead, their world collapsed when John Truman put all his assets into grain futures and lost everything. After selling all the family property to pay off his debts—or at least as many as he could—the elder Truman worked for seven years as, first, a night watchman, then a propertyless farm manager waiting for his wife to inherit land from his mother-in-law. For most of the rest of his life, his wife's title to that property was contested in a complex and bitter family lawsuit. It is reasonable to assume that part of the motivation young Harry Truman felt in his own quest for success was to compensate for the failures of his father. A half-century later, when Alfred Steinberg suggested to him that his father had been a failure, Truman responded snappishly: "My father was not a failure. After all, he was the father of a President of the United States."

There are ample indications that young Harry's rather distant relationship with his father was a source of considerable anxiety. There are, however, no indications that this anxiety was accompanied by any hatred, conscious or unconscious; quite the opposite. Truman respected his father, considered him a model of masculinity, and wanted his approval. He finally achieved it by giving up his own career in Kansas City and spending eight hard, unrewarding years helping the older man run the family farm. Intensely demanding, John Truman was not an easy man with whom to work, but the son gained a stronger sense of his own identity and a more satisfying relationship with his father. Years later, he wrote to himself with pride: "He thought I was about right, and I knew he was."[13]

"I was always afraid of the girls my age and older," Truman recalled in his *Memoirs* of his schooldays. His anxiety about relating to females was probably a product of doubts about the character of his own masculinity that he developed at a young age. Much of his psychic energy as a boy seems to have been devoted to developing ways that he could relate to his own gender. He was semisuccessful at it, making his closest friends among bookish youngsters like himself, establishing a reputation as a peacemaker in disputes among others, always displaying a ready smile and a cordial disposition. The task not only left him little time to deal with girls, it required him to cultivate other-directed behavioral traits that

[12] Daniels, *Man of Independence*, 49–52; Gaylon Babcock, Oral History, 21, HSTL; HST to Bess Wallace, 19 November 1913, FBP; HST, "Military Career of a Missourian," SVP, documents running from fights as a child.

[13] Steinberg, *Man from Missouri*, 15; interestingly, the same remark appears in Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking*, 71; HST, Pickwick Memo, 14 May 1934, Truman Papers, Presiding Judge and Post-Presidential Files.

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were by the norms of his culture predominantly feminine. His "sissiness" left little room for confidence in his attractiveness to the opposite sex.

He appears to have managed the problem of girls by his early, lifelong romance with young Bess Wallace, whom he always professed to have loved from his first sight of her in Sunday School. She was attractive and interesting, but as the product of an older and higher-status family, she was also inaccessible to him. His contacts with her when she was a schoolchild seem not to have gotten beyond Latin study and some play at the home of Harry's cousins, the Nolands. Indeed, after their graduation from high school, Harry Truman saw her seldom, if ever, for the next nine and a half years.

During that time, from his seventeenth into his twenty-seventh year, there is no record of him having anything like a serious relationship with a woman. As much as anything else, Bess seems to have served the function of allowing him to avoid all but the most casual social contacts with women until finally at age twenty-six he felt enough confidence that he determined to court her seriously. Even after he had done so, had wed her, and had fathered a daughter, he often was ill at ease with other women, both in those rare situations when some far-fetched doubt might be raised about the propriety of their relationship and in the somewhat more frequent ones when he had to deal with a woman as a serious figure in what he considered the man's world of politics. (Shortly after becoming president, he accepted the resignation of Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins at least in part because he did not want a woman in the cabinet.) On the other hand, he constantly delighted in the company of men and relished their approval.[14]

One must be careful about crudely psychologizing complex career decisions and such deep emotions as love and patriotism. Still, Truman's struggle to achieve a masculine identity helps explain crucial aspects of his early life: his abandonment of his piano aspirations, his interest in becoming a military officer, his curious (to the modern observer at least) lack of a love life at an age when romance is central to the lives of most men, his decision to leave a good job in the city to work with his father on the farm, and his option for service in World War I.

It likewise is revealing that Truman began a serious quest for an independent life beyond the farm soon after his father's death. Feeling that a satisfactory identity required the money and status that only came with substantial success as an entrepreneur, he sank all the capital he could raise first into a lead and zinc mine, then an oil and gas exploration partnership. By the time he entered the army in World War I, the mine was a failure that had cost him $5,000. The oil venture came close to gushers on a couple of occasions, but in the end did little more than return his original investment.

Truman's service in World War I (which he undertook although he was beyond draft age, eligible for exemption because of his continued farming activities, and begged by his fiancée to stay at home) was enormously beneficial for his sagging

[14] Truman, *Memoirs*, I, 115, for fear of girls; Eben Ayres, Diary, 14 September 1945, Ayres Papers, HSTL, for Truman remark about Perkins and women in cabinet.

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self-esteem. He became a first-rate artillery officer, who figured shell trajectories, risked death, and above all led men under battlefield conditions. The first such independent triumph of his life, it established a foundation for a long part-time career in the army reserves, culminating in a regimental command with the rank of colonel. There should be little wonder that throughout his life Truman valued his military comrades above most other acquaintances; they were, after all, reminders of his most satisfying experience.

Returning from World War I with heightened confidence, he finally married his sweetheart; the couple moved in, temporarily they apparently thought, with Bess Truman's mother. He then plunged back into some major risk-taking, establishing not only his famous haberdashery business but also engaging in some substantial real estate speculation. Again, the outcome was failure. He lost a 160-acre farm and found himself saddled with court judgments and debts totaling more than $10,000.

By his thirty-eighth birthday in May 1922, Harry Truman almost certainly possessed on balance a distinctly unsatisfactory sense of his own identity. He could count some plusses, to be sure. He had bolstering memories of his rebuilt relationship with his father and his war service. He possessed the supportive experience of association and friendship with former war comrades and fellow reservists, some of them men of substance and influence. He had begun a steady rise in the Masonic Order and enjoyed the respect of his fellow members. And he finally had married his long-sought love. Withal, he lacked the means to provide his wife with a home of their own and faced little more than the demoralizing prospect of extended debt, harassment by creditors, and possible bankruptcy. It was with this battled self-image that he plunged into politics.[15]

He hoped to win acclaim as a constructive public servant, but the circumstances were difficult, and the new career line even more precarious than the risky enterprises that had hitherto occupied him. His life from this point on would consist of a slow, awkward climb in self-esteem, based on numerous substantial public accomplishments. But that ascent always would be against the drag imposed by a previous deeply-imbedded negative self-image and by all the liabilities resulting from a machine affiliation absolutely necessary to his successes. In many respects, Truman's career would demonstrate the ways in which American democracy so frequently imposes a psychic penalty upon its servants, thereby canceling out the psychic rewards of election and office.

Struggling for Self-realization in a Tocquevillian World

Harry Truman's early world was not terribly distant in its values and assumptions from that which Tocqueville had observed in the 1830s, and as Tocqueville himself had written:

[15] The best published account of the various businesses and of Truman's World War I experiences is Richard Miller, *Rise to Power*, chaps. 5–7. It does, however, require correction on numerous matters of fact.

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> In nations where the principle of election extends to everything, no political career can, properly speaking, be said to exist. Men arrive, as if by chance, at the post which they hold, and they are by no means sure of retaining it. . . . The consequence is that in tranquil times public functions offer but few lures to ambition. In the United States those who engage in the perplexities of political life are persons of very moderate pretensions. The pursuit of wealth generally diverts men of great talents and strong passions from the pursuit of power. . . . I am not sure that the people would choose men of superior abilities even if they wished to be elected; but it is certain that candidates of this description do not come forward.[16]

Tocqueville's remarks, which describe with remarkable accuracy Truman's world a century later, stated two of the hallmarks of political life in America—its insecurity and its low status. Only a couple of the election campaigns that Truman fought from his first run for county judge in 1922 through his presidential effort in 1948 were easy. In most his chance of victory was rated as no more than even, and he faced a difficult, uncertain future if he lost. He turned to politics only after repeated business failures made it necessary; and his new career, largely scorned by the business elite, was one in which mediocrity and corruption were dominant. The leaders for the most part happily enough accepted a share of the boodle and the followers, many of them either unable or unwilling to find easy and steady work in the private economy, settled for low-paying public jobs. Truman preserved his self-respect by staying personally honest, and as a consequence found himself often acidly contrasting his debt-burdened existence with the earnings and lifestyles of the business elite and the political boodlers.[17]

Truman's political life might be divided into two distinct periods—the first set off by his dependence on Kansas City's Pendergast machine from 1922 to 1939, the second beginning in 1940 when he won reelection with an independent power base in his own state and culminating in his rise to the presidency. But the move from the first to the second phase did not result in a simple abandonment of attitudes and self-image acquired in the first. It was during the earlier period that he acquired a political identity as a machine loyalist that frustrated his hope for recognition as a disinterested public servant. It was in the earlier period that his emotions about politics were largely formed for the rest of his life. His later efforts at a new image were never very successful, internally or externally. His accomplishments in the public offices he held over a thirty-year period were positive and substantial, but politics had predominantly negative effects upon his emotions, personality, and physical well-being.

From the beginning he consciously struggled with ethical issues endemic to American democratic politics—the tension between the real and the ideal, patronage and merit, corruption and virtue. The product of an upbringing that saw the world

[16] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Random House, 1945), I: 216.

[17] For a journalistic view of Truman's rough and ready local political world, see William Reddig, *Tom's Town* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1947); for a more scholarly, if considerably less entertaining and less complete view, see Lyle W. Dorsett; *The Pendergast Machine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

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in terms of moral absolutes, intellectually committed to the ideals of civic reformers, he walked an uneasy line, attempting to hold the demands of the organization to a minimum. It was a difficult exercise. Truman insisted on a fair bidding process for the Jackson County road system, telling Boss Tom Pendergast that it was a matter of honor for him to keep faith with the electorate. Pendergast acquiesced reluctantly but scornfully told Truman that his honor didn't amount to a pinch of snuff. Truman found satisfaction in his standing as one of the few honest Jackson County politicians. Still, he had no illusions about the machine's criminality. He rationalized his association with it by emphasizing, even in his most personal jottings, the boss's virtues (he kept his word—when he gave it) and the reformers' vices (they were moral hypocrites).

Nonetheless, the things he had to do to appease his associates troubled him deeply. "I wonder if I did right to put a lot of no account sons of bitches on the payroll and pay other sons of bitches more money for supplies than they were worth in order to satisfy the political powers," he asked himself in one of his intermittent diary jottings around the end of 1930. "Am I an administrator or not?" he asked in another written at about the same time. "Or am I just a crook to compromise in order to get the job done? You judge it. I can't."[18]

These were among several diary memoranda he wrote to himself as a means of purging anger at a host of county government officials and employees whom he was persuaded had double crossed him, engaged in efforts to bilk the county, or had used family connections to obtain a job. Here, of course, the facts largely provided justification for his denunciations. Yet a bit of transferral also was involved. He clearly found it hard to deal with his own complicity, however slight, in a corrupt system. He may have been troubled by his own small-scale practice of nepotism: he had put his brother on the public payroll and assigned a contract to his architect brother-in-law; he would find a job for another brother-in-law at the depth of the Depression when he was laying off scores of public employees.[19]

For most of Truman's political career, his uneasiness in front of a crowd and his small ego were among the most noticeable aspects of his personality. As a man of twenty-nine he quaked at the prospect of having to make a few talks urging school children to participate in a township fair. For years, he was ineffective in any sort of a formal speech situation. This was in part a matter of his faulty vision; he had difficulty following a prepared text while attempting to maintain episodic eye contact with an audience. But it seems to have been equally reflective of a large insecurity that could bring him to the point of paralysis whenever he

[18] See Pickwick Memos beginning "I have had two wonderful associates. . . ." and "More Character Sketches," Post-Presidential File.

[19] Margaret Truman, *Bess W. Truman* (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 111, 118, for the brothers-in-law; "Family Mortgage from School Funds in an Illegal Amount," [Republican Campaign Pamphlet, 1944], James P. Kem Papers, Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri-State Historical Society of Missouri, mentions Vivian's last county job; Victor Messall to Edgar C. Faris, Jr., 28 September 1935, SVP, documents the arrangements to move Vivian from that job to one with the Federal Housing Authority during Truman's first year in the Senate.

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faced a new challenge. When he appeared before his artillery battery to assume command in July 1918, he was by his own admission so badly frightened that his knees trembled and he was unable to do more than blurt out an order of dismissal. Appearing before a carefully planned meeting of veterans called to launch his first campaign for county office in 1922, he could only stammer a few words of thanks. When he went to the U.S. Senate in 1935, he had outgrown this phase of stage fright, but he still managed to attract attention with his ostentatious self-depreciation and humility.[20]

He seemed to develop considerably greater confidence in his powers after he had become one of the most respected of senators in World War II, but he reverted to widely publicized professions of inadequacy during his early months in the presidency. Once again, he began a difficult recovery of self-esteem that reached its apex after his upset election victory in 1948. As is frequently the case in such mood reversals, however, he compounded the damage to his personal image by swinging too far in the other direction. "Instead of his original humble attitude," wrote *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* correspondent Raymond P. Brandt in April 1950, "he is almost arrogant at times, telling visitors that he knows more about the budget, China, and national security than anybody else." The earlier humility had at least evoked considerable sympathy; much of the public found the new attitude unattractive.[21]

The Need for Recognition and the Persistence of Resentment

Despite evident efforts to overcome it, he remained a remarkably thin-skinned individual, psychologically vulnerable to the personal attacks and routine mudslinging that characterizes most political campaigns. "I won the dirtiest and hardest fought campaign Eastern Jackson Co. has ever seen," he wrote to his cousin Ralph just after his first Democratic primary. It was a comment indicative of the toll campaigning took on him. In one try for office after another, he tended to consider himself uniquely a victim of dirty politics, although it is doubtful that the tactics and rhetoric of his opponents were any nastier than those of his supporters. The depths of Truman's feelings run throughout his private papers, but are perhaps nowhere better expressed than in a comment from a preamble he wrote, but did not deliver, for his 1949 State of the Union address. It asserted that because of his decision to back a liberal domestic program in the fall of 1945, "a campaign of villification, misrepresentation and falsehood was inaugurated against me unequaled in the history of the country—I might say in the history of the world." From such a perspective, political campaigns were something more than a clash of parties or politics; they were quests for personal vindication against character assassins.[22]

[20] HST to Bess Wallace, 4 November 1913, FBP; *Jackson Examiner*, 10 March 1922; HST, "Military Career of a Missourian," SVP; HST, *Memoirs*, I, 142–43; William P. Helm, *Harry Truman: A Political Biography* (New York: Duell, Sloane and Pearce, 1947), 7; *Kansas City Star*, 14 April 1935.

[21] Raymond P. Brandt, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 23 April 1950.

[22] HST to Ralph Truman, 6 August 1922, Truman Papers, Post-Presidential File—Family Corre-

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He was equally thin-skinned about his family throughout his career, especially toward any embarrassment involving the women in it. His off-and-on relationship with the *Kansas City Star* became one of lasting enmity when it prominently featured the foreclosure of the mortgage on his mother's farm in 1940. He consciously shielded his wife from the political world and overreacted to almost any remark that could be construed as a criticism of her. During his presidency, he barred Clare Booth Luce and Adam Clayton Powell from the White House and nearly declared a Soviet ambassador *persona non grata*, in each case because of insults, real or imagined, to Bess Truman. He considered most of the negative comment on his daughter's singing voice to be in reality a mean-spirited attempt to get at him.[23]

He felt much the same way about criticism of his friends. At the time he appointed young Dr. Wallace Graham his White House physician, he told Graham to expect the worst in personal attack. He was even convinced that his old buddy and military aide, Harry Vaughn, was being used as a whipping boy by various critics really interested in attacking the president. He was hypersensitive to alleged bureaucratic mistreatment of friends and appointees. He reacted with anger when criticism of various other functionaries developed during the intermittent "Truman scandals" of his second term. Emotionally incapable of making distinctions between charges that possessed some substance and those that did not, he vehemently personalized criticism of those connected to him.[24]

Yet for all his loyalty to family and friends he was suspicious of many others with whom he associated, sometimes very closely. At times he harbored a concealed hostility toward them. On a strictly rational basis it is hard to explain his disenchantment with Victor Messall, his first congressional aide, who also served him as a political adviser, investment counselor, rental agent, and 1940 campaign manager. A smooth Washington operative who also knew his way around the world of Missouri politics, Messall was an able man and loyal enough to run his chief's hard campaign for renomination without pay. Shortly afterwards, Truman eased him out of his job. He privately told one close friend that he suspected his aide of pocketing campaign contributions, but there seems to have been no evidence

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spondence (includes some material from earlier years given to HST after Ralph Truman's death). See also HST to Chief of Staff, 102nd Division, 2 August 1924, explaining failure to report to Reserve camp ("I am in the midst of the hottest and dirtiest campaign. . . ."), Army Personnel Records of HST; and HST's characterization of his 1940 primary campaign to his physician at the Army-Navy hospital in Hot Springs, 17 June 1941, ibid., discussed below. [HST], "Members of the 81st Congress. . . ." [1949], PSF.

[23] Burrus interview; Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1977), 147–48; Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking*, 198; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 149–50; HST to Martha and Mary Jane Truman, Post-Presidential Papers—Memoirs File. On Margaret and the music critics, see, for example, HST to Mary Jane Truman, 26 August 1947, ibid., and Margaret Truman File, PSF-Personal, esp. HST to Margaret Heggie, 20 December 1950.

[24] See HST to Maj. Gen. Raymond Bliss, 29 January 1949; HST to Cliff R. Johnson, 13 February 1948; HST to Shannon Douglass, 16 February 1949; HST, Memo to Charles B. Henderson, 13 December 1945; HST to Gen. Lewis A. Pick, 25 July 1952—all in PSF.

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for the allegation beyond sloppy bookkeeping in an office for which Messall was not responsible. It appears more likely that Messall had to move on because he had clashed with Harry Vaughn and especially because he saw himself too obviously as the person who had made the senator successful. He became a Washington lobbyist whose relationship with his former employer was superficially amiable but distant; he would play not the slightest role in the Truman presidency.

Hugh Fulton, the shrewd investigative attorney who managed the Truman committee and played a key role in running Truman's vice-presidential campaign, suffered a somewhat similar fate. Despite wide expectations that he would be recalled from a newly-established private practice to become attorney general or White House counsel, Fulton was shut out of the Truman administration from the beginning. According to Margaret Truman, the new president resented Fulton's decision to put his former affiliation with the committee on his business card and reacted strongly to questionable gossip that Fulton was exaggerating his influence with the White House.

Bernard Baruch, the famous financier and political dabbler, was another supporter who became a target of Truman's anger. Baruch's $4,000 contribution made a big difference in Truman's desperate, cash-starved 1940 Senate primary campaign. Truman's attitude toward Baruch, however, appears to have quickly become one of ill-concealed resentment, finally developing into open wrath when the old man refused to be his chief fundraiser for the 1948 presidential campaign. The immediate source of Truman's attitude was, to use a word that Truman often employed, Baruch's "egomania." By all accounts, Baruch was a man with an insatiable ego and an unquenchable thirst for public recognition. It was hardly odd that Truman was annoyed by the rituals of praise that he expected; the president was after all the product of a culture that had little use for them. Still, as much as Truman disliked manipulative stroking, he managed to deal with many other egomaniacs without a public explosion. What probably really galled him was the fact that he had been forced to take money from Baruch.

In truth, Truman's own ego, like that of many politicians, was at once fragile and somewhat avaricious. Messall and Fulton appear to have been guilty of little more than wanting a bit of credit for the genuinely important roles they played in Truman's political ascent. Truman, for his part, seems to have considered such desires a raid on his reputation; he found it difficult to share credit. He took Baruch's casual refusal of a political request as a personal insult. In each case he may have resented feelings of indebtedness that ate into his sense of self-reliance.[25]

[25] For examples of Truman's rage at county associates, see the Pickwick Memos. For Messall, see Messall to HST, 19 August 1938, Truman Papers, SVP; HST to Bess Truman, 29 August 1940, 21 June 1943, FBP; Tom Evans, Oral History, 272–77, HSTL; Daniels, *Man of Independence*, 225. (Daniels comments in his notes on his interview with Messall that Messall seemed to believe that he had made Truman what he was. Daniels Papers, University of North Carolina. [Copies of materials for *Man of Independence* at HSTL.]) For Fulton, see Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman*, 215. For Baruch, see HST to Bess Truman, 15 June 1946 (FBP), 7 June 1950 (PSF); HST, Diary, 6 May 1948, PSF; HST to Bernard Baruch, 31 August 1948, in Hillman, *Mr. President*, 39.

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Perhaps most surprising was Truman's constant suspicion of the press—not just of Republican publishers but of the working newsmen with whom he usually seemed on the best of personal terms. His private letters reveal considerable distrust of the entire White House press corps; and the public record displays many clashes with them, even if these later would be forgotten in the Truman nostalgia of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1952 an editorial cartoonist won the Pulitzer Prize with an effort that depicted an angry president confronting a group of reporters and telling them: "Your editors ought to have more sense than to print what I say!"[26]

The Need to Command

One way in which Truman frequently satisfied a need to display his command was to strike a pose of decisiveness at press conferences. He seldom waffled, spoke off the record, or resorted to "no comment," even when it would have been highly prudent to do so. The result was a stack of gaffes and misstatements that seemed amply to justify the Pulitzer cartoon of 1952. Some were funny, as when he heartily endorsed a candidate in a 1946 Missouri congressional primary, cited a lifelong friendship with him, and then was unable to come up with the man's first name. Some were politically damaging, as when he adopted a questioner's phrase, "red herring," to describe the early accusations against Alger Hiss. Some were diplomatically serious, as when he brought British Prime Minister Clement Attlee scurrying to Washington after implying (apparently inadvertently) that nuclear weapons might be used in the Korean War. Instead of establishing the image of control which he sought, these gaffes contributed to an impression of incompetence that was not warranted.[27]

Truman's need to feel in command was so strong that he could never quite bring himself to accept the fact that even as president of the United States he had to rely on the other-directed political skills of persuasion, accommodation, and conciliation. From time to time he could joke about it in a matter-of-fact fashion, as he (rather fallaciously) did in speaking of his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower: "He'll sit right here, and he'll say do this, do that! And nothing will happen. Poor Ike—it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating." Eisenhower, a man of substantial manipulative skills, seems to have found it less so than did Truman. Truman's naval aide, Admiral Robert Dennison, recalled years later: "I have been with the president on occasions when he had what appeared to me to be a perfectly normal and amiable conversation with a caller. After the caller left, he would say to me, in effect, 'I certainly set him straight,' or 'I let him have it.'

[26] *New York Times*, 6 May 1952. See also HST to Henry Grady, 18 November 1952, HST Papers, Post-Presidential—Memoirs.

[27] For the press conference gaffes cited, see the following volumes in the *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman* series: (hereafter *PPP*) *1946*, 352; *1948*, 432–33; *1950*, 727. The press conferences apparently developed into yet another source of stress for Truman. In 1949, he remarked to a stenographer, "I am getting so I dread these press conferences." Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., *Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), 170.

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The president's remarks seemed to me to have no conceivable relation to the conversation I had just heard."[28]

Dennison did not realize that he was describing what had become a common behavioral pattern by the time Truman reached the White House: the smiling, friendly conversation that smoothed over or failed to touch upon some difficulty with another person, then the surging feelings of aggression when that individual was out of range, at times discharged orally to a third party, at other times committed to paper in the form of an angry memorandum or letter that often was filed and forgotten but occasionally made its way to the addressee. Enough such missives, often directed to people with whom Truman had a friendly relationship, have been discovered in his presidential papers to provide the material for a small book.[29]

Occasionally, the characteristic surfaced in ways that affected his presidency. The most famous example was a product of his irritation with Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who displayed both a lack of deference and a lone-ranger negotiating style. A little more than four years after Byrnes had left the administration, apparently on excellent terms with the president, Truman, still in the White House, allowed the publication of a document designed to show how he had reined in his freelancing subordinate. A long written statement he claimed to have read to Byrnes, it sharply criticized both the conduct and substance of his policy toward the Soviet Union. A few years later in his *Memoirs*, Truman asserted that a sharp oral reprimand a few days earlier had preceded the document.

In both instances, Byrnes angrily and in the opinion of most scholars, accurately, disputed Truman's account of what had transpired between them. That Truman wrote his statement at the time seems certain, that he read it word for word to Byrnes seems very doubtful. Most likely, he made his concerns known in his customary mild and conciliatory fashion, after having put his emotions on paper. Truman's sincerity is not the question; almost certainly, he really believed his account. His need to demonstrate mastery over Byrnes, with whom he had a difficult personal and political relationship, had become so great that he allowed his mind to refashion reality. Several years later, he told Merle Miller an even more dubious story of how he had dressed down General Douglas MacArthur at their Wake Island conference in October 1950.[30]

[28] Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman*, 551–52; Francis Heller, ed., *The Truman White House: The Administration of the Presidency, 1945–1953* (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1980), 138.

[29] For a couple of early examples of Truman's delayed action fury, see Gaylon Babcock, Oral History Memoir, 8–12, HSTL; and Olive Truman, "1934 Senatorial Campaign," 9 June 1964 (manuscript memo), Harry Truman Papers, HSTL. The "small book" is Poen, ed., *Strictly Personal and Confidential.*

[30] For the Byrnes-Truman relationship and subsequent argument over the written reprimand, see especially Robert L. Messer, *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), esp. chaps. 9, 12. See also Hillman, ed., *Mr. President*, 20–23; HST, *Memoirs*, I, 550–52; James F. Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), 342–48, 399–403. Some years ago, Benjamin V. Cohen, counselor of the Department of State under Byrnes and probably his closest adviser, expressed to

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Truman's initial behavior with Byrnes was intelligent. It was probably a consciously calculated strategy, reinforced by a childhood experience of avoiding conflict at all costs. It was both rational and shrewd to deal with individuals, even cabinet officials, in a low-key fashion. Presidents seldom gain results by barking orders at men of Byrnes's caliber. Yet Truman seems to have felt that this was the way he *should* have behaved. The need to show the world who was boss seems at times to have been almost overwhelming. When Truman finally made his written memo public, he simply personalized deepening political differences with Byrnes over civil rights and the administration's liberal political agenda, thereby damaging his credit with the Southern Democrats at a time when he needed to unite his party.

Workaholism and Achievement

Perhaps most tellingly, Truman was a workaholic, a characteristic that Barber associates with the active-negative personality. A close look at the record of his entire life and especially at the presidential years reveals a man who attempted to compensate for deficiencies he perceived in himself through hard work and who consequently suffered periodic bouts of physical and psychological exhaustion.

As a schoolboy he labored so hard at his academic subjects and the piano that he had to quit his rather undemanding part-time job at Clinton's drug store. One of the keys to his success in the military was intense, mind-wearying, bone-numbing effort, whether in artillery school or in the battle of the Argonne. He approached politics with the same determination. His personal papers reveal that he found his work as chief executive of Jackson County difficult and wearing, especially during his Depression-era second term, when he had to institute budget cuts and layoffs. From time to time, he escaped from the pressure by staying overnight in downtown Kansas City as an unregistered guest at the Pickwick Hotel, where he wrote venom-filled diary memoranda to himself. He sought excuses to travel—in search of a model for new Jackson county courthouse, for example—largely to get away from the hard, demoralizing budget difficulties he faced.[31]

His Senate years display an even more ominous pattern—periodic bouts of exhaustion that led to hospital stays. In 1937, at about the time it was becoming clear that there was a break between the Pendergast machine and Governor Lloyd Stark in Missouri, Truman began to develop "severe headaches and [a] sense of being continually tired."[32] Nausea and vomiting became a frequent problem. Doctors at the naval hospital in Washington could find little wrong with him. In September, he checked into the Army-Navy hospital at Hot Springs, Arkansas, for a more thorough examination. It was the first of three or four visits to Hot Springs over

me his conviction that Byrnes would have resigned at once had Truman subjected him to a word-for-word reading of the handwritten statement. For the MacArthur story, see Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking*, 315.

[31] Pickwick Memos, Post-Presidential File; HST to Bess Truman, 12 February 1931, FBP.

[32] Physician's interview with HST, 13 September 1937, Medical Records, Truman Army Personnel Records.

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the next six years. Always, the basic diagnosis was the same: the patient's physical symptoms were hard to trace to a root cause and rarely seemed susceptible to treatment by drugs. The doctors recommended increased exercise for what appeared to be flabby heart muscles. On one occasion, they gave him a prescription for new eyeglasses; on another, a thyroid supplement; on a third, moderate doses of phenobarbital, apparently meant to serve as a tranquilizer. In general, however, their findings were unvarying: he had normal, healthy cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, and genito-urinary systems. Rest, relaxation, and exercise seemed the basic need.

Truman himself at various times either implied or asserted to others that the source of his problem was overwork and stress. In 1941 his interview with a physician at Hot Springs stressed his "strenuous campaign" for the Senate in 1934 and the way in which his early attacks of nausea "usually were associated with a particularly strenuous day of work." The physician's report continues:

> Last year he ran for reelection and had a particularly fatiguing campaign . . . in which a great deal of villification was hurled at him by nearly all the papers of his state. The attack on him affected him and caused him much mental anguish. His symptoms increased more than ever from this time on. In the last few months there has been an increased amount of activity in the Senate and the patient has been most actively engaged not only with his duties but also with those of others who have been away or have been sick. . . . he felt he would be unable to continue his present pace. He has come to this hospital for the purpose of a general survey of his physical condition and for the purpose of rest.[33]

Truman's description of his plight to this military doctor tells us much about him. There is the account of his exhausting effort, whether as a campaigner or a senator, the implied complaint about having to assume the duties of others (a frequent theme in his correspondence with his wife), the private reaction to the "villification" he had been forced to endure. Outwardly a man who took the heat unflinchingly, he was inwardly remarkably vulnerable to political name-calling. Bereft of a family heritage, childhood, or nonpolitical civilian adult experience that might provide him a sense of inner security, he was driven to prove himself through hard work.

It is hardly surprising that the presidency amounted to an extension of this syndrome. Upon becoming White House physician in mid-1945, Graham discovered he had a patient with a mild pulmonary edema (lung congestion), a tendency toward overwork, and a disposition ill suited to the stresses of his office. Graham's prescription was fundamentally the same as those of other physicians — adequate rest and exercise. Truman's frequent Key West vacations and his many weekends on the Potomac in the presidential yacht need to be understood not simply as the excursions of a fun-loving chief executive; they possessed a vital medical purpose. The early morning walks and the less well-known hours in the White House swim-

[33] Ibid., 27 June 1941.

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ming pool served the same function. So did evening and weekend poker games with cronies and political associates.[34]

Still, Harry Truman could neither escape the difficult times of the postwar era nor abandon his own basic impulses. He habitually carried armloads of work up to his living quarters in the evenings, some of it of course necessary, some of it assuredly not. He could not abandon the urge to immerse himself in detail; he took pride, for example, in his mastery of the federal budget. Nor could he evade the stresses and strains of domestic partisanship and foreign turbulence. Indications of exhaustion and occasional despair dot his years in the White House. What indeed did his vaunted ability to fall asleep as soon as his head hit the pillow indicate, if not extreme tiredness? In February 1948 he told his sister why he needed a scheduled week in Key West: "I'm so tired and bedeviled I can't be decent to people." In March 1951, Assistant Press Secretary Roger Tubby privately described Truman, weighed down by McCarthyism, domestic scandals, and setbacks in the Korean War as "burdened and psychologically worn." Surely, he was; to have been the smiling, bouncy optimist he liked to appear would have been to be abnormal.[35]

An Active-Positive/Negative Personality and the Burden of Leadership

For all his hidden discontent and public outbursts, Truman was reasonably successful in dealing with the stresses that beset him. Above all, he was a person of considerable recuperative powers, capable of bouncing back from senatorial fatigue after a week or so in a military hospital and calling his stay there a "remarkable rest" or a fine vacation. Clearly, he possessed some understanding of the psychological basis of his physical complaints and took a healthy attitude toward it. If he was too prone to indulge in impolitic public outbursts, he also frequently used pen and paper to achieve a private catharsis. Well-known now but happily invisible then were his many unsent letters and diary memoranda in which he hanged John L. Lewis or nuked the Russians before returning to the real world of politics and diplomacy. Neither a humorous eccentricity nor evidence of dangerous instability, those impulsive jottings are best understood as artifacts of a constructive do-it-yourself therapy.[36]

In an oft-quoted remark, Sam Rayburn once described Truman as right on all the big things, wrong on all the little ones. A shrewd assessment, it also provides useful insights into the way Truman channeled his anger. When he was unable to confine himself to outbursts on pieces of private paper, he lashed out at secondary targets such as the press. At other times, he used his rage as an effective

[34] Author's interview with Wallace Graham, 26 August 1985.

[35] On Truman's tendency to work late, see, *Memoirs*, I, 27, 35, 59, 63, 294. On his mastery of the federal budget, see his annual press conferences on the presidential budget proposals to Congress, *PPP 1946*, 374–84. Truman quote in HST to Mary Jane Truman, 11 February 1948, Truman Papers, Post-Presidential File – Memoirs; Tubby quote in Donovan, *Tumultuous Years*, 334.

[36] Medical Records, Truman Army Personnel File; "Longhand Notes" File, PSF.

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political weapon, most notably in his incessant denunciation of the 80th Congress during the 1948 campaign, a tactic that was effective because it was not just political rhetoric but was passionately felt. In other instances, as with Byrnes, his combativeness was counterproductive. In the last couple of years of Truman's presidency, it seemed increasingly unattractive to large segments of the public and enhanced the bland, healing appeal of Eisenhower.

What Truman did *not* do was to make spur-of-the moment decisions on the basis of personal emotions, although he often implied he did. In 1961, for example, he told television producer Robert Alan Aurthur that the story of his decision to intervene in Korea would require about a ten-second documentary: "I said, 'Dean, we've got to stop the sons-of-bitches no matter what.' And that's all there is to it." Roy Jenkins captures the prevalent impression very well when he writes: "If [Herman] Goering, when he heard the word culture, reached for his gun, Truman, when he heard the word problem, reached for a decision."

Actually, every major decision of his presidency – Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, NATO, the H-bomb, the Korean intervention, the dismissal of MacArthur – was the product of careful political or diplomatic planning and group consensus, not individual whim. The man who liked to present himself as a quick decision maker was actually slow and cautious on the big things. Oddly, he cultivated an image that damaged his claims to public respect and leadership, thereby adversely affecting his presidency in an intangible but widely perceived fashion.[37]

This article has emphasized some lesser known aspects of Truman's personality, but it is not an attempt to declare him a paranoid-schizophrenic fit for commitment to an historiographical psychiatric institution. On the important matters, he was a rational decision maker who displayed a good mind and measured judgment. At his relaxed best, he was a person of considerable charm and reflectiveness. Some of his suspicions and hostilities appear unfounded, but his wariness of the press and of numerous associates throughout his career was far from paranoid. As Fred Greenstein has observed, "an effective president cannot afford to be as naively gentle and open as a progressive nursery school teacher. . . . a 'realistic' quota of guardedness and suspicion is undoubtedly necessary for carrying out the presidential role unless the president construes his responsibilities in a highly non-activist fashion."

Truman's dispute with James Byrnes appears to have been outside Greenstein's realistic quota, but other concerns were well within it. He was constantly alert for possible encroachments on the powers of his office from such officials as James Forrestal, who at various times suggested a cabinet "secretariat," attempted to initiate a series of informal cabinet lunches, and seemed bent on taking over the new

[37] Robert Alan Aurthur, "The Wit and Sass of Harry S. Truman," *Esquire*, August 1971, 62–67, 115–18, quote at 66; Roy Jenkins, *Truman* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 164. For good overviews of the decisions mentioned, see the relevant chapters in Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis* and *Tumultuous Years*.

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National Security Council. Truman may or may not have misjudged Forrestal's intentions, but his concerns were hardly irrational. Nor did they ever become a matter of personal bitterness in the manner of his differences with Byrnes.[38]

Was Truman "neurotic"? Certainly, he carried a fair amount of generalized anger looking for a target, and on occasions he misdirected it. All the same, his public missteps and private rages do not add up to neurosis in the classical sense of seriously dysfunctional compulsive-obsessive behavior. He would have been well advised to show greater restraint in numerous instances, but he acted in a reasonably normal fashion for a man of his time, social class, and physical limitations. The crucial point is that the presidency, a position of enormous stress, requires an unusually stable temperament, an asset denied to Truman—and to most of us—by the sum of his experiences prior to achieving the office. A president with such extraordinary self-assurance and self-control as Franklin Roosevelt could respond effectively to personal attack and high pressure by dismissing his critics as abusers of his little dog, Fala. Truman, like the ordinary American, was more prone to lash out with an ill-considered characterization such as "S.O.B." or a physical threat, as in his promise to beat up music critic Paul Hume.

Some of the sources of Truman's personality were those which psychologists customarily probe—relationships with parents, siblings, and peers that apparently created a negative self-image. But in other respects, Truman exhibited the typical experience of the American democrat, the person born to no special station in life, possessing no extraordinary capabilities, having to construct an identity through his own efforts. The task, hard enough, was made even more difficult by his move into the insecurity of politics and a career path that brought him to one challenging new position after another. Tocqueville had sensed the precarious nature and low status of a democratic political career in the first third of the nineteenth century. A bit more than a hundred years later, the media age was dawning, casting an increasingly intense glare of public attention upon the presidency and adding to the inherent difficulties of coping with it. Truman faced the daily scrutiny of a growing White House press corps and the challenge of electronic modes of communication for which he possessed little flair.

One striking feature of the modern presidency (the office as it has existed since 1933) is the way in which so many of its occupants have been so obviously ill at ease with it. Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter all came from humble social origins and all won their first national recognition in politics. All pretty clearly felt uncomfortable with the presidency; all appear to have possessed a sense of identity that was not congruent with holding the highest office in the land. Truman in background and uneasiness bears many resemblances to them, but he coped with his responsibilities more successfully.

[38] Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics* (New York: Norton, 1975), xviii-xix. I have written of Truman's problems with Forrestal in "Harry S. Truman: Insecurity and Responsibility" in Fred I. Greenstein, ed., *Leadership in the Modern Presidency* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 60–61.

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Others, to be sure, have found the presidency less of an adjustment and of itself an inconsequential source of strain. The responsibilities of office and the intermittent need to make difficult, even tragic decisions weighed heavily on them from time to time, but they had no difficulty in envisioning themselves as president of the United States and in fact gloried in the role. Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy were born to wealth and status, groomed for leadership, and endowed with physical assets that facilitated their political careers. Dwight D. Eisenhower entered politics with the self-assurance, sense of command, and manipulative skills that had carried him to the pinnacle of military success. Ronald Reagan achieved wide public recognition and cultivated many talents indispensible to the practice of modern politics before embarking on a political career. In all these cases, the presidency could seem a logical extension of one's personality. In all, personal image was a distinct asset to leadership, frequently providing a "teflon effect" that compensated for policy failures. Harry Truman's personal image was seldom a net asset in his presidency, and teflon was a very scarce commodity in his White House. His successor, Eisenhower, was covered with layers of teflon—in no small measure because Ike had the self-discipline to confine his rages to private occasions and to project a constant public impression of steady, benign, and authoritative leadership.

To an ordinary American born in ordinary circumstances, the presidency could seem alien to one's identity and, above all, overly lofty for it. Democratic societies have a tendency to underscore such feelings rather than to ease them. Too frequently they make the path to power one of demeaning compromise with one's values, as was the case with Truman's alliance with the Pendergast machine. Too frequently they focus upon a leader's weaknesses rather than his strengths; Harry Truman was reminded on countless occasions that he was "too little" for the presidency.

Truman possessed many of the virtues of Harold Lasswell's ideal democrat—an "open ego" that sought out the friendship of others and was usually receptive to the honest advances of all; a tolerant, "multi-valued" disposition that enabled him to transcend many of the petty prejudices of his rural, Protestant upbringing; a "deep confidence in the benevolent potentialities of man"; and optimism about the future. Clearly, however, he fell short on one important criterion, "freedom from anxiety." Truman's anxiety about his identity was surely an impediment to effective leadership. He possessed a bit of the self-destructive attitude that Lasswell ascribes to "the respect-centered character":

> . . . he may react with wounded pride to fancied slights, and burn with fierce jealousies and resentments against those who receive the plaudits to which he fancies himself entitled, or against those from whom he believes that the plaudits ought to come. The respect-centered character is often disposed to poison human relations "by taking everything personally" and by needing a perpetual stream of reassurance about "how am I doing."[39]

[39] Lasswell, "Democratic Character," 495–505.

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Truman was not an extreme example of the type, but he harbored plenty of inner doubts about himself, however much he attempted to cover them up with ostentatious displays of confidence. He did not escape many of the manifestations of those doubts—hypersensitivity, workaholism, suspicion, generalized anger. He managed them in a way that was far from perfect but nonetheless displayed considerable psychic strength. Few politicians have worked more tirelessly or displayed more determination to overcome their apprehensions of inadequacy. None has been more successful in lending credence to our cherished myths of democratic politics.*

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The Reagan Administration and Coercive Diplomacy: Restraining More Than Remaking Governments

BRUCE W. JENTLESON

One of the highest priorities Ronald Reagan and his foreign policy team had when they came to office in 1981 was to break the United States out of what they considered its "Vietnam trauma" aversion to the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy. It wasn't so much that the Reagan administration wanted to engage in new wars as that it believed in the utility of limited military force as an integral part of a coercive diplomacy strategy for bringing political pressure to bear on America's adversaries.

Two conceptual distinctions are important in defining a coercive diplomacy strategy. First is the difference, as emphasized in the work of Alexander George, between coercive diplomacy and deterrence. Deterrence involves the use of threats and shows of force "to dissuade an opponent from doing something he has not yet started to do." Coercive diplomacy, however, uses threats and limited force to get an adversary "to stop short of his goal . . . [or] undo his action"—to stop what he or she has already started to do or to reverse what he or she already has done.[1] While any particular use of force may have both deterrent and coercive diplomacy objectives, it still is important for analytic purposes to make this distinction.

[1] Alexander L. George, et al., *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 24. Also see Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 69–78.

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Second is that coercive diplomacy is "not a military strategy at all but rather a political strategy." It involves using force in a "limited, selective manner . . . to induce the opponent to revise his calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict."[2] Costs are to be inflicted on the adversary, but of a type and magnitude more geared to influence his decision than to physically impose one's will upon him. "The activity of the military units themselves," as Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan state in their study, "does not attain the objective; goals are achieved through the effect of the force on the perceptions of the actor."[3] Coercive diplomacy thus is also distinct from what George calls a "quick, decisive military strategy," which "largely dispenses with threats, diplomacy or subtle modes of persuasion."[4] The invasions of Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) are recent examples more accurately seen as quick, decisive military strategies rather than coercive diplomacy.

Five principal cases of coercive diplomacy can be identified during the Reagan years: the 1982–1984 deployment of the Marines to Lebanon as part of the second Multinational Force (MNF); the military and diplomatic pressure against Libya, culminating in the 1986 bombing; the 1987–1988 reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers and deployment of the U.S. Navy against Iran in the Persian Gulf; and the military aid and covert assistance provided throughout the Reagan years to the Afghan mujaheddin and the Nicaraguan contras.[5]

In all these cases the Reagan strategy was more than deterrence but less than a quick, decisive military strategy. Military force was used, not just threatened, but it was kept limited and geared to political objectives. Those political objectives were of two basic types: the imposition of *foreign policy restraint* on an adversary engaged in aggression or other actions deemed threatening to the United States; and the engineering of *internal political change* within another state, whether in support of an existing government considered an ally or to overthrow a government considered an adversary. Both objectives were pursued to at least some degree in all five cases.

I make two principal arguments in this article. First, with respect to the success and failure of coercive diplomacy, the Reagan record shows it to have been a much more effective strategy for imposing foreign policy restraint (for example, forcing Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, containing Iran in the Persian Gulf, limiting Muammar el-Qaddafi's role in international terrorism) than for engineering internal political change (bringing the Afghan mujaheddin or the Nicaraguan contras to power, ending the Lebanese civil war, eliminating Qaddafi).

Second, this differentiated pattern of coercive diplomacy effectiveness is to be explained, both for the Reagan-era cases and more generally, by three sets of con-

[2] George, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 18.

[3] Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), 13.

[4] George, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 16–17.

[5] Two other cases—Kampuchea/Cambodia and Angola—also could be considered cases of coercive diplomacy, but the U.S. role was more limited than in the five cases selected.

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straints that vary with the two policy objectives: the *usability of military options*; the strength of the claim to *international legitimacy*; and the extent of *domestic political opposition* within the United States. All three sets of constraints tend to be less impinging for the foreign policy restraint objective than for the internal political change objective.

While stressing the significance of this basic pattern, I do not imply either decrees of failure or guarantees of success. On the one hand, strategies other than coercive diplomacy may be resorted to for overthrowing governments, as both the Grenada 1983 and Panama 1989 cases attest. There was nothing limited, selective, or inducing about thousands of American troops invading these small countries. Rather, in both cases the military action in and of itself achieved the U.S. objective: the adversaries were not just influenced; they were captured.

On the other hand, with respect to the foreign policy restraint objective, two limiting conditions are important to bear in mind. First, even when foreign policy restraint is achieved on immediate issues and threats, there is no assurance that more generalized foreign policy restraint will follow. Getting an adversary to cease aggression today is no small achievement, but it does not necessarily mean that he also will desist tomorrow.

Second, however critical the immediate objective may appear, coercive diplomacy must not be overplayed. Alliances of convenience, following the balance of power dictum "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," often are struck—as, for example, the Reagan administration did with Iraq against Iran. But strategists must be conscious—as the Reagan and Bush administrations before 2 August 1990 were not—of the risks of going too far in such relationships, of making them too unconditional, and of fixating too much on the immediate objective to the exclusion of longer-term balancing and security considerations.

The Record of Reagan's Coercive Diplomacy

Two caveats are in order. First, the case summaries presented herein are necessarily synopses, not in-depth analyses, the unavoidable trade-off in a comparative case study between the level of detail and the degree of generality. Second, the assessments of success and failure are conscious of the problems of both net assessment and attribution. I have tried to take into account the economic, political, and societal costs incurred, even when the policy objectives may have been achieved. I also have considered the fact that U.S. policy is never the only force at work in any situation and thus should not be overcredited for success or overblamed for failure.

Afghanistan

The best example of the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy for foreign policy restraint comes from the Afghanistan case. In fact, from an historical perspective the concessions the Soviet Union made in the April 1988 Geneva Accords amounted

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to more than just foreign policy restraint. They were an unprecedented reversal of policy. Never before had the Red Army retraced its footsteps and withdrawn from a country it had invaded. Moreover, it did so on terms that hardly could be considered favorable. The length of the troop withdrawal period was both shortened and front-loaded. The Soviets conceded symmetry to the United States, allowing American military aid to the mujaheddin as long as Soviet aid to the Kabul regime continued. They also did not get any guarantees about the character or composition of a post-occupation Afghan government.

To be sure, a large share of the credit for the Soviet withdrawal unquestionably must go to the United Nations and in particular Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordovez for his mediating and facilitating role throughout the six years of on-and-off negotiations. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev also had his own reasons linked to his domestic and broader foreign policy agenda for ending what he himself called "this bleeding wound." But American military aid to the mujaheddin made sure the bleeding couldn't be stanched. As concluded in a report by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Soviet decision to withdraw was heavily influenced by "the ability of the Afghan mujaheddin to continue and increase their military opposition. . . . Fundamental to this improvement was a significant increase in military supplies to the rebels."[6] American aid increased from only $30 million in 1983 to over $600 million by 1987. Moreover, beginning in mid-1986, it included the shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missiles, later assessed by the Pentagon as "the war's decisive weapon."[7] Thus, while other factors and forces entered in, the Reagan administration had a genuine claim to a substantial share of the credit for the restraint/reversal in Soviet policy.

American policy has been much less successful, however, in its efforts to depose the Najibullah regime and bring the mujaheddin to power. Around the time of the final withdrawal of Soviet troops in February 1989, the CIA made bold predictions that it was only a matter of when, not if, the Najibullah regime would fall and the mujaheddin would triumph. However, while Najibullah has proven to be as unpopular as advertised – there have been at least two coup attempts, including one in March 1990 by his defense minister – the mujaheddin have been weakened by their own military failures and politico-religious factionalism. Soon after the Soviet withdrawal, they suffered a major military setback in their siege of Jalalabad. And from the outset, the interim government proclaimed in February 1989 has remained a shell without any real authority, unable to assert control even over its own ostensibly constituent groups.[8] The concern expressed by one State Depart-

[6] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1987–88* (London: IISS, 1988), 135.

[7] The U.S. Army report has not been officially released, but was leaked in the *Washington Post*, 5 July 1989.

[8] The difficulties of the interim government in asserting its control were exemplified by a report in the *Washington Post*, 24 July 1989, about Finance Minister Hedayat Amin-Arsala, who "operates from a hotel room in Peshawar . . . with a staff of volunteers and furniture partly paid for from his own pocket."

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ment official that the struggle among the mujaheddin factions "may make Lebanon look like child's play"[9] was graphically underlined in July 1989 when fighters loyal to Gulbuddin Hekmatyr and his fundamentalist Hezb-i-Islami faction ambushed and murdered thirty leaders of a rival group. "In recent months," one observer reported, "so much of the rebel groups' energies have been expended in fighting among themselves that outsiders have been left to wonder if anything united them other than their resolve to rid Afghanistan of Soviet troops." Things got so bad that in February 1990 the Bush administration suspended its $30 million food aid program, because the food was "being stolen or sold to the Soviet-backed Afghan government."[10]

Thus, while coercive diplomacy worked when the principal objective was Soviet foreign policy restraint, it has failed as a strategy for reconstituting the internal Afghan political order. Quite to the contrary, with the Russians gone and the mujaheddin raging their own internecine warfare, "many Afghans have begun to see the United States in a new guise, as a distant power that sanctioned the routine killing of civilians."[11] By early 1990 the Bush administration had initiated a major policy reassessment, questioning whether a more political and less military strategy was now needed.[12]

Persian Gulf Reflagging

The 1987–1988 Persian Gulf reflagging and naval deployment case has been characterized elsewhere as an "extended deterrence" strategy, and a failed one at that.[13] When force is used to persuade an adversary to call off an action already initiated, as distinct from dissuading some presumably contemplated but not yet initiated action, the strategy is more accurately characterized as coercive diplomacy than deterrence of any form. This was the case in the Reagan Persian Gulf strategy. The Iran-Iraq war *already* had been going on for over seven years. Iran *already* was attacking Kuwait, both its shipping and its territory. Iran also *already* had been involved in efforts to foment Islamic fundamentalism and destabilize such key regional allies as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. And the Iranian imprint *already* was undeniably there in the hostage-taking by the Islamic Jihad and Hizbollah in Lebanon.

[9] Quote as reported on National Public Radio, "Morning Edition," report by Anne Garrels, 11 January 1989.

[10] John F. Burns, "Misery Replaces Hope in a Battered Afghanistan," *New York Times*, 17 December 1989; Steve Coll and James Rupert, "U.S. Suspends Food Aid to Afghan Rebels in Dispute over Thefts", *Washington Post*, 15 February 1990.

[11] John F. Burns, "Afghans: Now They Blame America," *New York Times Magazine*, 4 February 1990.

[12] Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker to Propose New Afghan Deal During Soviet Trip," *New York Times*, 5 February 1990; Robert Pear, "U.S. Weighs Shift in Afghan Policy," *New York Times*, 14 January 1990; Zalmay Khalilzad, "Ending the Afghan War," *Washington Post*, 7 January 1990.

[13] Janice Gross Stein, "The Wrong Strategy in the Right Place," *International Security* 13 (Winter 1988/89): 142–67.

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There were many flaws in the Reagan strategy, in particular with the overtilt toward Iraq. It also may well be that had the Reagan administration not self-inflicted the Iran-contra and arms-for-hostages fiascos, some alternative strategy could have been better pursued. And while stopping short of overattributing credit to the exclusion of such other actors as the United Nations, the Reagan policy nevertheless does warrant an ample share. The presence of the U.S. Navy and its demonstrated willingness to meet Iranian provocations with both retaliatory and preventive military actions was key to keeping the sea lanes open while the war dragged on. It also provided Kuwait and other gulf states with at least a degree of protection from Iranian attacks, and in the process kept the Soviet role and presence limited. Only slightly more than a year after the reflagging operation began, it was a beleaguered Iran that agreed to a UN monitored ceasefire with Iraq on virtually the same terms it had previously rejected.

The strategy was not, however, cost-free, even in the immediate term. The costs were both budgetary (an estimated $250 million) and human, most especially the innocent lives lost in the accidental attacks by an Iraqi warplane on the USS *Stark* in May 1987 and by the USS *Vincennes* on a civilian Iran Air flight in July 1988. Moreover, as Janice Gross Stein rightly stresses, at a number of points the Reagan administration ran substantial risks "of becoming trapped in a process of escalation it could not control."[14] Nevertheless, it managed to avert such a trap and to keep the costs limited, while coercing Iran into a substantial and significant degree of foreign policy restraint.

Contrary to many hopes if not expectations, this did not lead to more generalized moderation in Iranian foreign policy. Blowing up a civilian airliner in midair, as Iran is alleged to have done to Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988, is not foreign policy moderation.[15] Nor was pronouncement of a death sentence against the foreign author of a book deemed offensive (Salman Rushdie, *The Satanic Verses*). Nor were the assassinations of dissident and opposition leaders in exile. Nor was the bomb placed under the minivan of Sharon Rogers of San Diego, California, wife of Will Rogers, U.S. Navy, captain of the USS *Vincennes*.

The major stab at engineering Iranian internal political change had come with the arms-for-hostages "opening to the moderates." That it was ill-conceived, among other things, is by now a given. In its wake, both in appearance and substance, the Reagan administration was very cautious about appearing to be meddling again in Iranian politics, although it hardly would have objected had the ayatollah been brought down during the Persian Gulf engagement. But he wasn't.

Following Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's death, many in the West were heartened when "the moderates" came out on top, with Ayatollah Ali Khameini chosen

[14] Ibid., 148.

[15] According to John Newhouse, "a widening consensus of experts inside and outside of government" believe Ahmed Jibril, leader of the splinter Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, to have been the perpetrator, with the Lebanese Hizbollah as the intermediary and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as the originator and contractor. John Newhouse, "Annals of Intelligence: Changing Targets", *New Yorker*, 10 July 1989, 71–82.

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as the new imam and Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani elected president. Whatever his own dispositions may be, Rafsanjani has continued to face the dilemma that foreign policy militancy still has domestic political utility. The Ayatollah Khomeini's legacy, as embodied in his last will and testament, was one "of fierce animosity to the West, a militant assertion of Iran's Islamic identity."[16] Thus, it is not just a matter of whether Rafsanjani keeps hold of power. In order to do so he must guard against being painted as violating the legacy of Khomeini. He surely has been conscious of this, for example, in his unwillingness to join the U.S.-led multinational coalition against the man and country against which Iran fought an eight-year war.

Libya

The principal objective of the April 1986 bombing raid against Tripoli and Benghazi was antiterrorism. By early 1986 terrorism had become "a growth industry."[17] The number of terrorist incidents was up 30 percent, the number of injuries about 80 percent, and the death toll almost 300 percent. Moreover, Americans were increasingly being targeted: a navy seaman killed during the June 1985 TWA hijacking, the elderly crippled Leon Klinghoffer thrown overboard the *Achille Lauro*, an eleven-year-old girl killed during the Christmas 1985 attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports, and then in early April 1986 the bombing of a West Berlin discotheque injuring 230 and killing two people, including an American soldier. Qaddafi was linked to a number of these incidents; in the West Berlin bombing, intelligence intercepts provided the veritable smoking gun. The Reagan administration later cited five other terrorist plots that had been thwarted but that also involved Qaddafi. There also were unconfirmed reports of plans by Qaddafi to launch a major terrorist campaign within the United States proper, including a plot to assassinate President Reagan.[18]

While far from a cure-all for the scourge of terrorism, the bombing of Libya had its impact in a number of ways. Qaddafi's operations and training centers were severely damaged. He himself was wounded in the attack, and for a time thereafter he appeared extremely disoriented. For nearly two years his role in terrorism fell off quite substantially. Moreover, in a more general antiterrorism sense, as stressed by RAND expert Brian Jenkins, the Libyan bombing "permanently altered the equation. Any nation contemplating terrorist action against the United States after April 15, 1986, had to take into account the possibility of American retaliation."[19] This obviously did not preclude all future terrorism, but it surely

[16] Shaul Bakhash, "What Khomeini Did," *New York Review of Books*, 20 July 1989, 17.

[17] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1985–86* (London: IISS, 1986), 19.

[18] Robert Oakley, "International Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (America and the World 1986): 617; Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 166–67, 181–87.

[19] Brian Jenkins, "Defense Against Terrorism", *Political Science Quarterly* 101 (No. 5/1986): 786.

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left the American threat to retaliate much more credible than if no action had been taken in the wake of such blatant aggression as the Berlin discotheque incident.

In addition, despite the immediate dispute with the NATO allies over their unwillingness to support the bombing raids (Britain excepted), the alliance came out with a stronger multilateral antiterrorism policy. A week after the bombing raids, the European Community foreign ministers issued a resolution condemning Libya, banning arms sales to it, and pledging to strengthen intelligence sharing, enforcement, and other antiterrorism collaboration. On 5 May, at the annual western heads of state summit, the seven leaders singled out Libya and pledged maximum efforts against it. In more concrete terms, approximately 500 Libyans (diplomats, other government officials, "students") were expelled from Western Europe. Oil imports were reduced, other contracts were canceled, and official credits were suspended by a number of European countries. Thus, while not endorsing the U.S. action per se, in their actions the Europeans followed the broader U.S. antiterrorism lead.

All of this was not without its costs. One bomber and its two-man crew were lost in action. An American diplomat in the Sudan and two American and one British hostage in Lebanon were murdered in retaliation. The death of one of Qaddafi's young daughters and the allegation that this was at its core an assassination attempt tarnished the U.S. claim to high moral ground. And over time Qaddafi reared his head anew. By 1988 he once again was heavily involved in terrorism, including a series of attacks "commemorating" the second anniversary of the 14 April bombing, including one planned for New York City through a Japanese operative who was fortuitously apprehended by a state trooper on the New Jersey Turnpike.

Then in late 1988 came the revelations that Qaddafi was building a chemical weapons plant. The course that this dispute ran illustrates both the scope and the limits of coercive diplomacy-imposed foreign policy restraint. On the one hand, when the Reagan administration threatened to bomb the Rabta plant, its record of having used military force against Libya made its threat a credible one. No one doubted that it might do so again—not the West German government, one of whose companies (Imhausen-Chemie) was identified as the outside contractor and not Qaddafi, who was not seen or heard publicly for two weeks at the height of the controversy. The Reagan threat had some effectiveness without having to be executed. However, in early 1990 intelligence reports indicated that construction had resumed and the Rabta plant was now in limited production. Shortly thereafter a mysterious fire ensued that was attributed to everyone from the CIA to the Israeli Mossad to West Germany to Qaddafi as a deceptive action. But many analysts still concluded that Libya now had at least a limited chemical weapons capacity.

It may well be that, as concluded in a CIA report, "no course of action short of stimulating Qaddafi's fall will bring any significant or enduring change in Libyan policies."[20] Seymour Hersh and Bob Woodward and Charles Babcock have traced

[20] A June 1984 top secret Vulnerability Assessment prepared by the CIA cited in Tim Zimmerman,

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a number of covert operations aimed at bringing Qaddafi down.[21] A joint invasion with Egypt was considered but rejected by the Mubarak government, which then also leaked the story. And whether or not it ever was made an explicit objective, had the April 1986 bombing raids played upon existing internal tensions within the Libyan military and spurred a coup, or had Qaddafi himself been a casualty, it would have been less than happenstance.[22] But none of these operations succeeded in carrying out or catalyzing internal political change. Qaddafi still was there.

Lebanon[23]

An important distinction needs to be made between the first and the second Multinational Forces (MNF), both of which included U.S. Marines. The first MNF was sent to Lebanon soon after the June 1982 Israeli invasion with its priority objectives more as peacekeeping than coercive diplomacy.[24] It succeeded in its objectives and even went home early. But the peace broke down within weeks, following the assassination of newly elected Christian President Bashir Gemayel and the retaliatory Sabra and Shatila refugee camp massacres. A second contingent of U.S. Marines was then dispatched to Lebanon as part of a second MNF.

The mission of the second MNF, while purported also to be peacekeeping, turned out to be much more one of coercive diplomacy. The formal mission statement issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff talked vaguely about "establish[ing] an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area."[25] What this really meant was getting the Syrians out of Lebanon and brokering internal reconciliation among Lebanese Christians and Muslims. In this mission, however, the Marines were much less successful—and met a much more tragic fate.

Part of the problem for the Reagan coercive diplomacy strategy was Syrian intransigence. Syrian President Hafez Asad and his forces, fully rearmed by the Soviet Union, were not about to be coerced out of Lebanon by the presence of a few hundred Marines. But while Syrian resistance would have been a formidable

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"The American Bombing of Libya: A Success for Coercive Diplomacy?" *Survival* 229 (May/June 1987): 207.

[21] Seymour M. Hersh, "Target Qaddafi," *New York Times Magazine*, 22 February 1987; Woodward, *Veil*, 364–68, 411–12, 417–20, 471–77.

[22] Edward Schumacher argues that it actually had the opposite effect of "strengthening him vis-à-vis his rivals inside the government" and "ruin[ing] any remaining chances of a military revolt." See his "The United States and Libya," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Winter 1986/87): 329–48.

[23] This section draws on my article, "The Lebanon War and the Soviet-American Competition: Scope and Limits of Superpower Influence" in Steven L. Spiegel, Mark A. Heller, and Jacob Goldberg, eds., *The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1988), 321–339.

[24] Marianne Heiberg and Johan Jorgen Holst, "Peacekeeping in Lebanon: Comparing UNIFIL and the MNF," *Survival* 28 (September/October 1986): 399–422.

[25] *Report of the Department of Defense Commission on Beirut International Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983* (hereafter cited as *Long Commission Report*), 20 December (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1983), 41.

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obstacle for any U.S. strategy, the flawed approach to internal reconciliation made the situation totally intractable. The Reagan administration liked to claim that "we support no faction or religious community, but we are not neutral in our support of the legitimate government of Lebanon."[26] Whatever the legalistic validity of such a position, the reality was that the United States was supporting the government of Amin Gemayel, and Gemayel was ruling more like the leader of a faction than the leader of the nation. It was in this respect that the National Salvation Front (NSF), formed with the Syrians by Druze, Shi'ite, and even disaffected Christian leaders, can be seen to have been motivated by much more than just shared opposition to the treaty signed by Gemayel with Israel. Rather, it was the product of the interaction—an all too potent synergy—between opposition to Israel, opposition to Gemayel, and increasingly opposition to the United States as the sponsor of both. Consequently, Reagan administration contentions notwithstanding, as the Pentagon's own investigative commission later concluded, "the image of the USMNF [Marines], in the eyes of the factional militia, had become pro-Israel, pro-Phalange, and anti-Muslim."[27]

When U.S. forces finally withdrew following the October 1983 bombing of their barracks, all the spin control about redeployment to offshore positions could not hide the reality of retreat and defeat. But it wasn't just that the United States had tried and failed, as in the old adage of nothing ventured, nothing gained. The prospects for Lebanese internal reconciliation were even dimmer than before. The Syrian position was even stronger. And as far as hostage takers were concerned, the United States was now a particularly inviting target. Not a single American had been taken hostage in Lebanon before July 1982; between 1984 and 1986, eighteen Americans were abducted. Moreover, as Oliver North would later recollect, it was out of desperation to free these hostages that the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran was concocted as "about the only way we can get the overall process moving."[28] The rest is history.

Nicaragua

Officially, the original rationale for supporting the contras was to impose foreign policy restraint on the Sandinistas in the interest of regional security: to interdict arms supplies to the leftist guerrillas in El Salvador, to check the Sandinista military build-up, to prevent a Soviet-Cuban beachhead. It became clear over time, however, that the driving objective was less foreign policy restraint than internal political change: in Ronald Reagan's own words, to get the Sandinistas "to say uncle." Of course, now that the Sandinistas actually have fallen, losing the presi-

[26] Statement by Under Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Policy Options in Lebanon*, Hearings, 98th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1984), 26.

[27] *Long Commission Report*, 41.

[28] *Report of the President's Special Review Board* (Tower Commission), 26 February 1987 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1987), B-36.

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dential election to the anti-Sandinista coalition led by Violeta Chamorro, former Reagan administration officials and other devotees of the contras have been quick to grab credit and claim vindication for the surrogate war they waged for almost a decade.[29] Such historical judgments require more serious and thorough analysis than provided thus far on the op-ed pages and talk shows or than can be provided in summary form herein. But in the context of the argument of this article, I want to raise three reservations about the claiming of credit for the Reagan policy.

First is the attribution problem. There are at least two other key claimants and thus alternative explanations. One is the Nicaraguan people. On 25 February 1990, they did what they might have done any number of times in the past had they been given the opportunity to vote in a genuinely free election (but which they weren't, in large part because of U.S. support and intervention on behalf of the Somoza family dynasty): they threw out a corrupt and repressive regime. The Sandinistas grossly mismanaged the economy and systematically and often brutally repressed political opposition. They also engaged in personal corruption and conspicuous consumption that may well have been the most infuriating factor for the masses in whose name the revolution had been made.[30] The vote in the 1990 election was anti-Sandinista, not pro-contra. The loser was Daniel Ortega. The winner was Violeta Chamorro, but not Adolfo Calero or Enrique Bermudez or Comandante Suicida.

The other strong claimant is Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sánchez and his peace plan. Granted, the military pressure from the contras was a factor in the Sandinistas' acquiescence to an election. But given that by the time of the election U.S. military aid to the contras had already been cut off for almost two years, and that U.S. domestic political realities made it highly unlikely that military aid would be resumed other than in the most extreme circumstances, this claim also is a weak one. The Arias peace plan, in contrast, provided the impetus and set the terms for the elections despite the Reagan administration having labeled it fundamentally flawed and having taken a number of actions intended to override if not undermine it.

But even if one were to accept some attribution for the Reagan policy, there remains the problem of factoring the costs incurred. There were, after all, thousands of Nicaraguans killed, wounded, displaced and whose lives were disrupted or shattered by the years of so-called low-intensity war. While there is no ready formula or model for such net assessments, they also cannot be ignored. Moreover, a realistic accounting must also include the toll taken on our own country. Here I mean less the budgetary costs than the political ones of bitter ideological warfare and especially the threats raised to the integrity of U.S. constitutional order

[29] Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Nicaragua: The Credit," *Washington Post*, 5 March 1990; International Security Council, "Nicaragua's Opportunity – and Ours," *New York Times*, 14 March 1990; John Felton, "In Washington, the Spin Patrol", *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 3 March 1990, 678.

[30] William Branigan, "House Hunting Is High Politics in Managua," *Washington Post*, 16 April 1990; "In the view of one diplomat, 'corruption was the big unspoken issue' of the recent election campaign . . . 'they [Sandinista leaders] hardly bothered to hide it.'"

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by the actions of Oliver North and Company. Finally and rather ironically, there were the missed opportunities along the way for progress on the regional security/foreign policy restraint issues that ostensibly were the official original rationale for supporting the contras, but for which a definite pattern of Reagan administration disinterest and evasiveness can be traced. Some examples:

- In early 1981, even before aid to the contras had begun, there was evidence (substantiated by, among others, CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman) that other coercive measures such as the suspension of foreign aid already were leveraging the Sandinistas into cutting back their arms supplies to the Salvadoran FMLN (Farabundo Martí Liberation Front).[31] As time went on, interdiction by the contras "became a joke," one State Department official observed, "as the contras grew without interdicting so much as a helmet liner."[32]
- In late 1983, in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the Sandinistas "took a series of unilateral steps addressing the security issues about which the United States had complained . . . and communicated to Washington that they . . . were seeking a reciprocal gesture." Instead, the war party within the Reagan administration did everything it could to undermine negotiations.[33]
- The following year, when the Contadora process appeared close to yielding an agreement on regional security, a National Security Council background paper boasted of having "trumped" the draft treaty.[34]
- While some dutiful public lip service was paid to the Arias Plan (it did, after all, win its author a Nobel Peace Prize), the Reagan administration did more to punish than reward President Arias's efforts. It held up foreign aid payments to Costa Rica, provided information that led to the arrest of an Arias political supporter on charges of drug money laundering (while ignoring allegations of even more egregious activities by contra leaders), and accused the Arias government of foreign aid mismanagement on the basis of an audit so filled with inaccuracies that the U.S. ambassador disowned it.[35] In sum, the Reagan claim to credit for Nicaraguan internal political change is at best a limited one, weakened by both the costs incurred and the opportunities foregone.

[31] Woodward, *Veil*, 115–22, 175–76; Robert A. Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 232–33; Christopher Dickey, *With the Contras* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 106.

[32] Frank McNeil, *War and Peace in Central America* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 153.

[33] William LeoGrande, "Rollback or Containment? The United States, Nicaragua and the Search for Peace in Central America," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986): 102–03; Roy Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua, 1981–1987* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 88, 170–72, 211; Constantine Menges, *Inside the National Security Council* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988).

[34] James Chace, "The End of the Affair?" *New York Review of Books*, 8 October 1987, 24; McNeil, *War and Peace in Central America*, 18, 31, 89, 204; LeoGrande, "Rollback or Containment?"

[35] McNeil, *War and Peace in Central America*, 18, 189, 204.

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Policy Objectives and the Constraints on Coercive Diplomacy

Usability of Military Options

The military requisite of coercive diplomacy as defined by Alexander George is that a state has the capacity to wield force in a "controlled, discriminating manner" while also raising the adversary's fear of unacceptable escalation. The foreign policy restraint objective has two advantages in this regard. First, as a more limited objective in political terms, it has a greater proportionality with the limited applications of military force. As George also states,

> the task of coercion is determined or set by the magnitude of the opponent's motivation not to comply and that this, in turn, is a function of his perception of what is demanded of him. Asking very little of an opponent makes it easier for him to permit himself to be coerced. Conversely, demanding a great deal of an opponent . . . makes the task of coercing him all the more difficult.[36]

In contrast, there is a disproportionality between the limited coercive means available and the more maximal political objective of remaking the internal politics of another country.

Second is the tactical advantage of a more favorable balance of relative vulnerability, which is defined as the ability to limit the exposure of American forces while being able to strategically target and expose the adversary's vulnerabilities. The foreign policy restraint objective is more readily pursued from a distance through surprise attacks and other limited forms of direct engagement. But the internal political change objective tends to require more open-ended commitments, either directly with American forces or through surrogates. Moreover, when it is power and not just policies at stake, whatever an adversary's vulnerabilities may be, the adversary is likely to be infused with a heightened willingness to bear the costs in the name of survival.[37]

The cases bear out these advantages and disadvantages. The success in getting the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan was possible only because usable military options existed. Proportionality was established at the outset by the American position of support for the forces of nationalism against the foreign intervener. It was sustained by, among other things, the handling of the Geneva negotiations in a manner that avoided backing the Soviets into a corner or stripping them of

[36] George, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 225, 24–25. Nor, for that matter, is this only true for a military mode of coercion. In their study of economic sanctions, for example, Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott found a substantially higher success rate in cases involving "modest policy changes" (41 percent) than with major policy changes (26 percent), *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Economics, 1985), 79–81.

[37] Andrew J. R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict" in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Power, Strategy and Security: A World Politics Reader* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 126–51; Steven Rosen, "War, Power and the Willingness to Suffer" in Bruce Russett., ed., *Peace, War and Numbers* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972), 167–84.

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all pretense of saving face, so that (paraphrasing George's terms) their perception of what was being demanded of them was not overbearing. The favorable balance of relative vulnerability came from the U.S. ability to limit its own exposure while, especially by 1986–87 with the Stinger missiles, effectively targeting the Soviet's vulnerabilities. "Before [the] Stinger," according to a classified U.S. Army report, "Soviet fixed and rotary wing aircraft always won the day." But armed with Stingers the mujaheddin downed 269 aircraft in 340 firings (a formidable 79 percent average), weakening the Soviets' ability to cut into the resistance's supply routes, attack their mountain strongholds, or provide air support for government outposts under attack.[38] The wound about which Gorbachev had expressed concern even before the Stingers now was bleeding profusely.

The same military options, however, have proven much less usable for the internal political change objective. In their effort to seize power from the Najibullah government, the mujaheddin no longer could rely on the guerrilla tactics they used so well to target Soviet vulnerabilities. They now had to fight in the more conventional style of an army trying to take cities such as Jalalabad, at which they were inexperienced, poorly trained, and themselves vulnerable. Moreover, they increasingly resorted to sieges, indiscriminate shellings, and other tactics that have alienated the civilian population. Both proportionality and relative vulnerability thus shifted unfavorably.

In Nicaragua, the uncle-saying objective to which the Reagan administration aspired was quite disproportionate to the limited military means at its disposal. The desire to acquire greater military means than Congress was prepared to appropriate, rather than scale back its political objectives, led the Reagan administration into the questionable and in some instances unconstitutional practices of Iran-contra arms dealings, of independent fund raising in wealthy conservative circles, and of quid pro quos with third party governments. The usable military options problem, though, was much more endemic than just a shortage of funds. Levels of funding aside, the contras showed themselves to be quite unreliable and ineffective as a military force. After one of his frequent trips to the field, Oliver North's courier Robert Owen complained that "there are few of the so-called leaders . . . who really care about the boys in the field. This has become a business to them." More aid, Owen told North, will be "like pouring money down a sinkhole."[39] As to the balance of relative vulnerability, American exposure was limited in that troops never were committed. But through the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the preparation of an "assassination" manual, the military build up in Honduras, the 1986 crash of American mercenary Eugene Hasenfus's supply plane, and numerous other incidents and activities of the CIA and their operatives, the American position was all too exposed. Thus, while the Sandinistas definitely had their vulnerabilities, the contras and the Reagan administration were not particularly adept at targeting them.

[38] *Washington Post*, 5 July 1989.
[39] Chace, "The End of the Affair?" 30.

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In Lebanon there also was a serious disproportion between the type of military commitments and both the nature and the depth of the political problems. This was true even with regard to the very idea that a program of professional training would be sufficient to depoliticize the Lebanese army. As Ze'ev Schiff has observed:

> The Lebanese Army can play a part in consolidating the power of the government only if a prior political agreement can be reached between the central government and at least one of the major confessional groups, in addition to the Christians. History shows that without that agreement the army crumbles when asked to fight either Shiites or Druze.[40]

Nevertheless, U.S. Defense Department officials contended that "dealing with Lebanese factional politics was not their job; they were simply to train the Lebanese to be good soldiers." State Department officials also begged off, claiming "they felt unqualified to do more than urge the Lebanese in a general sense to reconcile their factional politics."[41]

Moreover, the balance of relative vulnerability was immensely unfavorable. On the one side was an adversary(ies) who had the benefits both of terrorist tactics and of the willingness to sacrifice imbued by their fundamentalist zealotry. On the other side were the U.S. Marines at fixed positions while being limited to peacetime rules of engagement and carrying out an uncertain mission. Their original deployment had proceeded from the premise that they would be operating in a "relatively benign environment." Long before the 23 October 1983 barracks bombing, though, it should have been clear, as stressed in the Long Commission report, that "the environment could no longer be characterized as peaceful." The terrorism against the Marines was "tantamount to an act of war," yet they still were not "trained, organized, staffed or supported to deal effectively with the terrorist threat."[42] Thus, when the terrorist truck bomber attacked the Marine barracks in the middle of the night, he encountered sentries who, in accordance with their peacetime rules of engagement, were carrying unloaded weapons – exposed and vulnerable.

"A floating Beirut" was the dire warning sounded when the reflagging and naval operations first began in the Persian Gulf. But while the military operations did have quite a few flaws (not the least of which was lumbering into the gulf without minesweepers), this was another instance in which military force did prove usable for a foreign policy restraint objective. Proportionality was maintained by keeping the use of force limited largely to retaliatory and preventive attacks, and by targeting primarily offshore and coastal sites of military and economic value but with minimal civilian presence. The tactical advantage was solidified by the cooperative deployments by other western navies, minesweepers included. By 30 September 1987, some seventy European naval vessels had been deployed to the gulf by Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Each of these fleets was operating

[40] Ze'ev Schiff, "Dealing with Syria," *Foreign Policy* 55 (Summer 1984): 109–110.
[41] *New York Times*, 11 March 1984.
[42] *Long Commission Report*, 39–40, 87–92.

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under its own national command, but together they amounted to the largest international fleet assembled since the Korean War.

The balance of relative vulnerability also was quite favorable. The war with Iraq had been going badly for Iran for over a year, with the Basra offensive in particular having gained some land but at the expense of 45,000 casualties. The Iranian economy was in deep trouble. Crude oil exports were down to less than one million barrels a day; in fact, Iran was having to import some petroleum products. National income, at $15 billion as recently as 1985, had plummeted to $6.5 billion. Reports emanating from within Iran talked about foreign exchange reserves being depleted, unemployment and inflation both running high, and some food being rationed.[43] Thus, while the costs the United States incurred were not inconsequential, they still were far less than those borne by a nation already at war for over seven years, with staggering death tolls and an economy in deep crisis. Even the Ayatollah Khomeini could not continue to muster the fervor necessary to sustain the will to bear such costs.

In the Libyan case American air power demonstrated its usability. Prior to the April 1986 bombing raids, the Reagan administration flexed American air muscle against Libya. In 1981, in a skirmish over Libya's claim of a 100-mile boundary for its territorial waters, two F-14s shot down two Libyan Su-22s over the Gulf of Sidra. On 14 March 1986, as tensions were increasing over terrorism, three aircraft deliberately were sent over Qaddafi's proclaimed "line of death." On 24–25 March Libya launched six SAMs at American planes and sent its patrol boats to challenge U.S. ships. None were hit, but the American bombers took out a missile site at Sirte and the naval task force sunk a high speed missile patrol boat, killing fifty-six. The April 1986 bombing raids were of a much greater coercive magnitude, yet still kept controlled and limited. "The results of the strike," the Department of Defense reported, "met the established objectives. . . . [A]ll targets were hit and all targets received very appreciable damage." The targets were specific facilities in Tripoli and Benghazi revealed by intelligence to be key parts of Qaddafi's infrastructure for terrorist training and operations. Collateral damage to civilian areas was not totally avoided, but the extensive precautions taken by the mission planners kept it limited.[44]

The balance of relative vulnerability also was a highly conducive one. The attack hit Libya at a point of close to maximal exposure. Its oil earnings had fallen to $5 billion (1980 = $22 billion). This not only left it with minimal leverage over western oil importers, but also the budget cuts necessitated by the fall in oil earnings had among other things fed tensions within the Libyan military. Qaddafi's plethora of conflicts with such other Arab states as Egypt, Tunisia, and Chad, as well as strains in his relations with Syria, left him somewhat isolated among his own

[43] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *The Persian Gulf: Stakes and Risks*, Current Policy No. 963, 29 May 1987.

[44] "Report of the U.S. Department of Defense on the Bombing of Libya" 8 May 1986, reprinted in *Survival*, September/October 1986, 451–53.

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brethren. His relations with the Soviet Union also were strained. Gorbachev had refused to promise aid in the event of a U.S. attack. And when the U.S. did attack, while the Soviet technical personnel and their commanders picked up early warnings, they took care of their own vulnerability by evacuating their positions at Libyan air defense installations. But they didn't bother to warn Qaddafi.[45]

International Legitimacy

A second differential constraint is the stronger claim the foreign policy restraint objective can make to international legitimacy. Principles of nonaggression, national self-determination, and the rights of sovereignty – however abused in practice they have been – are the closest the international system has to a universal set of rules and norms. A coercive diplomacy strategy mounted to restrain an aggressor nation in defense of these basic principles, therefore, can draw upon historical tradition as well as canons of international law for its justification. In addition to the importance in its own right of the moral authority that comes with international legitimacy, even more important is that in practical terms this can convert into the greater coercive potential of a broad-based international coalition, which brings to bear the authority and resources of other countries and of international institutions, along with those of the United States.

The Reagan administration, however, did not see it this way. It assumed that there could be no higher calling than to rid the world of Marxist-Leninist regimes and others it deemed illegitimate. This was the essence of the Reagan Doctrine and its "mission" to "nourish and defend freedom and democracy and to communicate these ideals everywhere we can."[46] Internationally, however, there were few other subscribers to this view, even among other western liberal democratic societies. Part of the disaffection was that few other countries so readily share the ABC blanket criterion – anything but communism – for regime legitimacy. Even more fundamental was the concern, as identified by Robert Tucker, that this risked "subordinat[ing] the traditional bases of international order to a particular vision of legitimacy."[47]

Three indicators can be used to compare the cases in terms of international legitimacy: support at the United Nations, support within the western alliance, and support from states in the affected region. Here too the cases bear out the contrast.

On Afghanistan, to an extent quite unusual for the time, at least so far as the Soviet invasion was concerned, the United States had strong support at the UN. Within weeks the General Assembly passed by 104–18 a resolution condemning

[45] Schumacher, "The United States and Libya," 334; Oakley, "International Terrorism," 618.

[46] Ronald Reagan, "State of the Union 1985," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 21, no. 6, 1985, 145–46.

[47] Robert W. Tucker, *Intervention and the Reagan Doctrine* (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1985), 13.

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the Soviet invasion and calling for a Soviet troop withdrawal. Similar resolutions passed by comparable margins in ensuing years. The UN Human Rights Commission went even further, charging the Soviets with "systematic brutality" and "a situation approaching genocide."[48] The western allies provided a moderate degree of support, collaborating with some economic sanctions and joining in tough declaratory communiques issued by NATO and at the annual heads-of-state summits. Much stronger support came from regional actors. The Islamic Conference was both vocal and active in its opposition to the Soviet invasion. Key countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt went much further and played active roles in supporting the mujaheddin. So did the People's Republic of China and, on its own, so did Iran.

In Nicaragua, the United States never could lay claim to any substantial degree of international legitimacy. The UN General Assembly passed resolution after resolution condemning American policy. The United States had its veto in the Security Council, but it still lost face when, as in 1984, thirteen of fifteen Security Council members voted for a resolution condemning the U.S. mining of Nicaraguan harbors. Britain abstained. The western allies were so unsupportive that there were widespread concerns about, as one book on the subject was titled, "Central America as a European-American issue."[49] Nor was there any legitimation of the U.S. strategy from within the region itself. Beyond the specifics of their respective peace plans, what the Contadora initiative and the Arias Plan were about was the rejection by Latin Americans of U.S. dominance of their region.[50]

In Lebanon, unlike other Middle Eastern multilateral forces such as UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) or UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization), the MNF never had the UN imprimatur. But the legitimacy of MNF I was not called into question because its mandate and mission were "judged worthwhile by all parties," including the Lebanese government, the PLO, key regional allies such as Egypt and Jordan, and the NATO allies (France and Italy also sent troops as part of the MNF).[51] MNF II benefited at the outset from the success of MNF I as an evenhanded peacekeeping force and from the widespread fear in the wake of the Gemayel (Bashir) assassination and the Sabra and Shatila massacres. But through its support for the Gemayel (Amin) government,

[48] On Soviet human rights abuses in Afghanistan, see Edward Girardet, "Migratory Genocide" and Jeri Laber and Barnett Rubin, "The War in the City," *New Republic*, 4 March 1985, 13–18; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Soviet Influence on Afghan Youth*, Special Report No. 139, February 1986.

[49] Andrew J. Pierre, ed., *Third World Instability: Central America as a European-American Issue* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985).

[50] "We Central American leaders," Arias stated, "have to begin to solve our own problems." Of a meeting between Arias and Reagan, a senior Costa Rican government official recounted: "I don't think anyone had ever told Ronald Reagan to his face that no respectable country publicly supports the contras . . . . and that the United States is alone on this issue." James LeMoyne, "Arias: Whom Can He Trust?" *New York Times Magazine*, 10 January 1988, 69.

[51] Heiberg and Holst, "Peacekeeping in Lebanon", 407–08.

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and particularly the military aid and training provided to the Lebanese Armed Forces, the United States no longer could make a sustainable claim in any eyes other than its own to being an honest, impartial broker. The American role consequently was transformed from one of "disinterested peacekeeping" to "partisan intervention" for which it could not credibly claim international legitimacy.[52]

The Libyan case requires some reading between the lines and separating of actions from rhetoric. The General Assembly did pass a resolution condemning the U.S. bombing, but the overall reaction within the UN was much tamer and more pro forma than might have been expected. Among the western allies, while only Britain was willing to support the actual bombing mission, a week later the European Community issued a resolution condemning Libya, banning arms sales to it, and pledging to strengthen intelligence sharing, enforcement, and other antiterrorism collaboration. Approximately 500 Libyans (diplomats, other government officials, "students") were expelled from Western Europe. Oil imports were reduced, other contracts were canceled, and many official credits were suspended. Thus, while not endorsing the U.S. action per se, the Europeans followed the broader U.S. policy lead. As to the Arab world, while allowing for a certain amount of obligatory denunciation of the United States, as one study concluded, "reaction to the U.S. bombing . . . has been surprisingly mild."[53] Both the Arab League and OPEC rejected Qaddafi's call for economic sanctions against the United States. Nor did any Arab state break relations with the United States.

The United States also was able to claim substantial international legitimacy for its 1987–1988 role in the Persian Gulf. UN Security Council Resolution 522 (passed 1 June 1984) reaffirmed the freedom of the seas and condemned Iran for its attacks on commercial ships. Resolution 598 (20 July 1987), which actually was the eighth time the Security Council had passed a resolution calling for a cease-fire, pointed its threat of an arms embargo at Iran. Important support also came from the western allies, who insisted upon keeping their actions outside of the NATO framework and under their own autonomous national commands, but who nevertheless sent their own naval vessels to the gulf. As to regional actors, the Iranian threat was very real to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates who banded together in 1981 to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). They stepped up their military cooperation with Iraq and lent it an estimated $30 billion.[54] Egypt also provided military and political support. And the Arab League (with dissent only from Syria and Libya) passed its own series of resolutions condemning Iran.

[52] Ibid., 399–400.

[53] Robert Satloff and Jonathan Barkey, "Arab Reaction to the U.S. Air Strikes Against Libya," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 9 May 1986 (mimeo).

[54] Richard M. Preece, "The Iran-Iraq War: Implications for U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief, 14 October 1987, 14.

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Domestic Political Opposition

If consensus could always be manufactured through public relations campaigns, then it would not matter whether one policy objective was more inherently disposed to low domestic constraints than another. Like Harry Truman and Dean Acheson in the selling of the Truman Doctrine, the right words and framing of an issue could evoke support even from a reluctant Congress and isolationist public. But precisely because of Ronald Reagan's well-deserved reputation as the Great Communicator, the limits of his capacity to forge consensus on issues like Nicaragua is all the more significant. Today the Congress is less automatically deferential, the public is much more attentive, and the executive branch itself is less strictly unitary than in the past.[55] Whether or not this is a positive or negative development for American foreign policy is a separate question. The relevant point here is that because domestic constraints are that much more prevalent than in the past, the inherent dispositions that different types of issues carry toward higher or lower constraints are that much more important.

Public Opinion. In terms of public opinion it is useful to apply William Schneider's distinction between valence and position issues.[56] Valence issues involve threats to shared basic values and thus tend to evoke consensual reactions, while position issues allow for legitimate alternative preferences on values and thus a more divisive politics. The pursuit of foreign policy restraint by an aggressor state is more likely to be treated as a valence issue for two reasons. First, the threat is much clearer, present, and dangerous: blatant violations of basic American principles such as national self-determination (Afghanistan), immediate threats to vital American geopolitical and economic interests (Persian Gulf reflagging), and direct aggression against American citizens (Libya), as compared to keeping somebody else's peace (Lebanon) and deposing the government of a tiny country because of a still hypothetical threat (Nicaragua).

Second, as evidenced by the more usable military options, the foreign policy restraint objective is more apt to allow for assertiveness without extended involvement and for shows of strength without open-ended commitments. As such, it embodies what Schneider assesses as the pervasive desire of Americans in the 1980s for "peace and strength, yes; involvement, no".[57] Peace and strength through shows of strength that don't entangle—either because of their indirectness (Afghanistan)

[55] Thomas E. Mann, ed., *A Question of Balance: The President, Congress and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990); John H. Aldrich, John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience'?" *American Political Science Review* 83 (March 1989): 123–42; David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle, *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988).

[56] William Schneider, "Conservatism, Not Interventionism: Trends in Foreign Policy Opinion, 1974–82" in Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert J. Lieber, eds., *Eagle Defiant: United States: Foreign Policy in the 1980s* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983), 39–40.

[57] William Schneider, "'Rambo' and Reality: Having It Both Ways" in Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild and Robert J. Lieber, *Eagle Resurgent: The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 45.

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or their quickness (Libya)—were far preferable to those that did entangle (Lebanon) or risked extended involvement (Nicaragua). The Persian Gulf reflagging case was more direct and less quick-and-out, and thus could be expected to show greater tension within public opinion, although not nearly as much as the more direct and entangling Lebanon commitment.

Public opinion poll data substantiate these propositions.[58] On a cross-case basis, public support was highest in the cases of Libya (average support score of 65.2 percent even in prebombing polls) and the Persian Gulf (55.5 percent), and lowest for Nicaragua (27.3 percent when asked about contra aid, 19.7 percent when asked about a U.S. invasion). On an intracase basis, when questions were asked disaggregating foreign policy restraint and internal political change objectives, the pattern is further corroborated. In the Libya case, questions about overthrowing or assassinating Qaddafi elicited an average score of only 29 percent. In the Nicaragua case, those questions asking specifically about using force for regional military deployments to deter Nicaraguan threats to other countries (35.2 percent), and an invasion of Nicaragua if it allowed a Soviet missile base (45 percent)—for foreign policy restraint—got higher levels of support.

Congress. The usual portrayal of legislative-executive politics is of the assertive Reagan administration pushing to "stand tall" and show that "America is back" vs. the retreatist Congress, reflexively pulling back from using force. In fact the pattern was not nearly so singular.

On Afghanistan it's often overlooked that Congress repeatedly pushed the Reagan administration to take a harder line. Initially the Reagan administration had kept aid and other covert assistance to the mujaheddin at the relatively low levels set by the Carter administration. The first major aid increase was in late 1983 at the initiative of Representative Charles H. Wilson, a conservative Texas Democrat, through a secret amendment to the Defense Department appropriations bill reallocating $40 million to the CIA for the Afghan operation. In fiscal year (FY) 1985 Congress nearly tripled the Reagan administration's aid request. The next year Congress set up its own Special Task Force on Afghanistan, chaired by the staunchly conservative Senator Gordon Humphrey (R.-N.H.).

One might have thought the foil was Jimmy Carter the way Humphrey used the task force to play to the press through hearings that "embarrassed the Reagan administration by disclosing one shortcoming after another in U.S. military and humanitarian aid programs."[59] And when in late 1987 news reports indicated that the State Department was considering conceding to Soviet demands for a cessation of U.S. aid as part of the withdrawal accords, the Senate voted unanimously for a Humphrey resolution opposing any such concession.

On Nicaragua, in contrast, the Congress had to be pulled kicking and screaming

[58] For a fuller discussion, see Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: American Opinion on the Use of Force in the Third World in the 1980s," paper presented at the 1990 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California.

[59] *Washington Post*, 12 February 1989.

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to vote for aid to the contras. Only once, in 1985, did it fully grant the administration's contra aid request. It surely never gave them more than they wanted, and it repeatedly gave them less. And at key points in 1984 and 1988, it cut the contras off almost totally. Then, of course, the Iran-contra hearings, to a greater extent than any scandal since Watergate, put the administration in the docket with the Congress as the inquisitor.

A comparison of the debates over the War Powers Act for Lebanon and the Persian Gulf reflagging cuts in the same direction. On Lebanon, Congress was willing to go along with the Marines' deployment, but only as part of a carefully crafted agreement that technically stopped short of a formal invocation of the War Powers Act, but made the commitment politically subject to congressional renewal or termination. Support thus was tenuous and tentative, ready to be tipped in the other direction by some unforeseen event, which is precisely what happened with the Marine barracks bombing. With the Persian Gulf reflagging and naval operations, the opposition in Congress never could muster the critical mass to take constraining action. The House passed a ninety-day delay on reflagging in early July 1987, but the Senate didn't follow suit. A number of senators tried in a variety of ways to invoke the War Powers Act or to pass other restrictive measures. But only the Byrd-Warner amendment, a measure loaded down in ambiguities and without any real effect, ever passed. Even then, this time it was the House which failed to act.[60]

In the Libyan case the president consulted some congressional leaders prior to the 14 April bombing. The consultation was more informational than advisory, but both the Democrats and Republicans assured him of their personal support. Some voices of protest came from liberal Democrats, but even many liberals raced for the syndicated television talk shows to bash Qaddafi. Congress never seriously considered any condemnatory or restrictive action.

Executive Branch Unity. Here too the contrast is consistent. As long as the objective was Soviet withdrawal, few if any stories were written about intra-executive branch conflict over Afghanistan. The State Department, Defense Department, and CIA all worked quite well together, both at senior policy-making and operational levels. Since early 1989, however, as the Bush policy has become ensnared in the traps of engineering internal political change, this unity has started to break down.[61]

Over Nicaragua, however, the Reagan executive branch was ridden with conflict from the start. The battles were fought not only between departments but in particular within the State Department. As one example, Philip Habib, appointed special negotiator only a few months earlier, resigned out of frustration with both

[60] Robert A. Katzmann, "War Powers: Toward a New Accommodation" in Mann, *A Question of Balance*, 35–69.

[61] See, for example, David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Reconsiders Policy on Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, 24 November 1989; Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Divided on Soviet Afghan Stand," *New York Times*, 16 December 1989; Bill McCollum, "The CIA Has Bungled It," *Washington Post*, 10 September 1989.

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the political obstruction and personal condemnation he encountered within the administration for his efforts to treat peace talks as something more than just a way of providing "a plausible negotiating track" for public relations purposes. Then, of course, there were the operations of Oliver North and his minions, intended to go around not only Congress but also normal channels within the State Department and the CIA.[62]

In the Lebanon case, revealingly, perhaps the most scathing criticism of the intervention came from within the military, in particular from the Long Commission. Secretaries George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger waged a very public debate, which grew out of Lebanon and came to involve the more general issue of the use of force. Shultz strongly opposed withdrawing the Marines from Beirut, especially after the barracks bombing. "If we are driven out of Lebanon," he argued, "our role in the world is that much weakened everywhere." At stake were America's responsibilities as the world's leading "defender of freedom, justice and peace," responsibilities from which "we cannot walk away . . . without paying a moral and a political price." Secretary Weinberger rejected this argument both in its specific and general forms. He played a key role in President Reagan's decision in February 1984 to withdraw the Marines under the ostensibly credible guise of an "offshore deployment." And while stopping well short of rejecting coercive diplomacy, later in the year he sounded "a note of caution" in laying out a series of preconditions for the use of military force.[63]

In contrast, both Weinberger and Shultz supported both the bombing of Libya and the Persian Gulf reflagging naval deployment. For Weinberger they both met his tests. For Shultz they were cases par excellence of his broader argument. The criticisms of the Persian Gulf operation, of which there were many within the executive branch, largely were about tactics and not questions of the use of force in itself. Thus, while well short of pure harmony, the intra-administration divisions in both the deliberations and execution of policy when force was being used primarily to coerce foreign policy restraint were much more confined and controlled.

Conclusions

What, then, are the conclusions to be drawn from the Reagan coercive diplomacy record? And what are the implications of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait? In one sense my analysis does affirm the scope of the power and influence that the United

[62] Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*; McNeil, *Reality or Illusion*; LeoGrande, "Rollback or Containment?"; Menges, *Inside the NSC*, *New York Times*, 14 July 1986; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, 100th Congress, 1st sess., 1987.

[63] *Department of State Bulletin*, November 1983, 26, and December 1983, 44–45; among Weinberger's tests are the need to be willing to employ sufficient forces to win militarily, a clear definition of the objectives which force is to serve, a reliable ally and strong and consistent public support. Speech to the National Press Club, 28 November 1984, as reported in *New York Times*, 30 November 1984.

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States still has for containing aggression. The Afghan mujaheddin had many supporters, but it's difficult to imagine them having forced the Soviet Red Army back across its border without U.S. support—diplomatic and military, even more than financial. With Qaddafi there was no one else willing to take up the challenge. Similarly, with Iran in the Persian Gulf, while there were many other actors, the American role appears to have been the crucial one.

The modalities by which force was brought to bear differed in all three of these cases: in effect, one was by land, one by sea, one by air. But in all three instances the use of force was kept limited, controlled, and discriminating. The costs imposed on the adversaries were substantial in their own right, as well as credibly foreboding of even higher costs that could follow. *Yet the strategies remained fundamentally political ones.* In both the Afghanistan and Persian Gulf reflagging cases, the use of military force did not stand on its own but was linked to diplomatic efforts to negotiate settlements. Both the coercive and the diplomatic components, not just one or the other, were at work. In the Libyan case there was no such diplomatic process, but even here the use of military force was intended more to persuade than defeat. When we speak of effectiveness, therefore, we are speaking of force combined with diplomacy, not force on its own. The Soviets were not about to withdraw from Afghanistan without at minimum the face-saving cover that a negotiated settlement provided. Nor could Iran have been expected to surrender to Iraq, which had started the war.

The cases also showed that uses of force by the United States do not inherently have insurmountable problems of international legitimacy. Support would be too strong a word, but acceptance fits. The United Nations never endorsed per se American aid to the mujaheddin, or the Kuwaiti reflagging, or surely not the bombing of Libya. But the first two were accepted on balance as complements to, if not de facto operational extensions of, UN resolutions. The UN criticism of the Libyan bombing was rather pro forma, a dutiful nod more than a vehement protest. With the NATO allies, the broader concern about keeping the alliance's mission confined to the North Atlantic region, as well as some specific policy differences, precluded formal collaboration or specific endorsement. But the allies still managed in the Afghanistan, Libya, and Persian Gulf reflagging cases (and initially in Lebanon) to express general support for the objectives being pursued and to find ways to work with the United States. Key countries within the respective regions provided even greater support. And they did so not just as American clients, as was more the case in the 1950s, but for their own self-interested reasons. This made them more independent, often to the displeasure of the Reagan administration, but it also gave the United States a much stronger claim to international legitimacy.

At home, support for coercive diplomacy was shown to be not out of the question, but to depend on its purpose. Support was most tenuous in the Persian Gulf reflagging case because of concern about the costs and risks of the military operations. But here too it still held. Nor were "divided government" and the partisan and institutional competitions which are its outgrowth an excessive constraint. Congress and the president found constructive ways to work together. The Amer-

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ican public was supportive, but not blindly so. The executive branch avoided many of the pitfalls of bureaucratic politics. The American political system, in sum, showed itself not to be as broke as so often accused.

None of these conclusions should be taken too far. Three limiting conditions are to be noted. First, the claim of effectiveness needs to be tempered by the distinction between immediate and generalized foreign policy restraint. As both the Persian Gulf-Iran and Libya cases demonstrate, the achieving of the one does not necessarily lead to the other. A key part of the problem here is the extent to which sustained conflict with the United States has domestic political utility within the adversary state. This in a sense parallels the argument about domestic constraints within U.S. policy. In the one it is a matter of the domestic political will to carry out coercive diplomacy; in the other it is a matter of the domestic political will to resist it. The common point is that foreign policy strategy is not exclusively a matter of calculations of interstate interactions, be they military or diplomatic. All the military calculations may line up, all the rules for effective negotiation may be followed, but if the leaders of the adversary have an interest in manipulating and fomenting the image of the United States as an enemy, they will continue to do so. The threat posed thus can be transformed from a compellent for compliance to a basis for continued resistance and aggression.

Second, it may be that the immediate objective is achieved but in the process the strategy is distorted in ways that create new threats—as did the Reagan and Bush administrations with their overtilting toward Iraq. Neither the failure to oppose Iraq's use of chemical weapons nor the near total relaxation of antiproliferation controls on trade with Iraq were necessary parts of the anti-Iran strategy. Nor were the exceedingly soft diplomatic signals sent to Saddam Hussein by key Bush administration officials in late July 1990 at the same time that he had escalated his rhetoric, made explicit threats, and mobilized his troops and tanks. Coercive diplomacy could have worked against Iran without these excesses and failures against Iraq.

Third, the extent of foreign policy restraint is not to be exaggerated. Coercive diplomacy is by definition a strategy of limited means. In all of the Reagan era cases, the force used was limited. The same has been true for the Bush administration's initial response against Iraq. However, the decisions taken by the Bush administration in early November 1990 to double the military deployment and move to an offensive military strategy indicated a belief that this was a case in which the adversary was so resistant that limited force would not suffice. Whether or not a continued strategy of limited force could have worked will never be known. Given the Bush administration's assessment of Saddam Hussein, it believed the only viable strategies were to escalate the degree of force to the outer edges of a coercive diplomacy strategy (the military build-up, the 15 January 1991 ultimatum) or, ultimately, to go to war.

The more severe constraint on what coercive diplomacy can achieve concerns the engineering of internal political change. The central point is not that the Reagan policies failed, but that coercive diplomacy as a foreign policy strategy has intrinsic

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disadvantages when put to this purpose. There still may be situations like Grenada and Panama, where it is possible to mount a military operation to overthrow a government. But those are unique cases from which it would be dangerous to generalize and which involve a quite separate strategy from coercive diplomacy. In Lebanon, American casualties were substantial. In Nicaragua, while others bore the casualties, the United States had the albatross of an open-ended commitment. In post-Soviet withdrawal Afghanistan, military force has not been nearly so usable as it was for getting the Soviets to withdraw.

These cases also show how and why the remaking of governments lacks international legitimacy. In Lebanon, the United States forfeited the legitimacy it started with as it transformed its strategy from honest broker/peacekeeper to supporter/sponsor of the Gemayel regime. In Nicaragua, the Reagan policy never could credibly claim any significant international legitimacy. The specific objective of overthrowing the Sandinistas and the more general precedent of making self-determination selectively applicable only to certain types of political systems as determined unilaterally by the United States were rejected by the western allies, by the countries in the region, and by the United Nations.

Finally, the domestic constraints, especially on Nicaragua policy, have to be seen as commentaries on the policies themselves. It's not that Congress, the American public, or the professionals within the State Department won't let the president use military force. One might even argue that these actors and institutions showed a much shrewder, more discriminating—yes, more realistic—sense of strategy than the Reagan administration. But even leaving such policy judgments aside, the objective fact is that broad political support is much less possible for efforts to overthrow, destabilize, or otherwise remake governments. This cannot be equated as a systemic malfunction. It is politics as it is supposed to work in the American political system: checks and balances, the separation of powers, and public debate over what United States policy should be.

That this is a dilemma is not to be denied. The kinds of governments other states have does affect Americans and American interests. Other foreign policy strategies, however, are necessary. Coercive diplomacy has its scope. It also has its limits. The realization of both together, but neither alone, is crucial to a truly realistic foreign policy.*

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From Negro to Black to African American: The Power of Names and Naming

BEN L. MARTIN

In a December 1988 news conference at Chicago's Hyatt Regency O'Hare Hotel, where leaders of seventy-five black groups met to discuss a new national black agenda, Jesse Jackson announced that members of their race preferred to be called "African-American." The campaign he then led to replace the term "black" met immediate success among African American opinion makers and more gradual acceptance in the national press. Jackson's cultural offensive proposed an ethnic reference for a racial one, aiming thereby to help create as much as express a sense of ethnic identity among black Americans. It recalled the successful imposition of "black" over "Negro" twenty years earlier and renewed other themes of the Black Power movement of the late 1960s.

Names can be more than tags; they can convey powerful imagery. So naming—proposing, imposing, and accepting names—can be a political exercise. And the call for blacks to be called African Americans was for more than a manner of speaking. "To be called African-Americans has cultural integrity," Jackson said. "It puts us in our proper historical context. Every ethnic group in this country has a reference to some land base, some historical cultural base. African-Americans have hit that level of cultural maturity. There are Armenian-Americans and Jewish-Americans and Arab-Americans and Italian-Americans; and with a degree of accepted and reasonable pride, they connect their heritage to their mother country and where they are now."[1]

[1] "Leaders Say Blacks Want To Be Called 'African-Americans,'" Associated Press, 21 December 1988, PM cycle.

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Reviving Black Power Pluralism

Jesse Jackson's proposal to conceive race relations as multiethnic pluralism was not entirely new. He himself called for ethnic consciousness twenty years earlier: "The other American ethnic groups . . . maintain their national styles, live in the same neighborhoods, visit the old country, have ethnic holidays. The continuity between the roots and the fruits of those ethnic groups remains. But the continuity between our root in Africa and our fruit in America has been broken. . . ."[2] As the civil rights ideal of individual integration was being displaced by Black Power separatism, there was a brief period when Black Power advocates explained it as conventional pressure-group tactics. From May 1966 to January 1967, Stokely Carmichael paradoxically combined a rejection of American institutions with an appeal to interest group pluralism before progressing to advocacy of armed struggle.[3]

In the group model of politics, public policy is the result of competition among organized interests in the political arena.[4] Individuals' interests are represented in group activity, and the primary function of government is distribution (or redistribution) of rewards for successful group competitors. The contemporary welfare state is generally responsive to ethnic claims because of elites' commitment to the values of democracy, self-determination, egalitarianism, antiracism, and, increasingly, cultural pluralism.[5] Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan described the apparent ease with which modern government uses ethnic categories as a basis for distributing its rewards.[6]

The phrase "Black Power" had been used by Richard Wright, Paul Robeson, and Adam Clayton Powell in earlier decades, but apart from racial assertiveness and rejection of assimilative integration, the slogan revived by Stokely Carmichael in 1966 never had an agreed precise meaning for its advocates.[7] NAACP Executive Director Roy Wilkins consistently condemned it as anti-white separatism, and Martin Luther King said the phrase "falls on the ear as racism in reverse."[8] King called instead for the sharing of power with white people, and this benign interpre-

[2] "Identity Crisis," *Newsweek*, 30 June 1969, 26.

[3] Donald McCormack, "Stokely Carmichael and Pan-Africanism: Back to Black Power," *Journal of Politics* 35 (May 1973): 388.

[4] Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (San Antonio, Tex.: Principia Press, 1949), 208–209; David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process*, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1971), 502.

[5] Ulf Bjorklund, "Ethnicity and the Welfare State," *International Social Science Journal* 39 (February 1987): 26.

[6] Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 10.

[7] Clayborne Carson, *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 209; Herbert H. Haines, *Black Radicals and the Civil Rights Mainstream, 1954–1970* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988), 58; Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, "The Meanings of Black Power: A Comparison of White and Black Interpretations of a Political Slogan," *American Political Science Review* 64 (June 1970): 367–368.

[8] M.S. Handler, "Wilkins Says Black Power Leads Only to Black Death," *New York Times*, 6 July 1966; Gene Roberts, "Dr. King Declares Rights Movement is Close to a Split," *New York Times*, 9 July 1966.

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tation of Black Power was accepted by most moderate white and black elites in the next two years.

Along with Stokely Carmichael in his brief pluralist period, Charles Hamilton codified this view of Black Power as pressure group tactics in the accepted tradition of the American political process, as well as a positive attempt to instill a sense of identity and pride in black people.[9] Carmichael and Hamilton rejected individual assimilation and integration as self-deceptive exploitation; only after group mobilization and assertion could blacks as a group demand their rightful share, a place at the table, and at that level of group interaction join (confront) whites. "Black people have not suffered as individuals but as members of a group; therefore, their liberation lies in group action."[10] Political strategy aimed then at developing a power base for a relatively autonomous black community rather than achieving civil rights for individuals or encouraging interracial contacts. Black Power leaders insisted that institutions serving blacks should be directed and staffed by blacks.[11] In black areas, it meant black control, and "where Negroes lack a majority, Black Power means proper representation and sharing of control."[12]

By 1967 white liberals were already accepting Black Power rejection of the traditional civil rights values of color blindness and assimilation.[13] They were willing to call separatism—as local control and assertion of black identity—a prelude to larger integration in a multicultural pluralist society and credit demands for redistribution as legitimate claims in interest group politics. By 1968, most federal policy elites, black elected officials, civil rights leaders, and influential media accepted Hamilton's interest group interpretation of black power as both reasonable and well within the framework of traditional American ethnic interest politics.[14]

Whitney M. Young, Jr. of the National Urban League criticized early Black Power extremism but endorsed the nonviolent, nonrevolutionary version that "emphasizes self-determination, pride, self-respect, and participation and control of one's destiny and community affairs."[15] Presidential candidate Richard Nixon explained that "what most militants want is not separation, but to be included in . . . to have a share of the wealth, and a piece of the action."[16] And the young Jesse Jackson—though he refused to criticize the Black Panthers—also employed this moderately separatist version of Black Power, calling for racial pride and redistribution. "It's nation time," he called to the national Black Political Convention

[9] Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (New York: Vintage, 1967); Charles V. Hamilton, "An Advocate of Black Power Defines It," *New York Times Magazine*, 14 April 1968, 22ff.

[10] Carmichael and Hamilton, *Black Power*, 53–54.

[11] Paul E. Peterson, "Organizational Imperatives and Ideological Change," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 14 (June 1979): 475.

[12] Stokely Carmichael, "What We Want," *New York Review of Books*, 22 September 1966, 5.

[13] Gene Roberts, "A White Liberal Shift on Integration," *New York Times*, 17 December 1967.

[14] Robert C. Smith, "Black Power and the Transformation from Protest to Politics," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (Fall 1981): 439.

[15] Earl Caldwell, "Young Embraces Black Power Idea," *New York Times*, 7 July 1968.

[16] "Nixon Urges 'Black Ownership' to Help Solve Racial Problems," *New York Times*, 26 April 1968.

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in 1972. "Cut us in or cut us out."[17] Nearly twenty years later, his call for African Americans to be considered an ethnic group revived that pluralist imagery—along with other Black Power themes—in a 1980s political setting more crowded with claimants for status and benefits.

Reasserting Moral Primacy

The expansion in the scope of government in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s provoked a parallel growth in pressure groups formed around the new government programs. Many of these groups adopted the black model of organization, mobilization, media management, and lobbying as well as civil rights imagery (victimization by the majority, access denied, legitimate aspirations, pressing needs) to demand government benefits and preferences.[18] Between 1966 and 1972 many black interest organizations formed to take advantage of the new race-conscious definition of integration as group inclusion rather than individual access.[19]

One reason for the "new ethnicity" of the early 1980s was the "impetus to organize in order to get what the state is distributing—and to prevent others from getting it."[20] Many made claims as victims of society or of government, if possible. Native Americans won compensation for government seizure of tribal lands in the last century.[21] Affirmative action benefits were extended to several categories of claimants. Resentful members of white ethnic groups were less likely to reject the rush to redress history than to complain that their ancestors too had suffered discrimination. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 provided reparations for some 60,000 survivors of the World War II removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans.

In part, the late-1988 announcement of African American ethnicity was a reassertion of the primacy of black moral claims on American society. In the election that year, Jesse Jackson spoke often of the political debt owed him and his constituency because of the votes they brought to the party; but after figuring only slightly in the election, that claim to political entitlement had to be set upon something more fundamental. After the demoralizing November vote, when the outcome of electoral democracy proved unsatisfactory, black leaders (especially unelected ones) sought to reassert the alternative model of pluralist democracy in which group interests are legitimate and group demands credited without careful regard to electoral strength.

When politics is viewed as the interaction of groups rather than individuals, the status of group leaders is enhanced, but at the same time the success of an ethnic organization and its leaders in a welfare state tends to be assessed primarily

[17] Jesse Jackson speech at the National Black Political Convention, Gary, Indiana, March 1972, broadcast in "Eyes on the Prize II," part 5, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, 12 February 1990.

[18] Aldon D. Morris, *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement* (New York: Free Press, 1984), 288.

[19] Smith, "Black Power," 436.

[20] William Petersen, "Concepts of Ethnicity" in Stephen Thernstrom, ed., *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 240.

[21] Nathan Glazer, "Ethnicity—North, South, West," *Commentary*, May 1982, 74.

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in terms of the recognition and concessions it can wring from the state.[22] "There are few things more valuable in the competition for government largess than the clearly perceived status of victim," and blacks have benefited from the widely held perception that their demands on the political system are a fundamental test of its fairness.[23] In the late 1960s, those demands were backed sometimes by more or less open threats of violence, but in recent years they have relied more on shame and guilt than fear. The call for recognition of an African American ethnicity restated the black claim to primacy among groups deserving redress from American society because of the special experience of slavery.

Researching African Roots

The campaign for renewal of an African heritage recalled earlier searches among black intellectuals for African cultural achievements and survivals in the black diaspora, as well as disputes in the late 1960s over the meaning of blackness. Subsaharan Africa—like northwestern Europe for long periods—was isolated physically from the core areas in which the great early civilizations (developing metallurgy, writing, agriculture, and cities) maintained indirect contact with each other in an arc from Spain and Morocco to China.[24] Since there is no evidence of indigenous written languages among the hundreds of different societies appearing and disappearing over centuries across the vast heterogeneous area south of the Sahara, written records are few; and early histories relied on explorers' accounts and anthropological discoveries to describe nearly static traditional cultures.

> Attempts to reinterpret this data began with anticolonial propaganda by African nationalists in alliance with Africans of the diaspora and radical Europeans. . . . Nationalist propagandists pointed to evidence of major empires . . . in the tradition of the golden remote past of heroic ancestors . . . and asserted that there was a basic unity of all African cultures that had long historical roots reaching back to a common source. . . ."[25]

French-speaking black intellectuals in the 1940s launched a search for *negritude* to refute the idea that Africa had made no great contributions to world civilization. At one extreme, to show the African as inherently gifted technically, writers held that black Africans first invented most of the achievements of civilization, from mathematics, arts, and science to writing, engineering, and architecture.[26]

[22] R. Fox, C. Aull, and L. Cimino, "Ethnic Nationalism and the Welfare State" in C. Keyes, ed., *Ethnic Change* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), 206.

[23] Glenn C. Loury, "The Moral Quandry of the Black Community," *Public Interest* 79 (Spring 1985): 20.

[24] Paul Bohannan and Philip Curtin, *Africa and Africans*, rev. ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1971), 226–227.

[25] J. F. Ade Ajayi and E. J. Alagoa, "Black Africa: The Historian's Perspective," *Daedalus* 103 (Spring 1974): 128.

[26] Cheikh-Anta Diop, *Nations Negres et Culture* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1954), 253.

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But advocates of *negritude* also relied on the concept of cultural relativity to stress the validity of African cultural forms in their own right, though nontechnological.[27]

Black American elites have been drawn to similar themes, which incorporate resentment at colonialists' and slavers' despoilation as well as whites' distortion of the African heritage. In his *Autobiography*, Malcolm X presented Elijah Muhammad's white devil legend, which Malcolm later repudiated: "You are of a race of . . . ancient civilizations, and riches in gold and kings. You don't even know your true family name. . . . You have been cut off by the devil white man from all true knowledge of your own kind. You have been a victim of the evil of the devil white man ever since he murdered and raped and stole from your native land in the seeds of your forefathers. . . ."[28] Jesse Jackson holds that Jesus Christ was of African descent[29] and that "historians have distorted history by ignoring the African roots of Western civilization."[30] When black leaders call for renewed awareness of African history, they evoke as well these themes of exploitation and entitlement. Jackson said that slavery alienated black Americans from their African roots, and "today, the descendants of the slave-masters discourage any real study of ties between Africa and America."[31]

Creating "in the community an aroused and continuing Black consciousness that will provide the basis for political strength" was a major part of the Black Power movement, necessary because "from birth, Black people are told a set of lies about themselves."[32] The 1989 cultural offensive to build an African American identity renewed the attack on that lingering false consciousness embedded in a social structure of racial oppression. *Boston Globe* writer Derrick Z. Jackson welcomed the new phrase, because "it is a tribute to ourselves that we have sought to restore our cultural umbilical cord in the face of the persistence of white America to drum inferiority into us."[33]

Though references to African heritage have been common since even before the Black Power movement and were renewed in 1989, detailed descriptions of African survivals among contemporary black Americans are rare. One reason may be that although most of the Africans brought to North America were captured in upcountry tribal wars and raids within 500 miles of the West African coast before being sold to one of the major slave-marketing tribes—the Fanti, Ashanti, Yoruba, Dahomey, or Benin—which then traded the slaves to Europeans, the captives came

[27] Abiola Irele, "Negritude—Literature and Ideology," *Journal of Modern African Studies* (1965): 514; Edna Steeves, "Negritude and the Noble Savage," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 11 (March 1973): 91–104.

[28] Malcolm X, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* (New York: Grove, 1964), 161.

[29] United Press International, Chicago, 24 December 1988, BC cycle.

[30] Itabari Njeri, "What's In a Name? African-American is the Accurate Ethnic Label of the Past and the Future, Black Leaders Say," *Los Angeles Times*, 29 January 1989.

[31] "Jesse Jackson Gains Backers," *New York Times*, 12 January 1989.

[32] Carmichael, "What We Want," 6.

[33] Derrick Z. Jackson, "Term 'African-American' Has a Long and Honorable History," *Kansas City Times*, 23 January 1989.

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from many ethnically distinct tribes.[34] Validating a "concrete" survival requires data on exact African origins, which is not usually available.[35] And so more scholarly claims have been made for abstract elements of West African cultures surviving for a time among slaves in America than for more tangible carry-overs.[36] Among the traits of contemporary Afro-Americans said to be African retentions are an emphasis on the spoken rather than the written word, "incessant African rhythms that came to the vocabulary of music with the concept of beat,"[37] a "riff-style flexibility and an open disposition toward the vernacular,"[38] emphasis on the "non-verbal, i.e., the non-conceptual,"[39] and some food staples like black-eye peas, okra, and yams.[40] The thinness of the empirical base for a powerful sense of ethnic identity may explain why the African cultural heritage is described far less often than it is evoked.

Jesse Jackson said "every ethnic group in this country has a reference to some land base, some historical, cultural base. African-Americans have hit that level of cultural maturity."[41] But black Americans are not tied to a specific homeland by an identifiable culture, language, church, history, or by family traditions like Greeks, Jews, Irish, Italians, or Armenians. Few American blacks know from which African state, ancient or modern, their ancestors came. Most, except for a few intellectuals, feel little affinity for or loyalty toward any country other than the United States.[42]

Declining the African American label, Phillip Gay argues that the descendants of Africans brought to the United States have long since created a unique culture virtually unrelated to Africa. Its elements include: "a distinctly Black American cuisine of low-cost edibles more indigenous to Europe and the New World than to Africa, a distinctly Black American patois firmly rooted in the English language, relatively distinct Black American patterns of familial organization and . . . religious practices grounded in Christianity, a non-African religion." Gay observes that "the overwhelming majority of black Americans are at least six or seven generations culturally removed from Africa. They speak no African language. . . . They have no relatives in Africa, and they have never themselves been to

[34] Donald L. Wiedner, *A History of Africa* (New York: Vintage, 1962), 55–70; Russell Warren Howe, *Black Africa* (New York: Walker, 1966), I: 98–107.

[35] Gerald Mullin, *Flight and Rebellion, Slave Resistance in Eighteenth Century Virginia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 174.

[36] Eugene D. Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York: Vintage, 1976), 285ff; R. L. Watson, "American Scholars and the Continuity of African Culture in the United States," *Journal of Negro History* 63 (Fall 1978): 384.

[37] Molefi Kete Asante, *The Afrocentric Idea* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 192.

[38] Albert Murray, "African Culture and Black Identity," *Current* 121 (September 1970): 27.

[39] Julius Lester, *Look Out, Whitey! Black Power's Gon' Get Your Mama!* (New York: Dial Press, 1968).

[40] Alene Barnes-Harden, "Cross-Cultural Understanding Among Peoples of African Descent," *Journal of Black Studies* 15 (September 1984): 35.

[41] John Camper, "Jackson: I'll Push Economic Boycotts," *Chicago Tribune*, 20 December 1988.

[42] Kenneth Longmyer, "Black American Demands," *Foreign Policy* 60 (Fall 1985): 7.

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Africa."[43] The term African American can provide then only an artificial sense of homeland or nationality, for Africa is not a nation but a huge heterogeneous continent.

Of course, nationalisms are inherently more or less artificial, based on "invented traditions . . . establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or group membership, real or artificial communities," including sometimes "an ancient past beyond effective historical continuity."[44] If a nation is an "imagined political community" to which an "image of antiquity" is central,[45] nationalism is a "past-oriented group identification emphasizing origins" or belief in common descent which "if not readily demonstrable, may be shored up by myths or a partly fictitious history."[46] The "new ethnicity" of the 1970s often focused less on original immigrant cultures than on the "reconstructed ethnicity" of later generations' adaptations to the American environment.[47]

The elusiveness of tangible African ties may not matter then, if the purpose of the African American cultural offensive was less to discover discrete African sources of cultural unity than to create a stronger sense of group identity. One common function of ethnic leadership is "the codification of idioms: the selection of signals for identity and the assertion of value for these cultural diacritica. . . . [A] great amount of attention may be paid to the revival of select traditional culture traits, and to the establishment of historical traditions to justify and glorify the idioms and the identity."[48] The scarcity of traceable ties to Africa does underscore the political nature of the campaign for African American in the test of credulity it poses, though that campaign has not attempted the open intimidation of the demands for Black twenty years earlier.

Raising Race/Lowering Class Consciousness

Until the late 1960s, black was an insult for many Negroes, and the nationalist/separatists' campaign for the term posed a test for conformity for both Negroes and whites. In addition to imposing new language on whites, it aimed at black mobilization and self-assertion. Black was starkly confrontational and militant, and imposing it on Negroes forced them not only to accept but to embrace there-

[43] Phillip T. Gay, "A Vote Against Use of 'African-American,'" *Los Angeles Times*, 2 April 1989.

[44] Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions" in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7, 9.

[45] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 15, 47.

[46] Anya Peterson Royce, *Ethnic Identity: Strategies of Diversity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 24–25.

[47] Stephen Steinberg, *The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 51, 60; Micaela di Leonardo, *The Varieties of Ethnic Experience* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), 134.

[48] F. Barth, "Introduction" in F. Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), 35.

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tofore undesirable racial qualities. This is the power of naming, and the public success and private partial failure of the idea that black is beautiful illustrate both the reach and limitations of the 1960s separatists' cultural revolution. After twenty years, tension between lighter- and darker-skinned blacks still surfaces sometimes, and standards of beauty have still not been dominated uniformly by an African ideal.

Jesse Jackson now rejects the term black because it is inaccurate: "Black does not describe our situation. In my household there are seven people and none of us have the same complexion. We are of African American heritage."[49] Now in another test of the power of naming, black leaders have proposed another nearly artificial, mostly symbolic attribute—African heritage—instead of blackness as the key to group identity. Such "invented traditions" often are "unspecific and vague as to the nature of the values, rights and obligations of the group membership they inculcate."[50] Africanness as essence is no more carefully defined than blackness. But the function of relabeling is clear: to strengthen group loyalty by renewing a sense of differences from and grievances toward outsiders. "Labeling, from within or without, of particular populations as somehow different from the majority, and of their members as genealogically related to one another . . . is crucial to the construction of ethnicity," and "labeling [them] a community confers upon it a hoped-for alliance of interests, solidity, tradition."[51] A sense of identity is built by contrasting oneself with others, and relabeling urges upon African Americans newly "contrastive" roles and representations that have a "separating function" within society.[52]

Creating myths of shared origins and destinies is an important part of ethnogenesis—the process whereby ethnic groups come into being[53]—especially "the autochthonous myths of human origin from a given sacred place . . . [which] buttress a conviction that one's group arrived 'here' from elsewhere."[54] Black leaders refer to Africa to raise racial consciousness and redefine it as ethnic identity. "Revivalist movements and legends of ordeal are an affirmation of the state of affairs that existed before a traumatic defeat which has marked a people," and "in claiming group origin prior to defeat or degradation, the individual is asserting that defeat is temporary and one must create a new dignity by re-establishing the status that was disturbed."[55] "We are not descended from slaves, nor up from slavery," Jesse

[49] Bob Merrifield, "Jackson Urges American Blacks to Rediscover Ties to Africa," *Chicago Tribune*, 25 December 1988.

[50] Hobsbawm, *Invention of Tradition*, 10.

[51] di Leonardo, *Varieties of Ethnic Experience*, 22–23, 134.

[52] George De Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross, "Ethnicity: Vessel of Meaning and Emblem of Contrast," in George De Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross, eds., *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 368.

[53] Lester Singer, "Ethnogenesis and Negro-Americans Today," *Social Research* 29 (Winter 1962): 419–432.

[54] De Vos and Romanucci-Ross, "Ethnicity," 364.

[55] Ibid., 366.

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Jackson told African American activists in April 1989, "but rather Africans who were enslaved."[56] Africa appealed to militant blacks in the 1960s and earlier for the same reasons—"a pristine paradise which could be as glorious as the imagination could make it. One could become a Pan-Africanist and find respite in contemplating one's supposed descent from splendid African nobility rather than from despised American slaves."[57]

The African American campaign to raise race consciousness by redefining it as ethnicity resembles, but is not exactly the same as, white ethnics' remanufacturing ethnic feeling because their original cultures have been so eroded by generations of adaptation to the American setting. For one thing, blacks' collective self-confidence and sense of soul and of racial differences from whites are more robust than ever, though black leaders may fear decay. For another, the campaign for African American stresses African over American and sets the two apart and against each other more than the other "hyphenated ethnicities," which stress the compatibility of their slightly mixed loyalties. "Africans in America" would probably be the first choice of most people leading the campaign for African American. Of the combination American names, only the African American is as negative as it is positive, an accusatory reminder of past wrongs and pending debts. Only the African American is loaded with political resentment—an implicit indictment and demand for restitution. Not even descendants of late-arriving immigrants are free from racial debt. As Orlando Patterson put it, "If the present descendants of postemancipation immigrants wish to be relieved of the moral burden of slavery, they had better stop cheering on the Fourth of July."[58]

The call for African American seeks to renew group solidarity by recreating a sense of shared disadvantage that can mute class and other differences among blacks. It recalls the antibourgeois animus of the Black Power movement that rejected middle-class civil rights organizations committed to integration like the NAACP and the National Urban League. Black was given political content and reserved for "Black brothers and sisters who are emancipating themselves," while Negro was applied contemptuously to those "still in Whitey's bag and who still speak and think of themselves as Negroes."[59] Within little more than a year of Stokely Carmichael's calls for Black Power in mid-1966, young blacks—especially in the urban North—stopped using Negro, except in ridicule. Black was associated with youth, unity, militancy, and pride, while Negro increasingly connoted middle age, complacency, and the status quo. Among nationally prominent blacks, only Roy Wilkins and Bayard Rustin consistently condemned the Black Power radicals' anti-white racism and separatism. Martin Luther King and Wilkins were heckled and denounced for using Negro,[60] though the 1967 Southern Christian Leader-

[56] "Jackson Speech," *Kansas City Star*, 23 April 1989.

[57] Jennifer Jordan, "Cultural Nationalism in the 1960s: Politics and Poetry" in Adolph Reed, Jr., ed., *Race, Politics, and Culture* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 34.

[58] Orlando Patterson, "Toward A Study of Black America," *Dissent*, Fall 1989, 485.

[59] Lerone Bennett, Jr., "What's in a Name?" *Ebony*, November 1967, 46.

[60] John Leo, "Militants Object to 'Negro' Usage," *New York Times*, 26 February 1968.

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ship Conference (SCLC) convention joined in the black consciousness drive with "Black is beautiful" placards and frequent mention of *negritude* and Afro-American unity.[61] Pressure came also from Black Muslims and earlier from Malcolm X, who referred routinely to the "so-called Negro."

The Black Power movement condemned racial assimilation and the embourgeoisement of upwardly mobile blacks as self-denial and shame. It demanded cultivation and celebration of racial differences before allowing the possibility of peaceful coexistence between races at the group level to be negotiated by black leaders. Black Power rejected color blindness at the individual level as cultural suicide, demanding race consciousness as self-acceptance. Mixing race, class, and culture, radicals condemned middle-class blacks committed to integration as traitors to the community and to their own true selves. "To be 'integrated' it was necessary to deny one's heritage, one's own culture, to be ashamed of one's Black skin, thick lips and kinky hair."[62] "Black SNCC [Students Nonviolent Coordinating Committee] workers who had white friends or who were too light-skinned or too imbued with 'white' cultural values became targets for criticism. . . ."[63] Before mounting a racial revolution against whites, Black Power advocates posed a class and cultural confrontation against middle-class blacks to force on them the Black Power definition of group identity.

In that antibourgeois cultural offensive of the late 1960s, middle-class Negroes were required to adopt cultural values of lower-class urban blacks as marks of racial loyalty. "Black Power, as an ideology, resonated with the values and life styles of ghetto dwellers."[64] Rap Brown urged black college students to "identify with the brothers in the street."[65] Emphasizing racial unity, the Black Power movement sought to collapse class differences, and by early 1968 there was increasing evidence that middle-class Negroes were conforming by identifying more with the black community.[66]

By the summer of 1968, black was displacing Negro in the pages of *Ebony*, though Afro-American appeared occasionally as well. While a few staunch integrationists like Roy Wilkins insisted on Negro, many moderates—like Whitney Young and Ralph Bunche—adopted both terms; and most white liberals—like New York Mayor John Lindsay—switched to black by 1968.[67] By October, when James Brown's "Say It Loud—I'm Black and I'm Proud" made the Top Ten hit list, black was well on its way to becoming the preferred term in major media and polite society.[68] Radical white organizations—like the National Student Association in 1967—were the

[61] Gene Roberts, "Dr. King Stresses Pride in His Race," *New York Times*, 19 August 1967.
[62] Hamilton, "An Advocate of Black Power Defines It," 80.
[63] Carson, *In Struggle*, 238.
[64] Peterson, "Organizational Imperatives," 470.
[65] Carson, *In Struggle*, 252.
[66] Roger Beardwood, "The New Negro Mood," *Fortune*, January 1968, 151.
[67] John Leo, "Militants Object to 'Negro' Usage," *New York Times*, 26 February 1968.
[68] Clarence Page, "African American or Black? Pride Comes with Label," *Chicago Tribune*, 25 December 1988.

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first to endorse Black Power imagery and vocabulary, but presidential candidate Nixon used the term in his campaign and pledged in his inaugural speech to make freedom real for both black and white. Depending on the ideological setting, saying Negro continued to be socially acceptable for whites in public for several more years, and it was not until the early 1970s that the term disappeared from the national press.

The Negro mass public yielded to black elite leadership for the new term only gradually—more gradually than white opinion makers yielded, in most cases. In June 1968, 69 percent of Negroes favored Negro compared to less than 6 percent choosing black; in fact, 15 percent picked Afro-American as the best name then.[69] A *Newsweek* poll in 1969 found twice as many Negroes still favored that name as those who chose black; in fact, as many still favored colored as made black their first choice as late as 1969.[70] It was not until 1974 that polls found solid majorities of blacks finally accepting elite usage in names.[71]

The twenty-year effort of black leaders to build racial unity succeeded also in overcoming class differences on most issues; the social and political attitudes of higher- and lower-status blacks vary little.[72] Moreover, that conformity has been achieved at the lowest social denominator; middle-class blacks have identified with lower-status blacks and share a sense of grievance and entitlement. Upper-status blacks have accepted a Black Power-defined political community of all social classes, including a set of beliefs and a mood of protest shared with lower-status segments.[73]

National black elites have tended to portray blacks as uniformly disadvantaged in socioeconomic status, contributing to stereotyping as poor, uneducated, unemployed, and dependent, despite a large majority living above the poverty line.[74] Jesse Jackson's assessment in 1988 was normal: "These are very tough times for black people no matter who you are and how well you are doing."[75] This identification of blacks with the poor has been accepted by blacks and whites as well, to a lesser extent. Half the white respondents in a 1985 poll overestimated the proportion of the poor who are black, as did two-thirds of blacks. Black respondents were ten times more likely to overestimate than underestimate the percent of poor who are black, while whites were more than twice as likely to overestimate than

[69] Gallup Poll, June 1968, USAIP068-0763.Q107, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[70] "Angry—But They Still Have a Dream," *Newsweek*, 30 June 1969, 20.

[71] Roper Poll, June 1974, USRPRR.7406.Q40, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[72] Diane Colasanto and Linda Williams, "The Changing Dynamics of Race and Class," *Public Opinion* 9 (January–February 1987): 53; Franklin Gilliam, Jr., "Black America: Divided by Class?" *Public Opinion* 8 (February–March 1986): 57.

[73] Aberbach and Walker, "Meanings of Black Power," 380.

[74] Louis Henri Boke III and Susan H. Gray, "Blacks, Whites and 'Race Politics,'" *The Public Interest* 54 (Winter 1979): 73; Martin Kilson, "Problems of Black Politics," *Dissent*, Fall 1989, 526.

[75] Juan Williams, "How Reagan and Jackson Managed to Isolate Blacks," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 28 November–4 December 1988.

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underestimate that share.[76] Those misperceptions are functional: "The suffering of the poorest Blacks creates . . . a fund of political capital upon which all members of the group can draw when pressing racially-based claims."[77]

Minority or Masses

The call for African American ethnic consciousness also revived others of the twenty-year-old postintegration images used by black leaders to portray their community in American society. As soon as the civil rights revolution established color blindness and equality of individual opportunity as political and social norms (denying the importance of group membership for individual status and achievement), Black Power advocates moved on to substitute race consciousness and equality of group conditions socially and economically. The accompanying pluralist imagery—revived twenty years later in the calls for African American—featured blacks as a specially deserving group among groups and demanded redistribution, local control of black areas, and assured access elsewhere.

This pluralist, minority-among-minorities view then joined the more traditional black-white, minority-majority imagery with its flashbacks to slavery and segregation. The African American campaign since 1988 has been less successful in finding African roots than reminders of slavery in the New World. Like other national black leaders, Jesse Jackson refers often to slavery,[78] inviting unified resentment from blacks (and guilt from whites) able to imagine racial oppression more than a century removed.

Minorities can claim sympathy and entitlement, but the most powerful moral claims are wielded by groups who see themselves as the many exploited by a few. The African American campaign renewed the nearly one hundred-year-old effort of Pan-Africanists from W.E.B. DuBois and Marcus Garvey to the Black Muslims to persuade black Americans to consider themselves Africans wrongfully separated from their motherland. Ramona Edelin, who persuaded the Chicago meeting of black leaders in 1988 to pursue the African American offensive, said: "We want African people throughout the world to refer to ourselves as Africans wherever we are in the Diaspora. This is our proper geopolitical identification."[79] The campaign for African American renewed explicitly also the efforts of anti-apartheid lobbying staffs like TransAfrica to persuade black Americans to identity with South Africans and to consider apartheid an analogy for the exploitation of black masses elsewhere by the white global minority. Claiming implicitly for African Americans by long distance some of the sympathy due South African blacks is the same as borrowing it from the past with reminders of segregation and slavery.

[76] *Los Angeles Times* Poll, April 1985, USLAT.96.R085, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[77] Loury, "Moral Quandry," 20.

[78] Gwen Ifill, "Action Jackson," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition,* 4–10 April 1989.

[79] Benjamin Hooks, "African American or Black: What's in a Name?" *Ebony*, July 1989, 76.

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It is when African Americans are identified not just with other Africans but with the entire Third World, however, that they are associated with the broadest masses of victims of western imperialism. "For a century," Stokely Carmichael wrote, "this nation has been like an octopus of exploitation . . . stretching from Mississippi and Harlem to South America . . . and Vietnam . . . a powerful few have been maintained and enriched at the expense of the poor and voiceless colored masses."[80] Infusing class analysis with racial content—identifying imperialism with racism—was an accomplishment of the New Left and black revolutionaries of the late 1960s that has endured among many intellectuals and black political elites. It encourages African Americans to identify and ally with other exploited masses in a nonracial united front. The Poor People's March on Washington in 1968 was offered as a mass movement not limited to blacks, and Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition was also cast as a quilt of many colors of the dispossessed, not limited to the African American patch.

Jackson refers to himself as having grown up as a "Third World resident in the first world" and of having been "born in occupied territory, having lived for all of my developing years under apartheid" (in Greenville, South Carolina).[81] Several activists have found the choice of revolutionary constituencies and alliances, ideology and tactics difficult since the 1960s. After late-1967 Stokely Carmichael stressed ties between the black liberation struggle in the United States and Third World liberation everywhere, but he broke with the Panthers in 1969 because of their willingness to ally with white radicals like the Weathermen for broader class struggle against American imperialism. Malcolm X, on the other hand, became less interested in a separate Afro-American nation than in revolutionary internationalism after he broke with Elijah Muhammad.[82] Similarly, the writer Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) worked for nationalist mobilization of urban blacks until 1976, when he renounced separatism and its black aesthetic movement, calling them racist and reactionary, and returned to Marxism.[83]

Jesse Jackson has refused to choose from starkly opposed radical models, and in his calls for an African American ethnicity he has combined race and class consciousness in what might be called a late-Malcolm X formula: first, ethnic unity; then multiethnic and revolutionary internationalism. But Jackson has also explained African American cultural nationalism in an early Stokely Carmichael style, alternating a colonial (black colony in the United States) analogy with the model of open pluralism. One element of the Black Power movement—threats of violence—has been missing entirely from the African American offensive. But in each of the portrayals of African Americans offered on behalf of the phrase—whether minority or masses, the many or the few—blacks are victims entitled to restitution.

[80] Carmichael, "What We Want," 6.

[81] Arch Puddington, "Jesse Jackson, the Blacks and American Foreign Policy," *Commentary*, April 1984, 20.

[82] Theodore Draper, "The Fantasy of Black Nationalism," *Commentary*, September 1969, 40.

[83] Martin Kilson, "Politics and Identity among Black Intellectuals," *Dissent*, Summer 1981, 340.

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Reparation and Separation

The themes of the African American campaign resonated through many black issues in 1989, including the demands for reparations, for Afrocentric curricula in schools, for an African American museum in Washington, D.C., and for D.C. statehood. The December 1988 Chicago meeting of heads of dozens of black organizations (after which Jesse Jackson announced that blacks wanted to be called African Americans) led to a gathering of a thousand activists at an African American Summit in New Orleans the next April. The summit meeting to set a black agenda for the 1990s was intended to be a strategic planning session on the scale of the first National Black Political Convention in March 1972 in Gary, Indiana.

As before, the 1989 African American Summit was dominated by activists of the protest wing of black elites, and the warmest applause was reserved for Angela Davis (of the National Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression), Lenora Fulani (of the New Alliance Party), and Louis Farrakhan (of the Nation of Islam).[84] Most of the 4,000 invited did not attend, including the heads of mainstream organizations like the NAACP and the Urban League, all but three members of the congressional Black Caucus, and mayors from big cities, except for New Orleans. But the organizers from the December Chicago meeting were there, along with Coretta Scott King, SCLC President Joseph Lowery, and Democratic Party National Chairman Ron Brown. Among the speakers, Louis Farrakhan and Jesse Jackson stressed most heavily the need for renewed awareness of African heritage. Updating 1960s charges of black genocide that underlined most heavily the common view of blacks as victims of manipulation and exploitation, Farrakhan warned of secret U.S. government policies to perpetuate poverty and drug abuse in the black community; his demands for reparations drew standing ovations.[85]

"We call for reparations," the summit resolution declared. "If they are good enough for the Japanese Americans, and native Americans, they are good for those of us who worked for hundreds of years unpaid, and who now need that capital that was used to build America and Europe, for our own development in this country."[86] Gathering concisely most of the premises of the African American movement—and those of its late 1960s Black Power predecessor—this resolution expressed as well the movement's primary policy implication: racial reparations. It recalled the reparations demands in 1969 of SNCC's James Forman for $500 million (later raised to $3 billion) from white churches and of the Council on Racial Equality's (CORE) Roy Innis for $6 billion from the banking industry as compensation for centuries of racist and imperialist oppression.[87] Except for Bayard Rustin (who called Forman's demands another form of "hustle"), both moderate

[84] Gwen Ifill and Thomas Edsall, "Infighting Mars Black Activists' Summit," *Washington Post*, 23 April 1989.

[85] Kevin McGill, "Farrakhan Brings Fiery Close to Meeting of Blacks," The Associated Press, 23 April 1989, AM Cycle.

[86] "Race: The Price of Penance," *Time*, 8 May 1989, 33.

[87] Stephen C. Rose, "Putting It to the Churches," *New Republic*, 21 June 1969, 20.

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and radical black leaders endorsed the reparations goal.[88] For example, even moderate Whitney M. Young, Jr. declared to the 1968 CORE convention that black people had given their sweat and tears in the development of this country and they "have a claim to every acre and institution."[89] It was not, however, a mass movement; a majority of blacks opposed the demand for reparations from churches in 1969.[90]

The twenty-year-old claim to reparations underscored several premises widely accepted among black elites, including a view of capital as treasure to be held, seized, or shared. Redistribution through politics then has been seen as the key to economic development, as in Stokely Carmichael's call for empowerment and self-reliance: "Black people must do things for themselves; they must get poverty money they will control and spend themselves. . . ."[91] African American political elites have tended to share Third World socialists' view of wealth as something acquired at the expense of the poor and economic development as something wrested from others.

In April 1989 the Detroit city council asked Congress to establish a $40 billion education fund for the descendants of slaves, and U.S. Representative John Conyers (D.-Mich.) introduced a bill in November for a commission to consider reparations.[92] "The passage of the Japanese World War II bill [providing $20,000 to each of the 60,000 surviving Japanese American internees] has rekindled sparks in the Black community," according to D.C. congressional delegate Walter Fauntroy, and a Massachusetts senate bill would require the commonwealth to negotiate with "legitimate representatives" of Africans' descendants born in the United States to consider claims like those filed by American Indians for compensation for lost land.[93]

In California at Berkeley, students are required to take a comparative course on American ethnic groups, focusing on three of five: African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, Native Americans, or European Americans.[94] In New York the State Board of Regents' report of a new "Curriculum of Inclusion" began by observing that "African Americans, Asian Americans, Puerto Ricans/Latinos and Native Americans have all been victims of an intellectual and educational oppression that has characterized the culture and institutions of the United States and the European American world for centuries."[95] And in Washington, D.C., the school

[88] "Report from Black America," *Newsweek*, 30 June 1969, 31.

[89] Earl Caldwell, "Young Embraces Black Power Idea," *New York Times*, 7 July 1968.

[90] Gallup Poll, May 1969, USAIP069-0781.Q7, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[91] Carmichael, "What We Want," 6.

[92] "Race: The Price of Penance," *Time*, 8 May 1989, 33; "Paying for Sins of the Past," *Newsweek*, 22 May 1989, 44.

[93] Tracie Reddick, "Conyers Asks Study of Slave Reparations," *Washington Times*, 8 December 1989.

[94] Jennifer McNulty, "UC Faculty Approves Controversial Ethnic Studies Requirement," The Associated Press, 29 May 1989, PM cycle.

[95] Tony Snow, "Professor Nietzsche's Blackboard Jungle," *Washington Times*, 4 January 1990.

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system received a $150,000 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to develop Afrocentric lesson plans and activities to replace its Eurocentric curriculum.[96]

Though there are more than one hundred black museums featuring black culture nationwide, none is seen as a national center; backers of a National African American Museum lobbied in 1989 for legislation to construct a free-standing building on the mall in Washington along the lines of plans for a National Museum of the American Indian pending in the House. Supporters of an African American museum rejected the idea of including it in the Smithsonian, insisting that the African American experience should not be assimilated into the rest of American history.[97]

The African American theme of separate representation appeared as well in calls for statehood for the District of Columbia, the "Nation's Last Colony," according to road signs posted by supporters. Jesse Jackson called the city "under occupation" and said he does "not rest easy with a Senate in 1989 that based upon this formula of exclusion has, you know, 100 white senators . . . and African Americans and Hispanics are locked out of the equation."[98] District statehood would virtually guarantee two African American seats in the U.S. Senate and achieve (though only symbolically) two goals of some black nationalists of the 1960s: self-determination and territorial separation from white America.

Mobilizing Black Opinion—Elites and Masses

Both the Black Power movement and its African American successor aimed at raising black consciousness and mobilizing black opinion, and the contours of that opinion indicate the success of those efforts as well as their limits. For twenty years black elites have encouraged their constituents to consider themselves victims of institutional racism. When polled in general terms, black respondents tend to agree that discrimination is widespread. Asked about the reasons for blacks' worse jobs, housing, and incomes, 69 percent agreed in September 1989 that it is mainly due to discrimination, and 67 percent agreed that it is because blacks lack the chance for an education.[99] Three-fourths agreed that blacks are not achieving equality because many whites do not want them to get ahead.[100] Asked in 1978 about discrimination against various groups in the United States, black respondents were

[96] Jenice Armstrong, "Grant Furthers Afro-Centric Curriculum in D.C. Schools," *Washington Post*, 21 December 1989.

[97] Kara Swisher, "Black History Museum Plan Sparks Debate," *Washington Post*, 16 October 1989.

[98] R. H. Melton, "Jackson Decries 'Occupation': Mayoralty Without Statehood Said to Be Far Less Attractive," *Washington Post*, 6 December 1989.

[99] ABC/*Washington Post* Poll, September 1989, USABCWP.89RACE.R21AB, R21CB, R21DB, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[100] ABC/*Washington Post* Poll, September 1989, USABCWP.89RACE.R22CB, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

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far more likely than nonblacks to perceive discrimination everywhere, against all other groups, though they saw themselves as the greatest victims.[101]

Middle-class blacks were a major target for racial mobilization by the Black Power movement, and that effort has generally succeeded. Blacks with college experience are more likely than others to perceive widespread discrimination and blame whites for blacks' circumstances. Some intraracial class differences remain, however. One recent study found higher-status blacks expressing less of a sense of black autonomy (separatism) and feeling less close than lower-status blacks to black masses and to black elites.[102]

But while blacks, especially those with some college, tend to agree that prejudice is widespread when asked about racism in general, they also report surprisingly few personal experiences with discrimination and display optimism about the future. In 1978 three-fourths of black respondents in large, northern industrial cities said that a young hard-working black "can usually get ahead in this country in spite of prejudice and discrimination."[103] And when asked in 1988 about the importance of several factors in getting ahead in life, 76 percent said that well-educated parents were very important or essential; 96 percent cited the importance of having a good education yourself; 94 percent cited the importance of hard work; but only 38 percent said that a person's race was similarly important in getting ahead in life.[104]

Accepting elites' portrayals of systemic racism, black respondents are generally more likely to say they see discrimination nationally than they find in their own areas. In 1980, 73 percent said there was very little or no tension between whites and blacks in their own area, and only 4 percent said those relations were worse than a couple of years before.[105] Ten years earlier, a Harris poll found more than two-thirds similarly reporting "pleasant and easy" personal relationships with whites.[106] In 1978, 66 percent said they had never been personally discriminated against for a job or promotion or in housing.[107] 72 percent of respondents in Watts in 1980 said they had experienced discrimination personally "not much" or "practically not at all."[108] In 1989, 74 percent of blacks said they had never or almost

[101] Roper Poll, February 1978, USRPSS7803.Q27, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[102] Richard L. Allen, Michael C. Dawson, and Ronald E. Brown, "A Schema-Based Approach to Modeling an African-American Racial Belief System," *American Political Science Review* 83 (June 1989): 433.

[103] CBS/*New York Times* Poll, February 1978, USCBSNYT78-FEB.Q34, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[104] Northwestern University Survey Laboratory, October 1988, USNWEST.88BLK.R08, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[105] Roper Poll, July 1980, USRPRR8007.Q10, 11, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[106] "The Black Mood: More Militant, More Hopeful, More Determined," *Time*, 6 April 1970, 29.

[107] CBS/*New York Times* Poll, February 1978, USCBSNYT78-FEB.Q42A, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[108] *Los Angeles Times* Poll, July 1980, USLAT80-033.Q40, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

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never encountered prejudice in their social lives; 76 percent said they encountered no prejudice in seeking housing; 68 percent said prejudice was only a minor factor or none at all in getting ahead in their jobs; and 77 percent said prejudice was similarly unimportant in trying to get a good education.[109]

Black elites have generally portrayed racial conditions in crisis and deteriorating steadily, but black respondents have felt differently. "Nationwide, blacks were most optimistic about the trend in patterns of discrimination, with 65 percent believing there was less discrimination in the 1979–1982 period than 20 years earlier. . .; 58 percent believing that there would be less discrimination 20 years later. . . ."[110] In 1981, 60 percent said that the quality of life for blacks in the United States had gotten better, and only 18 percent said it was worse than ten years before.[111] In 1987, only 12 percent of blacks said that racial relations were worse than ten years before.[112] In numerous polls, the proportion saying opportunities for blacks have gotten worse in the last few years rarely rises above 25 percent, and optimism for the future is also widespread, with twice as many blacks usually saying they expect improvement in opportunities and quality of life as predicting decline.[113]

Leaders of the campaign for African American have said that reemphasizing African heritage is important to instill a greater sense of racial and individual worth, especially among black youths. However, many studies have shown that blacks have self-esteem equal to or greater than whites.[114] In 1969, 75 percent said they thought most Negroes agreed that "Black is beautiful," while only 16 percent thought not.[115] Asked then if Negroes have a special soul that most whites have not experienced, 54 percent agreed and only 22 percent disagreed. When asked to describe that soul, more referred to qualities of musical (20 percent) and emotional (18.5 percent) expressiveness than to any others; and references to shared experiences of suffering (14.7 percent) were only the third most frequent response.[116] Unlike many elites, racial pride for most blacks has not required racial resentment. Similarly in 1980, 81 percent of black respondents said that most black people preferred being black.[117]

[109] Gordon Black/*USA Today*, August 1989, USGBUSA.893167.R08, 09, 02, 03, 04, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[110] Gerald David Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds., *A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1989), 132.

[111] ABC/*Washington Post* Poll, 1981, USABCWP.Q32A, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[112] Roper Poll, 1987, USRPRR8706.Q42Y, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[113] Gordon Black/*USA Today* Poll, August 1989, GBUSA.893167.QR19; ABC/*Washington Post* Poll, January 1986, USABCWP.213.R42, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[114] Michael Hughes and David Demo, "Self-Perceptions of Black Americans: Self-Esteem and Personal Efficacy," *American Journal of Sociology* 95 (July 1989): 132.

[115] Gallup Poll, May 1969, USAIPOSPG069-6955.Q77, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[116] Gallup Poll, May 1969, USAIPOSPG069-6955.Q23A, Q23B, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[117] Dresner, Morris & Tortorello for Data Black Polls, January 1980, USTORTJAN80DABLK.Q37, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

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Supporters of the African American cultural offensive said that the new term was necessary to encourage African Americans to identify with other Africans and develop a stronger sense of ethnic loyalty. But the 1979–1980 National Survey of Black Americans found twice as many saying that being black was more important to them than saying that being American was more important (though 71 percent rated both equally important); and more than twice as many said they felt closer to black people in Africa than said they felt closer to white people in America.[118]

Yet for twenty years, most black Americans have also resisted Black Power separatism. In 1969, 59 percent disagreed with the statement that "Negroes can get what they want only by banding together as Black people against the whites, because the whites will never help Negroes"; and 73 percent denied that "Negroes should give up working with whites and just depend on their own people."[119] Again in 1978, 93 percent disapproved of the idea that blacks should not have anything to do with whites if they can help it.[120] Blacks have also consistently favored racially mixed neighborhoods and workplaces by large margins.

Whether moderate or radical, most black leaders for decades have favored larger government income transfer programs. Black opinion, however, has been more ambivalent about government activism, welfare, and racial preferences. Blacks have generally favored government activism;[121] three times more agreed that government should do everything possible to improve living standards than felt that "people should take care of themselves" in 1988; and 71 percent said the federal government is doing too little to help blacks.[122] But black majorities have also sometimes been suspicious of government welfare programs, fearing that they create dependency for the poor; and blacks have responded variously as well to affirmative action preferences. In 1969, 85 percent rejected preferences over whites in hiring and college admissions, but reactions to questions about racial quotas and preferences since have been ambiguous depending on question wording.[123]

Changing Names—Media and Masses

Blacks called themselves Africans until after 1816, when the American Colonization Society was founded to help them back to Africa; but neither then nor since

[118] Jaynes and Williams, eds., *Common Destiny*, 134.

[119] Gallup Poll, May 1969, USAIPOSPG069.Q78A, 18, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[120] CBS/*New York Times* Poll, February 1978, USCBSNYT78-FEB.Q35B, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[121] Jaynes and Williams, eds., *Common Destiny*, 212–214.

[122] Northwestern University Survey Laboratory Poll, October 1988, USNWEST.88BLK.R04, R05; Gallup/*Newsweek* Poll, February 1988, USGALNEW.030788.R11B, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[123] Gallup Poll, May 1969, USAIPOSPG069–6955.Q19, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

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have very many black Americans been interested in Africa. However, several black organizations have retained the reference, for example, the African Methodist Episcopal Church. After the Civil War, freedman came into use, succeeded by Afro-American, even Afraamerican, tan, colored, negro, and Negro. Announcing the switch to African American, Jesse Jackson said, "Just as we were called colored, but were not that, and then Negro, but not that, to be called Black is just as baseless," though he led in establishing black two decades earlier.[124] To portray blacks again as objects of manipulation, he implied wrongly that earlier racial terms were imposed on his race by its oppressors. Each of the previous shifts from colored to Negro to black emerged from within the group and won gradual and often grudging acceptance in the larger society.[125] Colored was the preferred term when the NAACP was founded in 1909, but Negro became popular among avant-garde blacks in New York in the 1920s. These shifts in usage were accompanied by arguments over the ideological and political implications of names that reappeared later in the 1960s. Negro was opposed by militant radicals like Adam Clayton Powell and nationalists like Elijah Muhammad, who preferred black even then. But Booker T. Washington, Marcus Garvey, and W.E.B. DuBois used Negro, and DuBois defended the term against charges that it was a white man's word.[126] The *New York Times* agreed to capitalize Negro in 1930, and the term was common in polite society until radicals spread black in the 1960s. However, Afro-American and African American were also politically acceptable to Black Power militants and preferred by many separatists, as in Malcolm X's Organization of Afro-American Unity. Those terms had been used for decades, and their cultural nationalist flavor has continued to be favored especially in artistic, literary, and academic nomenclature.

Though the cultural offensive to use African American in 1989 revived many of the ideological themes of the Black Power movement, the latest effort has lacked the confrontational intensity, the intraracial class-based and generational hostility, and the intimidating tactics of the Black Power movement. Then black militants confronted Negroes and whites demanding new black names and organizations as marks of group loyalty or racial sensitivity, but in 1989 similar incidents were few. In 1972 the New York delegation to the National Black Political Convention barred white reporters from press conferences and issued rules for coverage of delegation activities, including using black "in referring to all people of African descent."[127] But in 1989 Jesse Jackson visited editorial boards of several major newspapers to try to persuade them to use African American.

Supporters of African American did not try immediately to make using black an ideological or social offense, and most black political and media elites quickly approved the term, though not necessarily its exclusive use. Perhaps remembering

[124] Page, "African American or Black?"
[125] Stephen Thernstrom, "Just Say Afro," *New Republic*, 23 January 1989, 10.
[126] W. E. B. DuBois, "The Name 'Negro,'" *The Crisis*, March 1928.
[127] "Nominee Doubted at Black Parley," *New York Times*, 8 March 1972.

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earlier Black Power assaults on the NAACP, Executive Director Benjamin Hooks was one of the few to respond with reserve, and the organization refused either to endorse or oppose African American.[128] By the fall of 1989, Urban League documents included the new term. Senior columnist Carl T. Rowan demurred, saying it would be no help, but most responded as Clarence Page did, saying that although he had not been consulted on the name change, it was fine with him.[129]

As in the late 1960s, black mass opinion lagged behind elite mobilization. In June 1989 four times more black respondents preferred black than chose African American, but even more said the choice did not matter to them.[130] By late September, 68 percent said they had heard or read of the new term, though two-thirds still preferred black.[131] Many of the largest black-oriented newspapers and radio stations in major markets adopted the change, with disk jockeys' on-air use especially effective in reaching mass audiences. The Johnson publications (*Jet*, *Ebony*) accepted the new phrase (though black continued to appear far more often in those pages) along with the *Chicago Daily Defender* and the *Amsterdam News* in New York, joining the *Atlanta Voice* which had used the term for years.[132] The program director of Chicago's WOCI-AM said in April 1989 that listeners were already beginning to match their staffers' adoption of African American: "There are times when a person might quote unquote slip, but they correct themselves."[133]

Editorials and columnists in most major newspapers approved the new phrase, but editors on national desks were slower to change their style books. For example, African American was used only eight times by *New York Times* reporters from the national desk in 1989, though the phrase appeared 103 times in other news stories, another 103 times in quotations, 49 times in the titles of programs or organizations, and 61 times in editorials, letters, opinion columns, and book reviews that year—*not* counting the times the phrase appeared in references to the controversy over the term itself.

The same pattern was apparent in the *Washington Post*, where the phrase appeared in 1989 only four times in the first section, six times in the metro section, but 96 times in quotations, 95 times in titles, and 119 times in editorials, letters, and the *Book World*—*not* counting references to the use of the term itself. African American also appeared in the *Washington Post* 104 times in 1989 in references to George Stallings's founding his Imani Temple to celebrate African American

[128] Hooks, "African American or Black," 78.

[129] Carl T. Rowan, "Another New Label Won't Help," *Kansas City Times*, 18 January 1989; Clarence Page, "Semantic Shift to 'African Americans' Makes Sense in Several Important Ways," *Kansas City Times*, 29 December 1988.

[130] *New York Times* Poll, June 1989, USNYT.89WMN1.R67A, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[131] ABC/*Washington Post* Poll, September 1989, USABCWP.89RACE.R30B, R31B, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn.

[132] Isabel Wilkerson, "'African-American' Favored by Many of America's Blacks," *New York Times*, 31 January 1989.

[133] Paul Galloway, "African American or Black? A Poll of Cultural Identity," *Chicago Tribune*, 26 April 1989.

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rites for his African American Catholic Congregation—a big Washington story carried nationally. In such stories and others about the campaign for African American itself, the phrase was virtually forced into news columns by controversy surrounding its partisans and began to seem increasingly familiar, despite news editors' caution and the larger number of keystrokes the new term required. This repeated the pattern of the late 1960s, when black references multiplied first in stories about Black Power militants, even though reporters still used Negro in news writing. At many publications then, white editors took their cue from black reporters until a policy decision was made to change usage.[134] "In 1967, a notice went up in the *Globe* newsroom that from then on, Negroes were Blacks," but most other papers took a year or longer to shift gradually.[135] In *Time* and *Newsweek*, black outnumbered Negro by late 1968, and in the next three years, Negro gradually disappeared there. African American appeared twenty times in the pages of *Time* in 1989 (including ten references in just one March story and four times in quotations) but only fourteen times in *Newsweek* that year (including seven times in quotations). Unless African American supporters make the phrase into a mark of racial sensitivity for whites and loyalty for blacks in the 1990s, it is unlikely to displace black quickly in the national press, despite its fast start in black media.

African American Campaigns

Finally, the campaign for African American had meaning for Jesse Jackson personally and his political constituency. In a note to his campaign workers in the summer of 1988, Jackson told them they had already accomplished a "literal miracle—you have helped me set the agenda" for November and "helped bring the civil rights movement to life as a force in national electoral politics."[136] But by the fall, he had been carefully relegated to a marginal role in the campaign which ended in the same unambiguous defeat as in 1984.

Within weeks of that earlier Reagan landslide, Jackson and other black activists mounted a media-oriented campaign against Reagan policy toward South Africa that reasserted the centrality of black issues on the national agenda and the importance of blacks in the Democratic party. Jesse Jackson did not dominate black leaders' participation in presidential politics in 1984. Many endorsed Walter Mondale, and a *Newsweek* poll found 51 percent of black Democrats choosing Mondale, compared to 38 percent for Jackson; and only 11 percent agreed that Jackson "represents Black Americans better than any one person."[137] His campaign that year was for status—among blacks, in the press, and in the party—as much as for the presidency. But by the summer it deteriorated into personal demands for patronage on Mondale's staff and for "respect" from Mondale publicly.

[134] "Identity Crisis," *Newsweek*, 30 June 1969, 62.

[135] Alan Lupo, "Sax-ual Encounters," *Boston Globe*, 28 December 1988.

[136] Philip Geyelin, "But He Still Has an Accommodating Streak," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 18–24 July 1988, 28.

[137] "What Jesse Jackson Wants," *Newsweek*, 7 May 1984, 42.

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By 1988, however, Jesse Jackson did dominate black participation in the election, and he guarded that status carefully, demanding "sensitivity" from Michael Dukakis and complaining when Dukakis failed to consult him before speaking at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1963 March on Washington.[138] Though Jackson did not control the postelection anti-apartheid campaign in 1984, he led from the beginning its 1988 counterpart, the campaign for African American, to reassert the primacy of black claims after the latest national electoral defeat. Jackson succeeded in becoming accepted (first in the national press by 1984 and then by a majority of blacks by 1988) as Martin Luther King's successor, but he failed in becoming accepted by electoral majorities as a national figure able to transcend his original constituency. He failed primarily as a candidate lacking government experience who was also to the left of all the liberal Democrats who lost national elections since 1968. But he also failed because the implicit themes in the black-oriented sector of his campaign could not be missed by white majorities.

There may be inherent tension for an explicitly racial candidate (even a progressive one who tries simultaneously for a class coalition of the dispossessed) that non-racial black candidates like Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley, New York Mayor David Dinkins, or Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder do not face. The Jackson campaign aimed first at racial mobilization with race-based emotional appeals that worked. Yet in "following Jackson, Blacks voluntarily walked out of the American political mainstream," and he succeeded finally only in making blacks complicit in their own political segregation.[139] Jesse Jackson received more than 90 percent of black Democratic primary votes in 1988, along with 13 percent of white votes; but neither represented an underclass. Roughly half the black Jackson voters had attended college, and nearly half had annual family incomes of $25,000 or more. White Jackson voters were an even better educated and more upscale group; 70 percent had attended college.[140] Despite Jackson's attempt simultaneously to mobilize blacks stressing shared suffering and entitlement (symbolized later as African heritage) but to explain it as just celebrating pluralistic diversity, toleration, and sharing, most white voters in 1988 fled the underlying racial themes in his campaigns. So did most successful black candidates running nonracial campaigns in 1989, like the first black mayors elected in New Haven and Seattle, who avoided public closeness with Jackson.

Jesse Jackson strived for first and secured finally in 1988 his place as successor to Martin Luther King, Jr., a status he had sought for twenty years. With the campaign for African American he reaffirmed that role, taking the lead in reassuring his prime constituency while reasserting its importance in American politics and the legitimacy of its claims on American society in the postelection season. Testing the power of names and naming, the cultural offensive for African American suc-

[138] "Notebook," *New Republic*, 26 September 1988, 18.

[139] Williams, "How Reagan and Jackson Managed to Isolate Blacks."

[140] Martin Plissner and Warren Mitofsky, "The Changing Jackson Voter," *Public Opinion* 11 (July-August 1988): 57.

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ceeded in 1989 at a faster pace than the Black Power movement in its first year in persuading blacks (elites, quickly; others, more slowly) to redefine themselves and whites to comply in public usage. As the newly fashionable phrase continues to gain currency, it may begin to lose in common use some of the ideological undertones intended by the leaders of the African American campaign, just as black has lost some of its confrontational edge since the late 1960s. Just as likely, however, is that the smoldering imagery of collective innocence, grievance, shame, and guilt embedded in the expression will be widely and unconsciously accepted, latent in everyday use.

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Alliance Pathology: Institutional Lessons of the 1930s

ALEXANDER J. GROTH
RICHARD G. RANDALL

Does the history of alliances confirm the role conventionally assigned to them in the literature of international relations? Not without important exceptions, it would seem. French alliance policies of the interwar period (1919–1939) suggest a modification of the traditional role of alliance as a means of strengthening the position of nation states.[1] Whatever the particulars of a given case, the traditional notion of alliance is closely linked with enhancement of state capabilities. States enter alliances in order to be stronger, safer, and generally better off

[1] For literature of alliance, see among others Julian R. Freidman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen, eds., *Alliance in International Politics* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970); Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice* (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1985); Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); note also Pitman B. Potter, *An Introduction to the Study of International Organizations*, 5th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948), 167–173; Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares*, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), 54–55, 246–247, 250, 255–256; Michael Banks, ed., *Conflict in World Society* (London: Harvester Press, 1984), 5–6; 120; Stanley Hoffman, "International Organization and the International System" in Leland M. Goodrich and David A. Kay, eds., *International Organization: Politics and Process* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), 49–73. Hoffman's discussion of the usefulness of alliances in securing peace revolves around the familiar condition about an underlying consensus among the participant states. The pathological possibilities of alliance systems are not addressed in any of these treatments. See also Stephen S. Goodspeed, *The Nature and Function of International Organization*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 61–63. For text of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Locarno Pact, see R. A. Akindele, *The Organization and Promotion of World Peace* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 151–159.

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presumably than they would be alone. What the French experience indicates is the development of a volatile domestic political situation in which the legitimate, manifest purposes of alliance become substantially subordinated to pathological, latent ones. Political leaders use mechanisms – bilateral or multilateral as the case might be – not in order to advance national security and welfare, but seemingly more to avoid having to take costly and risky measures and to create illusions about vigorous but largely empty diplomatic activity that may be politically useful to them at home.[2]

Situations in which such pathological malfunctions have occurred may be described; and it may be of some practical importance to appreciate the potential of alliance pathology. Yet, as the French experience also illustrates, there may be some irreducible ambiguities in all alliance situations.

At the conclusion of World War I, no French leader, indeed no intelligent French citizen, could have contemplated the resumption of all-out Franco-German conflict without the help of other states. France's population, birth rate, and industrial capacity would not have been adequate to defeat Germany in any lengthy duel one might envision within two or more decades of the armistice of 1918. On the other hand, would reliance upon others supplement or replace one's own national resolve? If French pursuit of alliances to balance resurgent German power had created collaborative mechanisms so transparently cumbersome or unrealistic that France could never count on them in its hour of need, one might reasonably infer that something was badly amiss. Alliance diplomacy was not really meeting France's security needs. If anything, it may have nourished public illusions with respect to the support of France by such entities as the League of Nations, Britain, the signatories of Locarno, Poland, or Yugoslavia.

The range of possible explanations for France's alliance problems of the 1930s is obviously very wide. At one extreme is the scenario of inevitable tragedy. Given all of the circumstances of European politics of that period, perhaps the rational purposes of French diplomacy were beyond attainment. No resolute allies could be found to help the French contain German expansion. Alternatively, perhaps good and laudable purposes were being badly or ineffectively pursued by some French politicians and diplomats. Perhaps particular actors outside of France were actually at fault. Still another explanation – suggested by France's domestic political context and not inconsistent with various others – is the conscious and probably also subconscious resort to alliance diplomacy as a way of actually evading self-defense measures.

Given France's domestic situation in the 1920s and the 1930s it is plausible to think that short-term costs, risks, and benefits to French politicians would incline many of them toward alliance politics as a way of *escaping* difficult choices and actions in the arena of foreign policy.

[2] One aspect of this situation is reflected in the words of Robert Merton: "Adherence to the rules, originally conceived as a means becomes transformed into an end-in-itself, there occurs the familiar process of displacement of goals whereby an instrumental value becomes a terminal value," *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1968), 253.

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Some Evidence: Classic Case?

The nature of the problem became starkly evident in the aftermath of Adolf Hitler's military occupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936. Since the conclusion of World War I, France's policy had been directed toward the containment of Germany through a series of multilateral and bilateral alliances. Hitler's action put these alliances to a test.

Outwardly, France's diplomatic and military posture seemed formidable. The French viewed the Franco-British alliance as the *sine qua non* of their ability to resist any potential German aggression. Additional alliance networks were created by the French, or with their participation, in the 1925 Locarno Pact and through the League of Nations in 1919 on the underlying principle of collective security through international action to contain aggression and to safeguard the territorial and political status quo of postwar Europe. The Locarno Pact guaranteed the western borders of Germany as established at Versailles, with Belgium, Italy, France, Britain, and Germany all pledged to enforce it. The Germans agreed to give up all claims to Alsace-Lorraine and to maintain a demilitarized zone of fifty kilometers east of the Rhine. France also negotiated mutual assistance pacts with Poland in 1921, Czechoslovakia in 1924, and one with the Soviet Union in 1935.

The French maintained a large military establishment with a much larger air force and navy than what was available to Hitler at the beginning of 1936 and also the largest and most prestigious land army in all of Europe. France occupied the Rhineland ostensibly to insure the payment of German war reparations in 1923; and it proceeded with the construction of the Maginot line designed to safeguard the eastern frontier from a German attack.

Nevertheless, the underlying premise of French policy after World War I—critical to the understanding of France's alliance politics—was a haunting sense of weakness. It was a policy shadowed by fear and worry for the future. If one can characterize many diverse streams of national opinion, France saw itself grievously wounded by the War of 1914–1918, physically depleted and exhausted, inherently weaker and "smaller" than Germany, and in the long run unable to hold off another German onslaught. In addition, virtually all leading French politicians and diplomats, judging by their own testimony, were haunted by the sense of mutual division and mistrust at home, which they viewed as a constraint on what they might be able to do in the realm of what we nowadays would call national security policy. Thus, from the very beginning of the postwar period, France's search for alliances had a desperate quality about it. In a psychological, if not legal-political, sense it was seen in France not so much as a useful supplement to other national resources for the maintenance of French independence and integrity, but as the principal hope for the solution of France's German problem: the containment of her mortally dangerous traditional enemy in the east.

The ultimate paradox of French policy became evident on 7 March 1936, when Hitler sent German armed forces into the Rhineland in clear violation of the Locarno Pact. All of the members of the French cabinet, as far as we can tell, recognized this action by Hitler not merely as illegal but as a grave threat to France's

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security. Nevertheless, apart from expressions of consternation and verbal protests, the principal response of the French government was to consult its allies, above all the British, through diplomatic channels. The results were both disappointing and also quite predictable. The British government, led by Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, feared war or the risk of war even more than the French. The British interpreted Hitler's actions to be no more than a German occupation of German territory. No great harm had been done. The peace of Europe had to be maintained, and the most important thing was to avoid any rash overreactions to this German measure. Further consultations among the nations were called for. Once the British position was made known, the attitude of the French, who were never eager for belligerent responses themselves, was as good as sealed.[3] Naturally, the positions of the much smaller and more vulnerable nations, such as Belgium, Holland, and Italy, became profoundly influenced by the Franco-British consensus. If France and Britain would not resist Germany, no one would. The paradox of the crisis of 7 March 1936 is that France, which was most directly threatened and undermined by the German initiative, was quite capable of repelling the German encroachment. If there are any certainties in history, it is retrospectively certain that France alone possessed the soldiers and armaments to expel the Nazis from the Rhineland and also to advance into Germany itself in 1936, if France so chose. German sources agree on this fact. The principal reason offered after the fact by French political leaders for the failure to take action against Hitler was the unwillingness of the British to support this kind of response and the French belief that without British support France was not strong enough to embark on military ventures against Germany.

Former French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet recalled his country's response to Hitler's announcement in 1935 that Germany would rearm in violation of Versailles restrictions:

> There is no doubt that France . . . was then capable of undertaking and establishing—even had she to do it on her own—another Ruhr operation a la Poincare.
>
> But we hesitated and marked time. We sent notes, protested half-heartedly—and in the result merely irritated the Germans and exposed our internal weaknesses. . . . We complained to the League of Nations! So at a moment when there was nothing between our armies and the Rhine—no Siegfried line, no modern air force, no panzer divisions—we let ourselves be publicly humiliated.[4]

And having done what was basically useless, what was France's next step? As Bonnet recalls, "This was [Foreign Minister Louis] Barthou's cue to launch a new [diplomatic] formula, Eastern Locarno . . . a coalition of friendly states in defense of Eastern Europe's Versailles frontiers against [Germany]."[5] Barthou was

[3] As William Shirer notes in his *Collapse of the Third Republic* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), 266, "No one in France, the politicians above all, especially with an election due in a few weeks, wanted to risk war, or upset the country by staging a total mobilization."

[4] Georges Bonnet, *Qual d'Orsay* (London: Times Press, 1965), 113.

[5] Ibid., 113–114.

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"warmly received" in Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade. He was "politely" received in Warsaw. This tour, as Bonnet notes, "bore no concrete results." It was "too fanciful to be practical politics."[6] And what of the subsequent failure of French response in March 1936? ". . . the fundamental reason was England's categoric decision that she could not risk war at that time. . . . The British nation was for once almost unanimous in that policy."[7]

But Bonnet's most telling observation is that "if France had been animated by a real will to resist then our Government would have been in duty bound to react immediately, without Britain, without the League. Once we accepted the procedures laid down by the League then compromise became the order of the day. The League was constituted in such a way that a well-organized opposition, using the League's procedure for all it was worth, could make quite sure that France's case never got anywhere."[8]

Retrospectively, political scientist Charles Micaud agrees that "England's attitude must have played an essential part in the decision of the Sarraut cabinet which refused to take radical measures."[9] He also points out that conservative opinion in France advocated no action against Germany without the help of allies, but simultaneously it viewed such help as "highly doubtful."[10] Premier Albert Sarraut's own explanation of the failure to stop the Nazi intrusion into the demilitarized Rhineland zone was as follows:

> The most important [opposition to military action] was from our foreign allies, who would not march and *who were even opposed to our marching alone.* . . . Opposition from French public opinion, which refused to risk war and was led by a press and by political parties that were also opposed to war. . . . Opposition from the military services, which were not ready for a victorious test of their war preparedness. . . . Thus, one after another, all the instruments of action broke apart in my hands. And it was necessary to decide to negotiate instead of fight."[11]

In a recent symposium on interwar appeasement policies, Gustav Schmidt has said that in Britain:

> . . . regard for public opinion meant that the decision-making process was partly blocked; the government and public opinion convinced themselves that basically Germany's demand for revision [of Versailles] was justified and that both the means of enforcement and the moral justification for even limited measures of retaliation were lacking."[12]

[6] Ibid., 114.

[7] Ibid., 140.

[8] Ibid., 141.

[9] Charles Micaud, *The French Right and Nazi Germany 1933-1939* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1943), 85-86.

[10] Ibid., 87-88. Also see Alexander Werth, *The Twilight of France 1933-1940* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), 66-70.

[11] See Robert Michael, *The Radicals and Nazi Germany: The Revolution in French Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy 1933-1939* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), 42-43. (Emphasis added.)

[12] Gustav Schmidt, "The Domestic Background of British Appeasement Policy" in Wolfgang J.

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On the other hand, Robert Frankenstein points out that France's

> . . . supposed dependence on Britain appeared sometimes as an alibi to justify their own appeasement action toward Germany. And, as a matter of fact, more firmness against the Reich on the French side might have pushed Britain to adopt an attitude of resistance. If France with her continental interests and her front-line position in front of Germany lacked political will, how was it possible to imagine that Britain . . . could have been more resolute? How could the British be more French than the French?[13]

Domestic Aspects

Britain and France suffered from somewhat different political pathologies. The common element between them was a widely diffused pacifism and a sense of inadequacy and weakness within the public opinion of each state. In both nations, the memories of World War I were profoundly traumatic. What differed between the two and apparently was worse in the French case was much greater alienation and fragmentation within the body politic.

In Britain the conservative governments of the 1930s operated with sólid majorities behind them, especially after the Tory landslide of 1935. This election assured Prime Ministers Stanley Baldwin and his successor Neville Chamberlain of overwhelming party support in Parliament. In France governments rested on much more precarious coalitions of parties with no majority for any one. There was also considerable division or fragmentation within the French parties; and there was an acute polarization and mutual alienation between France's extreme Left and the extreme Right—each much larger and more radical in outlook than their Left-Right counterparts in Great Britain.

The French Chamber of Deputies that served from 1932 to 1936 contained within it at least thirteen outwardly discernible political parties or groupings, the largest of which (the radical Socialists) had the support of less than 30 percent of the legislature. And the Radical Socialists were one of the most notoriously fragmented groups. The Chamber elected in 1936 had only ten major groupings within it, but the so-called moderates declined from 54 to 34 percent of the total; the following of the Right increased from 13.4 to 20.9 percent and the Communists rose from 3.1 to 11.7 percent of the total membership.[14] In contrast, the representation of the far Left and far Right in the British House of Commons in the mid-1930s was virtually nil; the decimated Labour Party of 1935 with only 154 members in a House of over 600, while clearly "leftist," was still easily part of the constitutional consensus in its attitude toward Britain's parliamentary democracy.

Mommsen and Lothar Ketternacker, eds., *The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1983); see Elaine Winrich, *British Labour's Foreign Policy* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1952), 150–151, for a defense of Labour's 1936 allegedly "staunchly anti-fascist" foreign policy—through Locarno and collective action under the League of Nations.

[13] Robert Frankenstein, "The Decline of France and French Appeasement Policies, 1936–1939," Mommsen and Ketternacker, *Fascist Challenge*, 236.

[14] See Micaud, *French Right*, 236–237.

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When former Cabinet Minister Paul Reynaud made a radio address to the French people in March 1938, he cried out in vain for a national unity that had been long lost. He said:

> France is making a terrible spectacle of herself. All the quarrels, all the rancor, all the bitterness of political strife, have come to the surface. Is it not time that we rise above ourselves, forget our party and class differences and become children of the same country, children of a country in danger? . . . Can it be that France has lost its instinct of self-preservation?[15]

In Britain the issue was not division but the unity among voters to escape war at virtually any price and any risk, with very substantial Left-Right consensus. On 12 November 1936, Baldwin told the House of Commons:

> You will remember the election at Fulham in the autumn of 1933, when a seat which the national government held was lost by 7,000 votes on no issue but the pacifist. . . . My position as the leader of a great party was not altogether a comfortable one. . . . supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and that we must rearm, does anyone think that this pacifist democracy would have rallied to that cry at that moment? I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain. . . .[16]

Winston Churchill subsequently noted in *The Gathering Storm*:

> It would be wrong in judging the policy of the British Government not to remember the passionate desire for peace which animated the uninformed, misinformed majority of the British people, and seemed to threaten with political extinction any party or politician who dared to take any other line. This, of course, is no excuse for political leaders who fall short of their duty. It is much better for parties or politicians to be turned out of office than to imperil the life of the nation.[17]

In Britain, as in France, the huge loss of life in World War I created a strong pacifist feeling. The Conservative Party favored a withdrawal from the continent almost as total as that of the United States.[18] The Labour Party resented French objections to German economic recovery and the French alliance system in Eastern Europe. Labour, too, suggested that the Franco-German problem lay in a League of Nations solution.[19]

[15] Paul Reynaud, *In the Thick of the Fight 1930–1945* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), 320.

[16] Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 216.

[17] Martin Gilbert, *Britain and Germany Between the Wars* (London: Longmans, 1964), 59; also see Sabine Wichert, "The British Left and Appeasement: Political Tactics or Alternative Policies?" in Mommsen and Ketternacker, *Fascist Challenge*, 125–141; W. R. Rock, *Appeasement on Trial: British Foreign Policy and Its Critics 1938–1939* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

[18] Margaret George, *The Warped Vision* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965), 27.

[19] Ibid., 28.

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IMPLICATIONS

Thus, the British had made a guarantee through Locarno that they did not intend to enforce, and the French had backed into a negotiated League settlement in an era in which they were militarily stronger than their potential adversary.[20] In the upshot, France's system of alliances not only did not augment its national strength but detracted from it. Thanks to alliance politics, France did *less* to oppose aggression than it alone was capable of doing.[21]

There are good reasons for believing that France's behavior in March 1936 was not so much *constrained* as it was *legitimized* and outwardly justified by the alliance system. Much of the evidence for this proposition is suggested by the work of diplomatic historians and scholars who have studied the interwar period. Arnold Wolfers sees the French abandoning all use of unilateral options quite early, perhaps as early as the mid-1920s. He says:

> Had they [the French] been willing to trust the sheer force of the military superiority which they possessed in 1919, they would not have been so much worried by legal considerations. But once they became convinced that in the long run they would have to be assured of British support, their freedom to employ what coercive means they possessed was greatly curtailed. . . . France, once she wanted to have British consent or cooperation for coercive action against Germany, had to bow to the British interpretation of the law.[22]

The Versailles settlement established that German military forces would never again be allowed west of a line thirty miles east of and parallel to the Rhine. Fortifications were also prohibited. Any violation of these principles (Articles 42 and 43) was to be regarded as a hostile act. At Locarno, six years after Versailles, the German government voluntarily reaffirmed to respect this demilitarized zone.[23] The British and French also signed the Rhine pact, although it seems clear that neither intended to fight for this area. As Wolfers noted, the price France paid for British alliance was that France had to bow to a British interpretation of the agreement.

The French wanted to use Locarno as an affirmation of collaboration, a mutual guarantee of Articles 42 and 43 of the Versailles treaty. The British defined this guarantee much more narrowly and decided to militarily intervene only if France were invaded. Other interventions were to be labeled "non-flagrant" and sent to Geneva where the League of Nations would decide what, if any, sanctions would be imposed.[24]

[20] Gilbert, *Britain and Germany Between the Wars,* 59.

[21] That the perception of French public opinion in the 1930s as "defeatist" may be in some respects exaggerated is argued by Robert J. Young, *In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 1933–1940* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 2–7.

[22] Arnold Wolfers, *Britain and France Between Two Wars* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1963), 35.

[23] James T. Emerson, *The Rhineland Crisis* (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1977), 20.

[24] Ibid., 23.

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James Emerson sheds light on the British view of the Locarno commitment as follows:

> In fact, the Rhine pact was never intended to function. Its very existence was seen as adequate to preserve peace in Western Europe. The governments of Stanley Baldwin and Ramsey MacDonald believed peace could be maintained along the Rhine so long as the other nations remained convinced of London's readiness to honour her guarantee.
>
> It may even be doubted whether Baldwin's cabinet would have undertaken the treaty if it had believed in 1925 that Britain would ever be obliged to fulfill her commitments. Thus, when Austen Chamberlain [foreign secretary under Baldwin] was asked by the Chiefs of Staff whether contingency plans should be prepared for executing Britain's guarantee, the foreign secretary replied that Locarno was a treaty for peace, not war. There was no need, he added, for military arrangements of any sort.[25]

In a speech to the House of Commons in 1925 Austen Chamberlain said, "The British government remains the judge, the only judge of whether . . . immediate danger has arisen."[26] Seven years later in a statement to the cabinet Chamberlain noted that Britain could not be made to act under Locarno in any case without government consent.[27]

Throughout the 1920s the French were the military hegemons of the continent, and by 1930 they still possessed the strongest military establishment.[28] Unfortunately, the war's huge toll in young life, about 25 percent of males under thirty years of age, helped to foster a profound pacifism among the people and this "political constant" was one that no leaders could neglect.[29] Although pacifism was good for electoral politics, the result in military strategy became a commitment to static defense. The Maginot line symbolized French security through the early 1930s.

Even before the rise of Hitler, the question of Germany reoccupying the Rhineland was raised in France, too, and the answer officially promulgated was profoundly disquieting. In the words of Anthony Adamthwaite: "As early as August 1932 the war ministry had asked the foreign ministry what was to be done about German violations of the demilitarized zone. [Édouard] Herriot, then Foreign Minister, replied that France would have to exhaust *all peaceful procedures through Locarno and the League.*"[30] Thus even before the rise of Hitler, the alliance trap had been set. France had committed herself to a collective solution via the League of Nations and joint French-British action to drive the Germans out should a violation of Articles 42 and 43 occur. However, the British had decided even earlier that a military response of any kind was not an option. This left France with only one basic remedy: a protest to the League of Nations.

[25] Ibid., 24.
[26] Ibid., 26.
[27] Ibid., 26.
[28] John Talbott, *France Since 1930* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973), 10.
[29] Anthony Adamthwaite, *France and the Coming of the Second World War* (Totawa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1977), 8.
[30] Ibid., 39-40. (Emphasis added.)

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Little fresh thinking had occurred about the Rhineland between 1932 and 1936. The French army had written off the area as a sphere for military operations as early as 1930 when the final occupation troops left. France was content to mobilize behind the Maginot line and await an attack.[31] Reports began to trickle in to Paris that Germany was going to reoccupy the Rhineland throughout 1935 and early 1936. A 29 January 1936 meeting of the French Council of Ministers simply reaffirmed the 1932 decision to act only after securing a sanction from Geneva.[32] Most ministers felt that French retaliation against a German occupation would be too dangerous, and if Paris risked appearing to be the aggressor, France could find itself fighting Germany alone. General Joseph L. M. Maurin warned that "any operation should not be considered without the full accord of the British government."[33] Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, however, refused to be drawn into making any statement in early 1936. This nonstatement was consistent with Britain's goal of doing and saying nothing that might encourage France to think it could get active British support against Germany.[34]

The British felt that the remilitarization by Germany of the Rhineland was inevitable. "As early as 1935, the British War and Foreign Offices had concluded that Germany was already capable of defending herself successfully. Indeed, their primary concern during this period was to predict when the Wehrmacht would be able to launch an attack."[35] Even at this time, when the government felt that the Third Reich was a threat to Britain and Europe, none of its members wanted to run the risk of war.

Foreign Policy Consequences

On 7 March 1936 German military occupation of the Rhineland took place. The stances of each government gradually became publicly apparent. The French turned for support to their British allies, while eschewing military or other unilateral measures. The British response to a French call for allied unity on the day of the crisis was not encouraging. "Following the news of German occupation of the Rhineland, Eden counselled the French not to take any action without prior consultation."[36] By 9 March Eden articulated the "non-action" that Britain would pursue throughout the crisis. He stated that in case of an actual attack on France or Belgium, the British "would regard themselves as in honour bound to come . . . to the assistance of the country attacked." But since nobody suggested that Germany was intending to attack France, these assurances apparently meant that Britain was unwilling to aid her ally throughout the crisis.[37]

[31] Emerson, *Rhineland Crisis*, 50.
[32] Ibid., 48.
[33] Ibid., 48–50.
[34] Ibid., 68.
[35] Ibid., 134–135.
[36] Adamthwaite, *France*, 38.
[37] Wolfers, *Britain and France*, 47.

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In a diary letter of 12 March 1936, Neville Chamberlain had recorded a conversation with French Foreign Minister Etienne Flandin at the time of the crisis. Chamberlain told him that British public opinion "would not support us in sanctions of any kind."[38] Flandin tried to convince Chamberlain that a united France and Britain would force Germany to withdraw from the Rhineland without war, but Chamberlain said the British could not "accept this as a reliable estimate of a mad dictator's reactions."[39] Instead, Britain regarded prudent policy as one that would negotiate the issues – it would appear, rationally – with the mad dictator. The British government and particularly Stanley Baldwin were upset with the French for *pursuing* joint action after the crisis. Baldwin grumbled that "it was no friendly act of France to force us into a decision for which we were not yet ready."[40]

This is how Winston Churchill remembered the diplomatic responses surrounding the crisis of 7 March 1936:

> In France there was a hideous shock . . . [but] more than once in these fluid years French Ministers in their ever-changing governments were content to find in British pacifism an excuse for their own. Be that as it may, they did not meet with any encouragement to resist German aggression from the British. On the contrary, if they hesitated to act, their British allies did not hesitate to dissuade them. During the whole of Sunday there were agitated telephone conversations between London and Paris. His Majesty's Government exhorted the French to wait in order that both countries might act jointly and after full consideration. A velvet carpet for retreat![41]

Anthony Eden noted in his postwar memoirs that the German action at the time seemed largely justified in the perceptions of British public opinion: "Most members of the British public would certainly see very little harm in Hitler's actions. It would merely appear that he was taking full possession of territory which was his by right."[42]

In any case, even retrospectively, Eden's description of his own response to the Nazi action is most revealing:

> I summoned the French Ambassador as soon as von Hoesch (German envoy) had left and told him that I deeply regretted Germany's action. I considered the denunciation of a treaty which Herr Hitler had freely accepted to be deplorable and I had already said so to Herr von Hoesch. The German memorandum would, however, require to be carefully considered by the Cabinet. I would arrange for this on Monday morning, after which we should want frank and thorough discussion with the French Government and with other signatories of Locarno. I felt sure that until this had taken place, the French Government would not do anything to make the situation more difficult, although there would no doubt be a considerable reaction on the part of French public opinion. There

[38] George, *Warped Vision*, 76.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid., 34.
[41] Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, 193–194.
[42] Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Facing the Dictators* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 382.

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must be a calm examination by all those interested, including as M. Flandin had himself suggested, the Council of the League.[43]

As to the long term consequences of a different, forceful French or French-British response to the Rhineland crisis, there can be no certainties. It is distinctly possible, however, that a resolute stance taken by the French in 1936 would have derailed Hitler's *Mein Kampf* plans and conceivably even brought about the demise of his dictatorship. What is quite clear is that the lapse of three and one-half additional years between Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936 and the start of World War II in September 1939 did not contribute to the strengthening of France's position vis à vis Germany. Quite the contrary. Hitler became much stronger in relation to France—or France and Britain both—by 1939 than he had been in 1936 at the beginning of his rearmament program and before his take-overs of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Note the view of historian Felix Gilbert on the various consequences of Hitler's Rhineland coup:

> The militarization of the Rhineland upset the assumption on which European statesmen had based their foreign policy. Germany's industrial area was no longer open to French attack, and her strengthened position would now have immediate repercussions in eastern and southeastern Europe. Many of the states of this region began to drift into the German orbit, perceiving the weakness of French character and determination. The various dictatorial regimes in Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria now began to imitate Fascist forms and methods, claiming they represented a political spirit appropriate to the 20th century. As for Mussolini, his subsequent portrayal of "fascism as a young international movement which would triumph over the dying world of the democracies" now indicated he had chosen to move into the German camp.[44]

Conclusions

What lessons or applications are there in this experience for American and, more generally, democratic foreign policy in the current era? The invocation of alliance politics as the predominant component of national security does not appear to have occurred in interwar France or Britain by chance. It was the product of a certain state of public opinion in which a profound sense of one's own weakness, fear of risks, and obsessive preoccupation with domestic political conflicts weighed heavily upon the thinking of policy makers.

Should such conditions arise in any political system that is relatively open—that is, subject to free and honest elections—one might expect that leaders would be tempted by alliance politics as a cure-all in the field of national security. From this perspective one could only observe that the continued health of the domestic American political system or a continuing sense of national cohesion and self-confidence is required to forestall the adoption of a pathological alliance politics

[43] Ibid., 383.

[44] Felix Gilbert, *The End of the European Era* (New York: Norton, 1974), 255.

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as the principal means of insuring the survival of the republic. If we posit an official—prime minister, president, or foreign secretary—in an open, democratically-constituted regime whose very existence is precarious (because of widespread and serious domestic opposition, division, and dissidence), we also posit someone who is likely to be very cautious. Drastic, risky, costly, and unorthodox actions on the part of such an official are likely to produce adverse political consequences. There may be a fall of the cabinet, an uproar in parliament and the press; there may be popular demonstrations; the coalition on which the government rests may become political unglued; an election may be lost. High-risk actions in the foreign policy field would generally include: use of military force and resort to war; use of credible threats of force, such as mass mobilization of one's military reserves or ostentatious concentrations of forces against some presumed opponent; substantial increases in military allocations, especially those involving obvious hardships for the civilian population and economy; drastic reorganization of strategic-tactical capabilities and preparations, especially those involving a substantial shake-up and denigration (disregard of the advice and expertise) of the relevant bureaucracies.

On the other hand, what may be relatively easiest for politicians in the day-to-day business of advancing national security is to engage in the pursuit of the politics of alliance—consultation, consent and cooperation. Alliance politics enables politicians and bureaucrats to do what they like to do and what is likely to be professionally rewarding for them. One can be impressively busy touring foreign capitals, conferring with one's counterparts abroad, giving eloquent and informed briefings about such outings before various audiences, including, above all, representatives of the media. The publicity is likely to be politically useful, and much of this kind of activity is hard to criticize. After all, what is the secretary of state supposed to do if not consult fully, frankly, and closely with our allies? Should he or she not seek understanding and approval of our policy, or better yet, our joint policy?

The problem in all of this is that dangerous public and sometimes even private illusions among decision makers themselves can be created. Energy and effort may be diverted to hopeless and dilatory processes that accomplish nothing positive. Valuable time and alternative opportunities of self-defense may be sacrificed to the process of obtaining agreements and cooperation where both are either impossible or not very useful even if obtained. Security may actually vanish in such a routine.

One may also need to be concerned with structural elements of foreign policy, which through bilateral or multilateral alliance arrangements could condemn the nation to a fateful *immobilisme* in world affairs. A potentially dangerous situation may be created by the institutionalization of any alliance structure that commits fundamental security interests of a state to the decisions of others.*

* An earlier version of this article was presented at the Western Political Science Association meeting, Eugene, Oregon, March 1986.

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The President's War Powers

Edited by DEMETRIOS CARALEY

This collection of articles from the *Political Science Quarterly* examines the arguments for and against the president's right to involve the United States armed forces in hostilities. It is particularly concerned with the question, What measures can the president take to protect American interests without a delcaration of war? Other topics include:

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New Light on Dean Rusk? A Review Essay

WARREN I. COHEN

In 1980 I published a biography of Dean Rusk, which I concluded by commending him for the advice and loyalty he gave his presidents and for his decency and humanity.[1] But I was critical of his "unending support to . . . [Kennedy and Johnson] and to a war being fought by means of which he did not approve—and of which he was not always aware—and by men whose purposes were not always his." I contended that "he remained too long the good solider." My closing lines were: "He thus betrayed his own better instincts, the interests of his country, the principles of the UN. Much may be said in mitigation, but never enough."

Rusk had submitted to several long interviews and I sent him copies of the book. In due course he wrote to thank me, noting, however, that I could not expect him to like the concluding lines. He wanted to add one sentence: "Dean Rusk never asked for mitigation."

In his own story, as told to his son Richard, he still asks for no quarter.[2] Pressed by his son to talk about the decisions to escalate the war, his apprehensions, and his resistance to some of the steps McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara were recommending, Rusk denied opposing the decisions to introduce American combat forces, to bomb the North, and to Americanize the war. Confronted with the evidence I had presented to the contrary, he insisted, "Cohen made me into too much

[1] Warren I. Cohen, *Dean Rusk* (Totowa, N.J.: Cooper Square Publishers, 1980) vol. xix of Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy.*

[2] Dean Rusk with Richard Rusk and Daniel S. Papp, *As I Saw It* (New York: Norton, 1990).

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of a good guy." And he added defiantly, ". . . I supported the military in their use of antidefoliants[sic], napalm, and antipersonnel weapons" (p. 497). Dean Rusk is in his 80s, his body betrays him from time to time, but he is not giving an inch.

On policy matters, the former secretary of state tells us nothing more than he told us in the 1960s and than I was able to get out of him in the late 1970s. I once complained that he seemed to be programmed to give eight answers – and he gave you one of them no matter what the question. Talking to his son, he admitted that was a deliberate technique he cultivated. When a reporter asked a question that he could not or did not want to answer, he answered a different one.

I advised Rich Rusk against trying to write a biography of his father. I'm glad he did not take my advice. Dean Rusk has a marked distaste for, even terror of, psychobiography. He wants the world to see him as he would portray himself. What you see is what there is: the persona he has created. Even to Rich he insisted that he was a much simpler man than Rich perceived; even to Rich he insisted upon the impenetrability of his inner self: "I try never to completely expose myself to anyone" (p. 16). But Rich Rusk is able to get his father to talk more about his childhood, particularly his parents, than I was; and he offers insights that no outsider could have obtained.

Rich Rusk was not put off easily and therein lies the beauty of this story. Dean Rusk speaking into the tape recorder need not be read very carefully. The results are repetitive, underedited, familiar. But read every word that his son writes: the foreword and the brief lead-ins to each section of the book, especially the pages on Vietnam. Rich Rusk was an undergraduate at Cornell in the mid-1960s as his father, his father's colleagues, and their employers took the United States to war in Vietnam. He was a bright kid who saw the "relentless illogic" of the war but loved his father too much to join the antiwar movement. Torn apart by this conflict, he collapsed; he had what a psychologist called "your father's nervous breakdown." Nearly twenty years later, he sold his home in Alaska and drove with his wife and children to Athens, Georgia, where he overcame his father's "relentless inscrutability." Working on this book together, father and son eliminated the distance, emotional as well as physical, that America's and Dean Rusk's war in Vietnam had forced upon them. No father or son can fail to be moved by the journey.

Dean Rusk has one lesson he wants engraved indelibly on the American psyche. He repeatedly tells a story of leaving a boat untended on a German lake in the early 1930s and returning to find it missing. He reported the theft to the local authorities who recovered it, but fined Rusk "for tempting thieves." He uses the anecdote to argue for vigilance and military preparedness. The United States tempted the Axis in the 1930s, and its rapid demobilization in 1945 tempted Stalin. A strong America with a demonstrable, credible willingness to punish aggressors is essential to maintaining the peace. He fears the 1960s generation has missed this lesson, as perhaps have those who followed, and he has spent his waning energy taking the message across the South. His convictions on preparedness account for his involvement in the late 1970s and early 1980s with Paul Nitze's Committee on the Present Danger, a group which had very rigid views of what constituted

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acceptable arms control agreements and played a major role in preventing ratification of SALT II. Rusk does not mention the committee's work, but it was consistent with his expressed views as to what constitutes unilateral disarmament.

Talking about the people with whom he worked in his years with the Department of State, Rusk is characteristically generous. Many of his erstwhile colleagues did not hesitate to express contempt for him or his style when I interviewed them. With rare exception, Rusk is saintly by comparison. He offers little indication of resentment of the roles played by McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara, who allegedly usurped his place as the dominant figure in foreign affairs—although some readers will be tickled by his comment that he thought so well of Bundy that he would have liked to have had him as one of his undersecretaries. He gives J. William Fulbright a gentle jab or two, but does not hesitate to credit the former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for wise advice. His distaste for Bobby Kennedy slips through in nearly every reference. U Nu is dismissed disparagingly. The closest he comes to being vituperative, downright nasty, is in his discussion of the media. He suggests that television footage of American forces behaving brutally in Vietnam was staged, fake; and he sneers at "freedom of the press," at least the freedom of *Washington Post* and *New York Times* reporters, whom he contends can only write what their editors and publishers allow.

On policy issues there are few surprises. The good soldier who followed his leaders down many a slippery slope states categorically that he would never have "participated" in an order to launch a nuclear first strike; but he quickly qualifies his assertion by excepting a response to a massive conventional attack on Europe. He also states that he never saw any indication that the Warsaw Pact nations intended to invade the West and "seriously doubt[ed]" it would ever happen. He concedes that Americans were overbearing and sanctimonious in the way they handled the Soviets on some issues in 1945 and 1946, specifically negotiations over the composition of UN security forces and the Baruch Plan. The United States may have treated the Soviet Union like a second-class power, but Rusk rejects categorically suggestions that the United States was equally culpable for the cold war—unless it was by tempting Stalin to commit aggression by demobilizing so rapidly at the end of the war.

I had hoped for some new disclosure about policy toward China, but his interrogator was not equipped to press him. There is no reference to the efforts he and John Foster Dulles made to get rid of Chiang Kai-shek on the eve of the Korean War to facilitate American support for Taiwan. Rusk repeats the story about Eisenhower warning Kennedy that he would oppose any effort to recognize the People's Republic or allow it to sit in the United Nations. Recent essays by Qing Simei and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker have revealed that Eisenhower in fact favored accommodation with China, was obstructed by members of his administration, and backed off only because of a perceived need to pacify his party's right wing.[3] Eisenhower's

[3] Qing Simei, "The Eisenhower Administration and Changes in Western Embargo Policy Against China" and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "A House Divided: The United States, the Department of State,

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threat is generally reported as having been made to Clark Clifford during the transition, and it seemed to be another example of Clifford's penchant for putting his own spin on the historical record. But Rusk claims to have been present at a session in which Eisenhower advised Kennedy against recognition—not quite the same as opposing it—and the mystery persists. His story of the formulation of policy toward China in the 1960s is gentler with Kennedy than I was and quite fairly denies that he, Rusk, was the obstacle to a fresh initiative. There is no discussion of Gordon Chang's recent argument that Kennedy was contemplating a joint Soviet-American strike against Chinese nuclear facilities.[4]

Shrewdly, Dean Rusk defends Lyndon Johnson by wrapping him in the mantle of Jack Kennedy. His discussion of Johnson's intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is illustrative. He argues Kennedy would have done the same. Conceding Johnson's hyperbole, he insists that despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary the president did not overreact. He, Rusk, would do it exactly the same way if he had it to do again. Dean Rusk has no regrets.

Rusk reveals no awareness of the disastrous nature of Lyndon Johnson's foreign and domestic economic policy. He declares that he did not understand economics as well as George Ball or Tony Solomon and simply delegated all economic issues to them. Douglas Dillon and Henry Fowler over at the Treasury were good men who understood foreign policy, and there was minimal trouble between Treasury and State. Economic issues lagged well behind political and strategic concerns in the questions with which Rusk involved himself. He is persuasive when he dismisses economic determinist explanations of policy decisions, at least in his own thinking.

But Rich Rusk didn't wrestle for twenty years with his father's handling of the Congo or the Dominican Republic or balance of payments deficits. He drove across America to get his father to talk to him about Vietnam. He found him "sometimes tight-lipped on the issue." Rich Rusk's own words are worth quoting here:

> With this reticent, reserved, self-contained, emotionally bound-up father of mine from rural Georgia, how could the decision making have gone any differently? His taciturn qualities, which served him so well in negotiating with the Russians, ill-prepared him for the wrenching, introspective, soul-shattering journey that a true reappraisal of Vietnam policy would have involved. Although trained for high office, he was unprepared for such a journey, for admitting that thousands of American lives, and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, might have been lost in vain (p. 420).

What Rich Rusk heard from his father were the same words Dean Rusk gave to the American people in the 1960s. How could it have been otherwise? How can a human mind accept responsibility for an error of that magnitude? The United States fought in Vietnam because it had a commitment. SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization) was a mistake; but once signed, the honor and credibility

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and China" in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, *The Great Powers in East Asia 1953–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

[4] Gordon Chang, *Friends and Enemies* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990).

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of the United States was at stake. It linked Vietnam to the whole structure of collective security. "The United States had a clear and direct commitment to the security of South Vietnam against external attack" (p. 460). "There could have been peace in Southeast Asia if North Vietnam had been willing to live in peace with its neighbors" (p. 461). When I interviewed Rusk in the late 1970s, I found him willing to discuss, even argue various points of policy, except with regard to Vietnam. He was fascinating on policy toward China when he was assistant secretary for Far Eastern affairs during the Truman administration. The day we were to discuss Vietnam, I found upon my arrival in Athens, Georgia, that Dean Rusk had an intense need to watch the University of Georgia football team on television. His mind was closed. It still is—and probably always will be.

Dean Rusk believes the war in Vietnam could have been won—if the American people had been patient, if the press had been honest, if there had been solidarity at home. If-if-if, then the United States could have prevented the North Vietnamese from taking over South Vietnam. He cannot—will not—understand that no amount of American patience or will power would have enabled American forces to outlast the Vietnamese. One day the Americans would go home—and the next day the Vietnamese would resume the struggle to unite their country. He could not—would not—understand that the great powers cannot simply draw a line across a country and pronounce it two. Some day, perhaps in our lifetime, the Vietnamese people will join the march toward the freedom that Dean Rusk wanted for them, but they will do so at a time of their own choosing. As Rusk and Maxwell Taylor once agreed, "white-faced" troops could not do it for them.

Dean Rusk had the misfortune to preside over American foreign policy at a time when the relative power of the United States was in decline, when the United States could no longer maintain the arguably benign hegemony it had provided since the close of World War II, when the influence of the Department of State was being nibbled away by the National Security Council staff, the Pentagon, and the CIA. He lacked Dean Acheson's force of personality. Indeed, he was chosen by a president who feared an Achesonian presence, but no secretary of state in the 1960s had the opportunity to shape events that was offered to George Marshall and Acheson. The mistaken economic policies of the 1960s and the war in Vietnam hastened America's decline, but the achievement by the Soviet Union of strategic parity, the regaining by Japan and Western Europe of their competitive edge economically, were all but inevitable. The era of American domination was over.

Nonetheless it *was* a time of great opportunity for the United States to fashion a new style of leadership, a posthegemonic style—and that opportunity, along with American wealth and power, and hundreds of thousands of American and Vietnamese lives, was squandered in America's longest war. Dean Rusk and his colleagues insisted on demonstrating the credibility of the American commitment to collective security in a conflict much of the rest of the world deemed irrelevant, at the expense of a people who could not understand and resisted the United States insistence on the right to control their destiny. But Rusk in particular was a man whose ideas about world affairs and America's role were shaped in the 1930s, against

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the backdrop of Japanese, Italian, and German aggression. He may have been the right man to cope with the Soviet Union of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, but he was not a man for all seasons. He was not the man to appreciate the difference between great power aggression and wars of national liberation. He did not recognize how much more complicated morally the latter were, how much more difficult to combat politically or militarily. Rusk's universalism, his suspicion of racism on the part of colleagues who refused to look beyond the Atlantic community, led him to advocate the exercise of American power in remote regions, low on any list of American priorities, and ultimately to dissipate that power. Dean Rusk had the strengths—and the myopia—of the postwar liberal internationalists who were determined to accept the responsibilities of power that the United States had rejected after World War I. Good men all, they served their country well and provided the American leadership the world desperately needed in the 1940s. But they never knew when to stop, when the burden was more than their country could bear, when the lessons they had learned in the 1930s had ceased to apply.

There is a touching passage early in the book in which Rich Rusk compares the homes of his Jewish friends in Scarsdale, where "love and anger were lived right on the surface," with his own home and his father who was "painfully distant." He reflects further on what it was like to have a father who was secretary of state, on the absence of contact for which he longed. Dean Rusk is lucky to have a son like Rich; and I am reminded once more how lucky I was that my own father drove a taxi.

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Book Reviews

Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs *by Louis Henkin. New York, Columbia University Press, 1990. 125 pp. $25.00.*

Louis Henkin, professor emeritus at Columbia University, has written a splendid book that sets forth lucidly the fundamental constitutional values that govern foreign affairs. In many ways this book is a primer, which is precisely what the nation needs after the scandals of Watergate and Iran-contra. People in power regularly exhibited ignorance and contempt for popular control and representative government.

Despite the brevity of this volume, Henkin addresses the key areas of dispute. After identifying the basic ingredients of democratic government, he offers sound judgments on many issues. Executive-legislative struggles are fought out in the "twilight zone," where the Constitution has not specified which branch controls and Congress fails to either grant or deny power. The advantage generally lies with the president, who can more easily take the initiative, "but the claims of Congress in the twilight zone are strong, and when Congress acts, its claims for supremacy are strong" (p. 29). For the "high-flying prerogative boys" who want to expand presidential power by relying on the Court's decision in *Curtiss-Wright* and John Marshall's statement in 1800 that the president is the "sole organ" in foreign affairs, Henkin makes it clear that Marshall never claimed sole presidential authority to *determine* national policies. Marshall spoke only of the president's power to communicate and represent those policies (adopted in concert with Congress) to other nations.

Just as firmly, Henkin states that the decision "to take the country into war is for Congress." While the president may respond to an attack on the United States and deploy forces for foreign policy purposes, he may not, "without congressional authorization, engage them in hostilities that amount to war, or put them where they court war" (p. 33). With regard to Iran-contra, Henkin's advises executive officials who chafe under such statutory restrictions as the Boland Amendment: "If the President cannot persuade Congress, he must bow to its will" (p. 40).

Henkin devotes a chapter to the role of the judiciary in foreign affairs, expressing

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disappointment that the Supreme Court relies so frequently on the fuzzy doctrine of "political questions" to avoid adjudicating disputes between Congress and the president. Although he does not suggest that courts can issue orders to end a war or drop a bomb, he urges the Supreme Court to revisit its doctrines on political questions and provides his own list for the kinds of foreign policy issues that should be justiciable. This invitation to the Supreme Court is based on what Henkin calls the achievement of "judicial supremacy," the availability of "infallible Supreme Court Justices," and the duty of courts to act as "the ultimate guardians of the Constitution" (pp. 4, 14, 18, 69, 76). That is one reading of history. Other interpretations are less charitable toward the Court, either as to its actual supremacy on constitutional questions, its supposed infallibility, or its capacity to safeguard constitutional rights.

No doubt the courts have an important duty to perform in foreign affairs. There is no need to defer automatically to the political branches. But the role of the judiciary is fairly well circumscribed by questions of prudence and institutional limitations. Assertions of judicial authority are likely to be done on a very selective basis, demanded at times because of a rare conjunction of circumstances. The protection of constitutional values in the area of foreign affairs will depend primarily on members of Congress, executive officials, and private citizens who remain alert to the ever-present temptation to transgress constitutional boundaries.

LOUIS FISHER
Congressional Research Service

China Rising: The Meaning of Tienanmen *by Lee Feigon. Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1990. 269 pp. $19.95.*

China's Crisis *by Andrew J. Nathan. New York, Columbia University Press, 1990. 242 pp. $24.50.*

These two books differ widely in their approach to the tragic Beijing Spring of 1989 but converge in their analyses of its causes and consequences. Although both authors are scholars, Feigon tells a story that combines historical perspective with a personal eyewitness account, while Nathan offers political science analysis in largely republished articles of thematic relevance with additional updated observations. Thus the two books complement one another in style and substance. Both will enrich the understanding of the specialist in comparative politics as well as of the China expert.

Feigon draws on the record of previous Chinese student movements together with his several periods of residence in the People's Republic during the 1980s. The combination of history and experience is effectively handled, providing a critical and dispassionate account of repeated student failures in achieving fundamental reform of authoritarian regimes, whether Qing, Nationalist, or Communist. To

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the extent that demonstrations were tolerated and some reform achieved, one or another government faction was usually supportive. Such support was possible because reform, not revolution, was demanded. But by trusting the extant regime to mend its ways, students and intellectuals remained dependent on its will. Their reward was partial change at best and brutal suppression at worst. Yet despite the long-standing failure at realizing "Democracy," a concept usually advanced without specific definition, the historic role of student demonstrations was emulated by successive generations, especially in Beijing.

Much of what Feigon recounts will be familiar to close readers of the major press during the tumultuous period of April-June 1989, as he acknowledges in his summary of sources. But his residence at People's University provides unique insight on the different behavior of its students whose parents were frequently high party officials, compared with those at the more reknowned Beijing University where the author had lived previously. He depicts the former as initiating the demonstrations for clearly defined goals of reforming party corruption and bureaucratic practices, whereas the latter came in later with more radical demands for specific leadership changes. Foreign media largely missed the first wave of demonstrations that occurred before Mikhail Gorbachev's arrival in Beijing, hence the special value of this study.

Feigon's first-hand account of individual leaders and factions carefully differentiates the actions of each and how they changed over time. This clarifies the complexity of what was simplistically termed "the student movement" by many observers at the time and since. His personal exchanges with non-students, especially workers, question the degree to which the image of wholesale urban mobilization conveyed by television cameras reflected a common stimulus or genuine unity of goals.

As an historian, Feigon is properly scrupulous in distinguishing between verifiable fact and rumor, rarely omitting the qualifying words "likely" and "possible" when hearsay replaces hard evidence. Unfortunately, such omission tends to occur at the most critical point when top leadership figures are depicted in internal debate. Less is known here than is implied in his account. A curious blooper has Hu Yaobang visiting the United States in 1986 and suggesting that Deng Xiaoping should retire. Hu never made the visit, although he did make the impolitic remark in another context at the time. However, none of these instances seriously flaw the book as an insightful analysis of the most serious challenge to authority since the Cultural Revolution.

Nathan's pioneering work on factionalism in Chinese politics and his subsequent study of democracy and its prospects in the People's Republic provide an excellent framework for understanding both sides, officials and demonstrators, that collided in the Beijing Spring. *China's Crisis* is largely comprised of articles published prior to the event, mostly in English, related to these two points of inquiry. In addition to a mainland focus, however, Nathan compares democratic trends on Taiwan that challenge conventional wisdom concerning how "Chinese" is the codependency of regime and citizen with respect to authoritarianism.

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The Taiwan dimension also illustrates the paradox of U.S. policy. Publicly, human rights are professed to be of critical concern. Yet Taipei's human rights record steadily improves but wins relatively little attention from official Washington because of *Realpolitik* priorities in its relationship with Beijing. Meanwhile Beijing's long-standing abuse of human rights impacts on the White House management of China policy only when it is embarrassed by congressional resolutions on Tibet or when national outrage is aroused by television coverage of Tienanmen.

Nathan also calls attention to the potential political influence Taiwan's reforms may have on mainland politics. In this regard, developments in 1990 on both sides of the Taiwan Straight tended to prove his point. Hong Kong reports claimed low-level debate in Beijing on how to handle fresh moves by Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui toward détente, virtually declaring the forty-year civil war at an end and proposing governmental negotiations. Lee was rebuffed but seeds were sown that may eventually sprout.

Nathan's explanation for the 1989 events largely parallels that of Feignon, but he goes more deeply into the alternative prospects for democratization and deals more systematically with the critical variables. He is guardedly more optimistic that a transition can be effected without undue violence. However, he correctly denies any analogy with East European developments. He does not foresee a collapse of the Beijing regime, claiming the party and army enjoy a duopoly of organized power that the opposition wholly lacks. Finally, he warns against any expectation that the post-Deng system will be patterned after western democratic institutions, Chinese traditions to the contrary being too entrenched even today.

The volume includes an interesting exercise in political risk analysis, written in 1981, that forecasts various scenarios. Nathan claims reasonable success for the two he accorded "highest probability," one approximating developments in most of the 1980s and the second corresponding to the events of 1989. The reader may score the success rate somewhat differently but nonetheless can respect his fruitful combination of political science and area expertise in non-quantitative analysis. Unlike Feigon, Nathan's anthology cannot be essayed easily by a general reader. However, there is much of value in the collection that warrants putting in one volume otherwise widely scattered articles. Their thematic unity adds a dimension in depth to the tragedy of Tienanmen and the problems faced by the world's largest society in its long march toward political modernization.

ALLEN S. WHITING
University of Arizona

China's Unfinished Revolution: Problems and Prospects Since Mao *by James M. Ethridge. San Francisco, China Books & Periodicals, Inc., 1990. 372 pp. $24.95.*

Nonspecialists have historically made important contributions to the American public's understanding of China. Unfortunately, the book under consideration

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demonstrates the pitfalls awaiting the unwary neophyte. James Ethridge, described on the book flap as a professional researcher and publishing executive who has frequently visited China, presents to the general reader a wide array of valuable information on the post-1978 Chinese reforms. A weak framework and poor organization, however, make the information difficult for the reader to digest. The author, furthermore, relies mainly on official PRC English-language sources such as the *China Daily* and the *Beijing Review* and to a lesser extent on foreign news reports, rather than on his own experience in China or on western scholarly literature. The material culled from these sources can of course be enlightening if handled properly. Ethridge, however, fails to assess or analyze it in any meaningful way. His attempts to do so often end up as bland equivocations, the most egregious being: "There may be some substance to the current effort, or it all may very well be sound and fury, smoke and mirrors. Only time will tell" (p. 93). "China is no different from other countries in its difficulties with prices, and China's problems arise from the same problems as elsewhere . . ." (p. 127).

Ethridge does attempt to develop some sort of theoretical framework by characterizing the 1949 revolution as a vast social transformation meant to release the Chinese people from the shackles of a feudal and colonial culture and enable them to take control of their own lives. Such a broad definition allows him to see continuity in governmental policy despite the sharp twists and turns of the last forty years and yet is so inclusive as to be almost meaningless. It has been precisely the acrimonious disputes among the top leaders and the frequent shifts in policy that have hampered China's development under the Chinese Communist Party.

Ethridge, however, deviates from this framework by designating the reforms that begin in the late 1970s as the New Chinese Revolution. How can the reader reconcile these conflicting concepts of continuity and revolution? The 4 June 1989 massacre further muddies the theoretical picture. In discussing the nightmarish events, Ethridge refers to the regime as the Mao dynasty, which has permanently lost the trust of the people. The term "dynasty," of course, suggests continuity with China's imperial past and contradicts the notion of social transformation. Moreover, if the regime has lost the trust of the people, then the revolution is indeed finished and any discussion of prospects for the pre-1989 reforms is meaningless. The author appears to have added his comments on 4 June after the book was largely done and seems not to have thought through how these events affected his project. This theoretical incoherence makes it difficult for the reader to establish the significance of the abundant information provided by the author.

Organizational weaknesses add to the reader's difficulties. The author has a tendency to touch upon subjects here and there without discussing them fully. In chapter two, for example, he considers the background to the reforms, but only in chapter four does he present some of Deng Xiaoping's crucial views on how China should develop. Moreover, he has the annoying habit of referring the reader to a mini-encyclopedia in the back of the book instead of explaining important terms comprehensively in the text. The book flap claims that the author is now

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working on an expansion of the mini-encyclopedia. This project is perhaps more suited to the talents of a writer without a deep knowledge of China.

RICHARD LUFRANO
Barnard College

Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations From Brezhnev to Gorbachev *edited by Timothy J. Colton and Thane Gustafson. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1990. 370 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $16.95.*

The revolutionary changes in the Soviet Union bring many new questions to the fore and place old ones in a new light. This study, conceived in 1983, was completed on the basis of research into early 1989. The editors have sought to emphasize "the long-term, systemic trends in the shaping of the civil-military environment" (p. 344), but the very example they cite in this connection illustrates the fast and far-moving wave of sea change under way. Today it is unlikely the editors would have stated that "Gorbachev's political strategy must be interpreted in part as an effort to restore the general secretary's power and authority, as well as that of the political system as a whole" (p. 344). What political system? Not one resting on the general secretary, or the Politburo, or even the Communist party.

The editors posit three models of Soviet civil-military relations: Model I, based on a presumptive conflict between civilian-political and military elites, as set forth by Roman Kolkowicz (in 1967); Model II, assuming a cooperative and integrated political and military relationship, as emphasized by William Odom (in the mid-1970s); and finally Model III, an interactive and multifaceted relationship, as depicted in particular by editor Timothy Colton (in 1979). Model III thus is implicitly a synthesis of the earlier Model I thesis and Model II antithesis. The present volume unsurprisingly and convincingly supports Model III. It is in error, however, in claiming that "most" of the earlier literature on the subject reflected Models I or II; a number of studies in the 1950s and 1960s (in particular studies by Thomas Wolfe, Herbert Dinerstein, and this reviewer) embodied Model III before any of these models were postulated.

The present study is especially strong on the economic-technological-resource allocation parameters of Soviet civil-military relations, treated very well in chapters by Robert Campbell, Julian Cooper, and Thane Gustafson. Bruce Parrott's chapter on political change and civil-military relations is a very good analysis of a difficult moving target. Ellen Jones has a useful discussion of social change and civil-military relations. And Amy Knight treats well the neglected subject of the KGB and civil-military relations. Bruce Porter's chapter on the impact of Soviet military involvements abroad, a little examined subject, concludes that such involvements have not been a source of political-military conflict. His account is generally well-grounded, but he errs in denying any overseas Soviet military presence under Nikita Khrushchev; in 1962 a 42,000-man military contingent was dispatched

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to Cuba, including a platoon of generals and, incidentally, as commander of one of four army regiments, then lieutenant colonel, now Marshal and Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov.

The value of the study is lessened by the editors' decision to forego a chapter on military policy and doctrinal change, probably the most distinctively new and important element in civil-military relations at the present time.

While this book makes a definite contribution to understanding Soviet civil-military relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev, whether the analysis will weather the next few years is questionable. Events in the months since this book went to press have already raised major new questions—the import of Soviet generals at a Party Congress challenging the political leadership over losing Eastern Europe, splits in the political establishment over the presence of Party organizations in the armed forces, and divisions between the union leadership and the republics over control of the armed forces. Such developments diminish confidence in the editors' judgment that despite recent changes there are "significant elements of stability and continuity in civil-military relations" (p. xi). Nonetheless, this book is based on solid research and does provide a useful baseline for measuring further change.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Brookings Institution

Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System *by Gene Sharp. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1990. 166 pp. $19.95.*

Anyone familiar with the work of Gene Sharp, who has been touting the advantages of civilian-based defense for over thirty years, will have a fairly good idea of what this book is about without bothering to read it. It is primarily just a summary of his earlier works that offers little new material despite the author's stated intention in the preface to offer new information, concepts, and options. The fact that the overwhelming bulk of the book is a synopsis of earlier works is supported by the author as he begins the notes to each chapter with phrases like, "for further analysis and information," "for a much more detailed development," "for a full account," and then cites a variety of his own previous books and articles. While there is nothing wrong with a book that ties together and summarizes an author's earlier works, one wonders why a major university press has published a monograph that adds very little to what has already been said about a subject.

The gist of his argument is that no political leader, whether foreign conqueror or internal usurper, can run a country without the cooperation and assistance, either tacit or active, of a large portion of the subject population. So a people can protect themselves nonviolently against violent takeover by simply not cooperating with the new regime, thus denying it the benefits of its aggression. Moreover, a robust civilian-based defense that is well publicized can act as an effective deter-

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rent against internal or external aggression, since it will be known in advance that the outcome of that aggression will fail to accomplish its intended purpose.

The author cites four examples of spontaneous civilian-based, nonviolent resistance against internal and external aggression from the European experience of the last seventy years that were either successful or partially so. Opposition to the Kapp Putsch in Weimar Germany in 1920 and to the rebelling generals in Algeria in 1961, opposing DeGaulle's decision to give up that country, resulted in the failure of the proposed takeovers. German resistance to the French-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr in 1923 resulted in the removal of foreign troops within two years, and Czech resistance in 1968–1969 held off full Soviet control for eight months, which is certainly longer than Czech military forces alone could have resisted its overwhelming neighbor.

In all cases, there were some casualties and suffering, but they were probably less, according to the author, than if the opposition had been primarily violent. The fact that some cases of nonviolent resistance end in failure should not be taken as proof that the strategy doesn't work, since in all wars throughout history military force has failed at least one half of the time – for the losing side. Sharp finds encouragement in the fact that almost all of the examples of civilian-based defense so far in history have been primarily spontaneous with little prior organization and training on the part of the populace. Yet they have enjoyed some measure of success. How much greater would be the successes if a country had conscientiously adopted such a policy before an aggression?

At least one of the major ingredients of such a policy, according to Sharp, is the need for "intensive preparation and training for the whole population and all its institutions" (p. 87). In fact, the more enthusiastic he or she becomes about advanced preparations – "prior training of the population in the wide range of methods. . . ." (p. 103) – the more glassy eyed the reader becomes. In a country like the United States, where two out of three people will often not bestir themselves to vote, one wonders about the possibility of training and mobilizing the people on a scale envisioned by the author in the absence of some clear and overwhelming threat. As one who is faced daily by the massive indifference to being educated demonstrated by many college students who have voluntarily selected college and are at least above average in ability, this reviewer can only shudder at the enormity of the educational effort envisioned by Sharp.

Yet, we all know that something unprecedented did happen in Fall 1989, especially in Eastern Europe, where large masses of people gathered peacefully in a public square one day and oppressive governments collapsed the next. The exact process by which change occurred is not clear, but perhaps it was close to what Gene Sharp is advocating. Unfortunately, while mention is made of the Eastern European phenomenon in this book, it is not discussed in any detail, so we cannot be sure. Perhaps, as the author suggests, civilian-based resistance is an idea whose time has come and more study, which he also calls for, is required before we understand the power of an aroused but nonviolent population acting in unison to

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opposed internal and external aggression. Kuwait could certainly have used some insights from this approach.

PHILIP W. DYER
University of Nebraska—Lincoln

The New Deal and its Legacy: Critique and Reappraisal *edited by Robert Eden. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1989. 263 pp. $47.95.*

This volume originated in a series of papers delivered before conferences at Hillsdale College occasioned by the fiftieth anniversary of Franklin Roosevelt's election to a second term as president. Hillsdale, of course, is well known as a purposefully conservative institution. A "critique and reappraisal" formulated under these auspices and pronounced during the high noon of Reaganism might be expected to reproduce the ancient indictments of the American Liberty League. But this is not what happened. Most of the contributors came less to bury FDR than to praise him. In a concluding chapter the editor ponders "this amazing development . . . that it now falls to conservatives to do justice and honor to Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal" (215).

The contributors include six political scientists, three historians, and two economists. The authors sometimes argue interestingly and fruitfully with each other. The chapter on the Supreme Court does sound as if it were left over from the Court-packing debate of 1937, but the rest of the book is analytical, thoughtful, and relatively dispassionate.

Historians are likely to find much of the argumentation unduly abstract, occasionally verging on philosophical overkill. This is in part because of the overrepresentation of political scientists, but it is also in part because the authors take FDR and the New Deal seriously and strive to work out both the intellectual presuppositions of the era and the relationship between those presuppositions and the American political tradition.

If one can isolate an overarching theme amidst the somewhat discordant voices, it is that the New Deal was the American manifestation of what Peter J. Coleman calls "the world of interventionism" (p. 49) and that its result was the emergence of "the administrative state" (p. 7). Coleman explains the culture of intervention as an inevitable and worldwide (or at least westwide) response to "a profound crisis in late nineteenth-century capitalism" (p. 54). The New Deal itself, he suggests, "was no more than an extension and nationalization of programs long established or proposed at state and local levels of government" (p. 75) and may indeed represent "a return to the ancient concept of 'commonweal' as the arbiter in human relations" (p. 50). In any case, "The New Deal was not so very new. In many ways it merely poured old wine into new bottles. It is for others to say if the wine was drinkable" (p. 75).

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By the "administrative state," the authors mean a state where "enlightened administration" (as FDR called it in his Commonwealth Club speech) would displace partisan politics. Expert agencies would govern through loosely drawn statutes that empower unelected officials to make a wide range of public decisions (p. 93). Political parties would in time, Sidney M. Milkis argues, fade away. The authors disagree among themselves as to whether the New Deal achieved the administrative state, whether FDR wanted a full-fledged administrative state, and whether such a state represented a drastic departure from American traditions.

Ellis W. Hawley ascribes "the failure of the New Deal to construct a true administrative state" (p. 78) to FDR's appreciation of the strength and validity of American anti-bureaucratic traditions. John A. Rohr presents the establishment of the administrative state as not a rejection but "in some sense a reenactment of the founding of the Republic" (p. 93). Public administration thus emerges as an important secondary theme. The chapters by Rohr on the Brownlow Commission Report and by Milkis on administrative reform are filled with interest and insight.

How to account for FDR's appeal to this generation of thoughtful conservatives? Morton Frisch argues that, though FDR did not perceive the danger if the welfare principle were pushed to its utmost extreme, the New Deal none the less "provided a viable alternative to the ideologies of progressivism and socialism" in an age when the American experiment was faced with "what was perhaps its greatest test" (p. 197). John A. Wettergren emphasizes the moral element in the New Deal—the belief that the fundamental causes of the Great Depression were moral causes and that the remedy was the restoration of standards of rectitude to economic life. "If they erred" in viewing economic problems as moral problems susceptible to moral solutions, "they erred more on the right side than we do" (p. 211). And the editor, Robert Eden, in a most interesting essay praises FDR for his embodiment of the "conception of democratic honor . . . Roosevelt, more than any public man in living memory, stands for the United States" (p. 215–16)—a legacy he feels that the present-day Democratic party is doing its best to dishonor.

The New Deal and its Legacy is a valuable and unexpected addition to the unending reconsideration of our fascinating and enigmatic thirty-second president.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers *by Sheila Jasanoff. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1990. 302 pp. $27.95.*

In *Democracy and its Critics* (1990), Robert A. Dahl warns that democracy is threatened not only by economic inequalities but perhaps even more by "inequalities in resources, strategic positions, and bargaining strength . . . derived not from wealth or economic position but from special knowledge." As social questions become more complex, public policy elites threaten to exercise a "quasi guardi-

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anship" beyond effective popular control. Sheila Jasanoff's detailed examination of the role of scientists in domestic policy making bears out Dahl's concern, but her findings are somewhat reassuring. Because the science involved is uncertain and often hard to disentangle from policy considerations, regulatory science turns out to involve the same sort of bargaining and interest representation as democratic politics—technocratic illusions notwithstanding.

The premise of the study is that just as the civil service has become in effect the fourth branch of American government, so the advisory network is now the fifth branch. As Jasanoff points out, no fewer than 5,000 such committees advise federal agencies. The two main users of external scientific advice, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Food and Drug Administration, are the focus of the study.

Jasanoff shows that in instance after instance—the Environmental Protection Agency's efforts to set clean air standards and regulate the use of pesticides and widely used toxic substances, and the Food and Drug Administration's to assess the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, foods, and food additives—regulatory science is just as subjective a process as sociologists and literary deconstructionists might suppose. Neither ordinary peer review nor adversarial confrontation can put findings beyond plausible criticism. Scientists representing industry and environmentalist groups have different criteria for what constitutes acceptable risk. Specialists in different disciplines and professions disagree about research protocols and the interpretation of data. Time and economic constraints limit inquiry. Disputes must therefore be resolved by negotiation and bargaining. For just this reason, "the risks of science seizing the reins of decisionmaking from political institutions may have been overdrawn. Negotiation commits scientists, no less than other actors, to moderating their views toward a societal mean" (p. 250).

Had Jasanoff compared her findings with those drawn from studies of the role of scientific advisers in defense policy, she would have found a similar tendency for scientists and engineers to divide into rival camps, based on institutional, ideological, and intellectual commitments. The main difference is that when foreign policy and big spending decisions are at stake, and not just regulation, the president, Congress, and the voters are apt to play more of a role, and the courts less in moving the experts toward a policy mean.

It is nevertheless too much to claim that because of flaws in peer review and differences of research perspective, all "scientific reality" is "socially constructed" (p. vii) and therefore no different from sociology or literary criticism. If that were the case, some of us would not now be exploring outer space and curing genetic diseases, while others are still debating what causes crime or who wrote the Bible and the plays of Shakespeare. As Jasanoff herself recognizes, peer review works well in science when there is enough time to discover falsehood and when consensus is sought among scientists in a single discipline. Both the time pressures in regulation and the need for multidisciplinary findings make it less effective as an instrument of public policy. By its nature, regulatory science is bound to be less objective than ordinary science.

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Jasanoff's first-rate study makes this point in impressive fashion. Her findings have important bearing on the general concern with the impact of expertise on democracy, as expressed most recently by Dahl. Some comfort can be drawn from them. As she shows convincingly, if the introduction of civil service did not take politics out of government, neither does the use of advisory committees take the politics out of policy making.

SANFORD LAKOFF
University of California, San Diego

South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945–1988 *by James Barber and John Barratt. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1990. 398 pp. Cloth, $54.50; paper, $16.95.*

James Barber, pro-vice chancellor of the University of Durham, and John Barratt, director general of the South African Institute of International Relations, join hands to offer a painstaking political history of South African foreign policy in the postwar era. Their terminal date, 1988, is far more than the authors could have anticipated the end of an era: the dramatic events following in swift succession after the curtain falls on their chronicle—the Namibia settlement, Nelson Mandela's release from prison, and movement toward a postapartheid political order—have already fundamentally transformed the southern African landscape. World War II and current sea changes serve as convenient bookends for the authors' careful narrative.

The volume provides a comprehensive, gracefully written political history of South African external relations during four decades. The central determinants of South African policy—the quest for status and acceptance as a member of the western community and the protection of its racial order of white domination—remain stable; the steadily increasing international hostility to apartheid makes these goals ever more elusive. The analysis is unencumbered (uninformed?) by conceptual concerns; this is diplomatic history in the classical mold. Nor is this a book of revelations; no startling new information is uncovered.

The authors structure their analysis around four cycles of challenge and response in South African policy. At each of these stages a sudden upsurge of external pressures and internal unrest provoked a period of stress and uncertainty in the system. A combination of defensive diplomacy and internal repression brought subsidence of the pressures and renewed self-confidence to the state and the white minority it represented. Each episode left in its wake a higher degree of international isolation, increased reliance upon the internal security apparatus, and deepened disaffection on the part of the oppressed black majority. The first of these cycles opened in the late 1940s with the first exposure to international animosity and newly militant African claims. The second came with the 1960 "winds of change" in Africa and the international storm provoked by the Sharpeville shootings. The

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third opened with the unexpected 1974 Portuguese coup and swift dissolution of the *cordon sanitaire* of colonial and white regimes to the north, and the wave of student unrest in Soweto. The final round began in 1984 with the fiasco of the Botha constitutional "reforms," near insurrectionary conditions in the townships, and the adoption of sanctions by the United States and the European Community.

The extraordinary myopia of successive South African leaders and the bulk of the white community leaps out from these pages, although the authors do not dwell upon this aspect. The robust capacity for self-deception survived repeated warning signals of inexorable historical trends. A persistent demonization of anti-apartheid forces, internal and external, permitted a dismissal of their claims.

To this reader, the analysis loses some of its balance only in its treatment of the final apartheid decade of the 1980s. The flawed American policy concept of constructive engagement is considered with excessive circumspection. The terrible damage wrought by the aggressive policy of destabilization of neighboring states from about 1980 is seriously underplayed. So also is the growing role and seeming autonomy of the national security apparatus in the Botha years. These reservations notwithstanding, Barber and Barratt contribute an indispensable basic work of historical reference for understanding the postwar role of South Africa in the international system.

CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison

The Politics of Rich and Poor: Wealth and the American Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath *by Kevin Phillips. New York, Random House, 1990. 285 pp. $19.95.*

In 1967 Kevin Phillips wrote *The Emerging Republican Majority*, a breathlessly overwritten book cluttered with facts and factlets mostly irrelevant to his main theme but in the end arguing as follows: by espousing the cause of civil rights the Democratic party would earn the fear and hatred of its traditional supporters in the white middle and lower-middle classes. This fear and hatred, he said, could be exploited by the Republican party, which would in consequence emerge as the majority party in America. Some observers—I am not one of them—think that this realignment of partisan supporters came to pass and that Phillips was a bit of a prophet.

In his current breathlessly overwritten contribution to political analysis, a book cluttered with sometimes fascinating facts and factlets mostly irrelevant to his main theme, Phillips argues as follows: by espousing policies favorable to the well-off during the Reagan years the Republican party has risked the fear, envy and hatred of members of the middle classes. He implies, therefore, that the middle classes can be expected to punish the Republicans accordingly by supporting the Democrats.

An alert reader with a long memory can detect certain similarities in the two

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books, above all a belief that the mobilized fear, envy, and hatred of the middle and lower-middle classes is the most salient and most interesting factor in American electoral politics and that therefore the key question in American political life is always to figure out what the current target of that hatred is.

Then and now, it seems to me the main weaknesses in his argument are: there are more voices in the system than those of middle and lower-middle class voters; and there are more wellsprings of human motivation than hatred, and these may impinge upon voting decisions. Of the latter I offer three examples: *Greed.* This may cause people to vote in favor of their own pocketbooks regardless of their envy of or anger at others. *Habit.* This may cause people to be reluctant to change their party loyalties and their allegiances, even when they become dissatisfied. *Altruism.* This may cause people to have views of public policy that include generosity toward others.

Some of these feelings undoubtedly played a part in retarding the emergence of a Republican majority. As a matter of fact, by most objective measures, while Republicans have elected presidents since Phillips's first book was published, they have not yet become a majority. Will Democrats profit from Kevin Phillips's latest trend? Possibly, since he has hatred and greed lined up together this time. As before, however, there will be a lot of things going on in the electorate to which Phillips's rather crude style of analysis is insensitive. Readers may enjoy, however, the copious lists of billionaires in his latest book, an excellent companion volume to the television show, *Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous.*

NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California, Berkeley

The Loyalties of Voters: A Lifetime Learning Model *by Richard Rose and Ian McAllister. Newbury Park, Calif., Sage Publications, 1990. 219 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.95.*

Most recent books on Britain argue that its tradition of unexciting and predictable electoral politics has given way to the same volatility and turbulence that characterizes most other western democracies. The perverse argument of Rose and McAllister is that there is much more stability than meets the eyes of most psephologists.

This book begins from a line of thought presented in Rose and McAllister's earlier book, *Voters Begin to Choose.* Their basic theme is that even if the traditional class-based system of electoral politics is giving way to new issue concerns and new parties, voters still approach each election with a set of political experiences they have accumulated over their lifetimes. When parties fail to offer choices consistent with the lifetime experiences of the electorate, then voters may make new choices. The continuity of voter experiences and values provides a stability to the political landscape that is often overlooked by those who simply track the fluctuations in party programs or vote shares in the most recent election.

The evidence to support this lifetime learning model is presented in the first

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half of the book. Successive chapters calculate the impact of family loyalties, socioeconomic position, value orientations, and geographic context on vote choice in 1987. One strength of this material is that it presents a useful literature review and rationale of the major predictors of British voting behavior. New students to this topic would be well advised to use these chapters as a starting point. Many scholars will also be interested in the new findings from the 1987 British Election Study, enabling us to update past trends on class voting, regional differences, etc. At the same time, both students and scholars will wish Rose and McAllister had analyzed these data in more theoretical and empirical detail. For example, with only brief acknowledgment of the methodological problems, recall data is used to assess the impact of parental partisanship on voting behavior in the 1987 election; issue beliefs, party identification, and candidate images are restricted to residual categories by their methodology. Instead of trying to sort out the complex causal relationship among variables and the way they cumulate through a lifetime, the authors rely on stepwise regression to force a *deus ex machina* solution to a complicated theoretical question. In the end, the clearest relationship is between personal political values and vote—and only by logical inference is it shown that these values stem from lifetime experiences.

The most interesting and innovative part of the book is contained in the last two chapters. Here the authors first add a temporal dimension to their research, assessing how the weight of various groups of causal variables changes over time. Early life experiences, for example, have dropped off markedly from the 1960s to the 1980s, while the influence of personal values shows a corresponding rise in importance. The final chapter uses a lifestyle approach to identify voter types and then uses this typology to illustrate the nearly unsolvable problem that faces any British party that hopes to gain an electoral majority. This is interesting and thought provoking research, and one might argue that this evidence at least partially undercuts the lifetime learning thesis of the book's earlier chapters.

This book documents the complexity of British electoral politics that faces British parties and voters with an impressive array of empirical analyses. Although the authors have not answered the question of whether voters are beginning to choose or merely carrying out the learning of a lifetime, in addressing this question in a provocative way *The Loyalties of Voters* makes a valuable contribution to an eventual answer.

RUSSELL J. DALTON
University of California, Irvine

The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions *by Marc K. Landy, Marc J. Roberts, and Stephen R. Thomas. New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. 309 pp. $29.95.*

This volume presents some of the most thorough case studies of federal environmental decision making that have been written. Vivid, accurate detail is provided

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to describe revising the ozone standard, writing hazardous waste regulations, passing Superfund (the federal toxic waste clean-up program), forging a cancer policy, and implementing the Clean Air Act. Chapters are also devoted to the origins of the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the damaging effect of the Reagan administration on EPA. The cases are essential reading for any serious scholar of U.S. environmental policy making.

Connecting these cases is a conceptual framework that is internally consistent and plausible, but significantly flawed. The authors evaluate the EPA's performance according to four criteria: responsiveness to the public, fidelity to the technical merits, civic education, and capacity building. Having worked and consulted for EPA for most of the past dozen years, I must confess to a more modest set of expectations of what the dedicated but all too human officials of that agency (or any agency) are capable of delivering. The first criterion I would use for assessing EPA's performance is that the quality of the environment not deteriorate significantly. Given the growth of our population and gross national product, that is an ambitious goal. A second criterion would be to keep as many people as possible out of harm's way.

The authors of this work hunger for the type of rational dialogue and well reasoned analysis of the facts that political processes simply are not equipped to deliver. In discussing congressional review of the ozone decision the authors note that congressional deliberations "were neither helpful nor edifying. . . . The hearings hardly represent democratic deliberation at its best" (p. 77). Similarly, they express frustration with EPA's "manipulation" of Congress during the debate over the enactment of Superfund. In the authors' view, EPA did not present a fair and balanced view of the toxic waste problem, while in Congress "each committee viewed the bill through the narrow lens of its own particular mandate. None tried to critically examine the structure of the program as a whole" (p. 164).

It may be that our institutions and political processes will not be able to survive the onslaught of a complex, interconnected, and frequently lethal modern postindustrial economy. My own feeling is that it will be easier to slow down and reduce the input of economic and technical demands into the regulatory system than it will be to change the human tendencies on which our institutions have been built. The EPA that the authors criticize for asking the wrong questions is groping, sometimes blindly, for solutions to some of the most difficult policy problems we face. Congress is a partner in this far from perfect effort.

How is progress made and how are lessons learned in our political process? Generally, the dispassionate analysis the authors would like to see in the political process is limited to the academic arena. That may be where such decisions belong. When necessary, academic knowledge filters into a political process characterized by trial and error, guess work, and the manipulation of symbols. The world is too complex to be governed in any other way. The committees in Congress and offices in EPA narrowly focus on some aspect of the problem, because without doing so they could not understand any part of the problem and therefore could

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not act. This may disappoint the authors' quest for rationality, but at least so far it has worked.

If the legislation and program that emerge from this messy process are truly awful, Congress will eventually modify them. We see this in the case of Superfund. Six years after the flawed decision making decried by these authors, Congress reauthorized the act. It made some important midcourse corrections but essentially ratified the basic program design and provided a 500 percent increase in funding. Since Superfund was enacted in 1980, we have learned quite a bit about the nature of the toxic waste problem. Thousands of federal, state, and local officials and private contractors have learned how to clean up toxic waste sites. The learning process has not been neat, but it is well underway. Perhaps someone was asking the right questions after all.

STEVEN COHEN
Columbia University

Deadly Dilemmas: Deterrence in U.S. Nuclear Strategy *by James H. Lebovic. New York, Columbia University Press, 1990. 252 pp. $38.00.*

This is a very wise book, but it at the same time may be fundamentally misleading in its theme, that is, in the general impression it gives that major mistakes are being made in the handling of nuclear deterrence. It is a book that too many of us, as the Warsaw Pact and the cold war seem to fade away, might think was no longer relevant; and the tone of the book does suffer slightly from having been largely finished before the momentous events of 1989.

Lebovic does an excellent job of sorting out the logical and psychological dilemmas of contending approaches to nuclear strategy, breaking out three of such approaches on the U.S. side: assured destruction, "pure" warfighting, and "political" warfighting. He quite sensibly finds major logical flaws in each of these approaches; but the reader might still come away with the feeling that he has merely supplied extensive additional proof that such internal contradictions are necessary and inevitable in any form of nuclear deterrence. It is thus easy to agree with the book's contention that too much importance has been attached to the details of the numbers and characteristics of nuclear weapons systems; but beyond this there are paradoxes and dilemmas here that may never be settled.

A more general criticism could be offered that Lebovic underrates the importance of Soviet strategic pronouncements in nourishing the American warfighting schools, as people like Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger could argue that they didn't believe in victory, but that they had to pay attention to victory because the Soviets believed in it. The most recent changes in Soviet public statements about nuclear strategy and conventional strategy (not really discussed in this book) are thus very important for giving us some relief for our tensions, even if the unification of Germany and decommunization of Eastern Europe are even more important.

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The author similarly argues that the difficulties of extended deterrence are not central to keeping the anxieties and debates about nuclear strategy alive, but there are those who would disagree with him here. If Western Europe and South Korea had not seemed so geopolitically vulnerable to a communist conventional attack, would not many of us be researching and writing about nonmilitary topics? The definition of "existential deterrence" Lebovic seems to be using is not the notion McGeorge Bundy and others put forward in their Spring 1982 *Foreign Affairs* article, which rather than focus on whether nuclear weapons could deter the use of the opposing nuclear arsenal, saw some inevitable extended deterrence of conventional attacks in the mere existence of nuclear weapons.

This book is very carefully researched, well-written, and thoughtful throughout. Even if one differs from the policy judgments that emerge at the end, the reader learns a great deal from the complexities of argument presented here.

GEORGE H. QUESTER
University of Maryland

Eisenhower: Soldier and President. *by Stephen E. Ambrose. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1990. 635 pp. $29.95.*

Eisenhower: Turning the World Toward Peace *by Harold Stassen and Marshall Houts. St. Paul, Merrill/Magnus, 1990. 438 pp. $22.95*

More than a decade of revisionist literature suggests that the greatness of Dwight D. Eisenhower is no longer in dispute. Some doubts may linger about his generalship during World War II, but about his presidency the overwhelming consensus is that Murray Kempton's early suspicions were right on the mark: contemporary observers and Kennedy hagiographers badly underestimated Ike's skill as a leader, an administrator, a strategist, as well as a tactician, and even a politician. This historiographic revolution has received further impetus from the geopolitical and ideological revolution that has accompanied the end of the cold war. If America's misguided adventures in Vietnam drove scholars to credit Eisenhower with at least exhibiting admirable self-restraint, the retraction of Soviet power, especially but not exclusively from Eastern Europe, the successful arms control initiatives, and the global avalanche toward free market economies and democratic institutions have added an increasingly positive and dynamic cast to evaluations of the 1950s record. Moreover, as America's economy drowns in red ink and the public doesn't know whether to laugh or cry over both parties' budgetary shenanigans, Eisenhower can hardly be derided for his penny-pinching ways and fiscal orthodoxy. Contemporary concerns are normally poor barometers for assessing a past president's policies and performance. Because he based his on the long haul, however, Eisenhower would have wanted us to use them anyway. Most historians have, and their collective judgment is clear: They like Ike.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the centennial of Eisenhower's birth on 14

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October 1890 has been celebrated across the United States. He has been lauded in news stories and editorials, lionized in television documentaries, and – with few exceptions – acclaimed at academic conferences appropriately held at the University of Kansas and Gettysburg College in Pennsylvania. What is surprising, but perhaps is more significant, Eisenhower's centennial was also marked by a conference in Moscow hosted by the Soviet Academy of Arts and Sciences's Institute for USA and Canada Studies (ISCAN). Unquestionably Eisenhower would have been most pleased by this latter event. Never did the acrimony and vitriol of the cold war override the affection and respect he had for the Soviet Union and its people. His most cherished objective was to revive the spirit of friendship and cooperation that from his perspective at the time characterized the wartime alliance. His failure to do so, dramatically represented by the U-2 episode and collapse of the 1960 Paris summit, was his most severe disappointment, which he must have felt acutely because he knew, even if he never admitted, that he shared in the responsibility for it. Judging from their remarks at the conference, the Soviets, perhaps more than the Americans, have forgiven him. As a matter of fact, at least one of the arguments of the Eisenhower revisionists has not found a receptive audience in Moscow. John Foster Dulles is still the villain who thwarted his president's less confrontational agenda.

Stephen E. Ambrose was one of the featured speakers in Moscow, as he was at the University of Kansas and in Gettysburg. This is to be expected. No one approaches Ambrose in terms of the sheer number of words he has written about Eisenhower, before and after he entered the White House (not to mention his works on Milton Eisenhower and Richard Nixon). Also to be expected is that Ambrose has written a new book to commemorate the centennial. Actually, "new book" is misleading, because *Eisenhower: Soldier and President* is a condensation of his two-volume biography. There are a few revisions, but they are modest and minor. This is unfortunate. Since the publication of the biography's second volume in 1984, a great deal of excellent scholarship has appeared on all aspects of Eisenhower's pre- and presidential careers. Likewise, a vast amount of archives has been declassified. Of course, there is no guarantee that the incorporation of these materials would have altered Ambrose's fundamental perspective or interpretation. Still, they pose questions and present arguments that a "definitive biography," as the dust jacket purports this study to be, requires the author to address.

As a biographer of Eisenhower, Ambrose is, nevertheless, without peer. He writes with the expertise and authority of someone who began his study some three decades ago as an associate editor of the Eisenhower Papers. He benefited from lengthy conversations with Eisenhower himself, his family, and network of friends and colleagues, and has mined the riches of the Eisenhower Library. Indeed, in certain respects this condensation is superior to the two-volume biography, because Ambrose has perforce separated the wheat from the chaff, and he has done so without sacrificing the lively narrative and atmospherics that highlighted the original. The coverage is cradle to grave, which because of the subject is inherently

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colorful and momentous. Not only is *Eisenhower* informative, but it is also a good read.

Because Ambrose is an unabashed Eisenhower enthusiast and is included on all lists of Eisenhower revisionists, he has been charged with writing too uncritically about his hero. This charge is not without some validity. His description, for example, of Eisenhower's handling of the first Quemoy-Matsu crisis as a "tour de force" is unpersuasive, and he manages to turn the Suez crisis into "one of his greatest moments as President" (p. 422). Was the Atoms for Peace Proposal "the most generous and most serious offer on controlling the arms race ever made by an American President" (p. 343) and was he "determined to destroy McCarthy, as he had destroyed Hitler" (p. 307)? In both instances the answer is probably no. Yet such extreme judgments are no doubt a function of Ambrose's dramatic flare and hyperbolic style, and his criticisms of Ike can be equally scathing—and exaggerated. His treatment of Eisenhower and the Civil Rights Bill of 1957 and the next year's crisis at Little Rock is nothing sort of devastating, as he portrays the president as ignorant, hesitant, and even cowardly. The problem with Ambrose is not that he is uncritical; it is that he has an unusual approach to achieving balance.

A more fundamental flaw is the book's very conceptualization. Ambrose defines biography too literally. He focuses almost exclusively on Eisenhower, relegating all other actors, including key advisers, to minor roles. There is no sense of process or decision making. Worse in my opinion, his obsession with chronology is as counterproductive as it is maddening. Ambrose organizes his chapters by months. Thus the narrative is irritatingly disjointed as the reader is jerked back and forth among the events, particularly during the White House years. Granted, a president's calendar is full, and he cannot devote himself exclusively to one matter at a time. But the key to Eisenhower's administration and the success it had was integration. The president thought of each piece of his international and domestic puzzles in relation to the others, and he saw the puzzles themselves as inseparable. By atomizing Eisenhower's strategy Ambrose does not do justice to it.

A very different kind of book on Eisenhower, also published to coincide with the centennial, is Harold Stassen's memoir of his service in the administration, co-written with Marshall Houts. Its celebration of Eisenhower is about the only thing that *Eisenhower: Turning the World Toward Peace* and Ambrose's biography have in common. Whereas Ambrose strives to include everything and everyone, even in this abridged edition, Stassen is highly selective, confining his account to his own experiences with the president. He begins with the role he played in convincing Ike to run and then the campaign. He ends with the 1955 Geneva summit and the Open Skies proposal, which sanctioned mutual aerial surveillance for Moscow and Washington. Stassen appears but fleetingly in Ambrose's narrative; in his self-portrait he is positioned not only at the center of the administration's inner circle, but he claims to be virtually the president's alter-ego and confidant. Ambrose pays scant attention to strategic concepts such as the New Look, process, and advising; Stassen accents all of them throughout. I also feel obliged to

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add that Stassen's wooden exposition contrasts sharply with Ambrose's attractive writing.

Readers looking for Stassen to provide fresh insights or evidence will be disappointed. Much of the book consists of lengthy block quotes drawn from sources familiar to Eisenhower scholars, although he apparently paraphrased some documents that remain classified. They are not cited, however, and reveal little. When he supplements this material with his own recollections, moreover, his partisan and personal attacks on all his opponents undercut his credibility. His primary intent appears to be to present Dulles, who gave him so much grief, as an unreconstructed hawk for whom, as opposed to Stassen, Eisenhower had no affection or respect. The archives show this view to be simply untrue. They also show, for example during the 1954 Indochina crisis, that the Secretary of Peace, as Stassen fondly refers to himself, was far from the consistent advocate of negotiations and restraint (nor, for that matter, was Eisenhower). Stassen skips over such inconvenient details.

He does not skip over his involvement in arms control proposals, and in this area the book does make a contribution. He does not resolve the apparent contradictions in Eisenhower's nuclear posture, but he adds information, albeit mostly anecdotal, that will assist scholars in their efforts to do so. Students of this period will also appreciate his account of the origins of Open Skies, especially his emphasis on the role played by General James Doolittle, although they will likely find unpersuasive his attempt to divorce the initiative totally from the administration psychological warfare program.

Most of what the authors write about Eisenhower has been written before, which reflects the quality of the extant literature. From this perspective, both books underscore the need to ask new questions and to probe more deeply into the president's perceptions and objectives as well as his policies. To do so will require the release of additional archival material in the United States and, more importantly, in the Soviet Union. There are indications that this will be done. If so, it will truly represent a peace dividend and, more than the centennial celebrations, a fitting memorial to Eisenhower and his place in history.

RICHARD H. IMMERMAN
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Lucius D. Clay: An American Life *by Jean Edward Smith. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1990. 835 pp. $35.00.*

Clay's biography needed to be written. John Kenneth Galbraith once referred to him as "one of the most skillful politicians ever to wear the uniform of the United States Army." Clay once described himself—on the occasion of James K. Pollock's advice against holding early elections in the American zone of occupation

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in Germany—as "a hard-boiled soldier running a military occupation." His German years, including his role in the Berlin blockade of 1948 and his influence in the founding of the Federal Republic, have been treated extensively in his own *Decision in Germany* (1950), in John H. Backer's *Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay* (1983), Wolfgang Krieger's *General Lucius D. Clay und die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik, 1945–1949* (1987), and in many books and articles, including my own. Smith, who previously edited *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945–1949* (1974), has now responded to the larger need, and he has done so admirably and apparently definitively.

The book is rich in detail, well-written, thoroughly researched, interesting to read, and especially refreshing for the first-hand information from Clay and others who knew him or worked with him. It exhibits the rich rewards of patient archives research and mastery of the available literature. And it is remarkable for its imaginative solution of a problem that I discovered years ago when I considered writing Clay's biography myself. Other than the papers he left with the War Department after his tour of duty in Germany—the papers that Smith edited and published in two volumes in 1974—Clay kept no personal papers: for example, no letters he might have exchanged with friends while he was in Germany; no letters he might have exchanged with the German minister presidents with whom he met often while in Germany; no letters that he must have exchanged with Sir Brian Robertson, his British counterpart in Germany; no letters he most certainly exchanged with members of Congress, cabinet officers, and people of affairs in private life (such as Herbert Hoover). To solve that problem, Smith researched the available archives, read the existing literature, and—over a period of years and in a series of personal interviews—ran his findings past Clay and let him talk. His questions and Clay's responses are featured throughout the book, often in the form of quotations.

The virtues and the success of that method are obvious throughout the book, but they may be illustrated briefly with references to a few items that are familiar to me from my own research. Smith's treatment of the Clay-John Foster Dulles differences over German policy that came to a head during the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers early in 1947 is superb; and I think his interpretations of the problems faced by Secretary of State George C. Marshall and the American delegation at that conference are better than any I have seen. Likewise, though not as dramatically so, Smith's treatment adds new insights on such topics as the origins and impact of George Kennan's long-telegram, the 1947 revised level-of-industry plan for Germany and the role of France, and the decision to include Germany in the Marshall Plan.

There are 32 pages of photographs. The extensive bibliography includes a list by date of Smith's interviews with Clay. The index is useful, but the notes are less so. The references to sources are not flagged in the text, though they are listed in the back of the book by page number.

JOHN GIMBEL
Humboldt State University

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The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems Since 1949 *by Douglas Stuart and William Tow. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. 383 pp. $42.50.*

While Douglas Stuart and William Tow were writing their well-researched study of alliance politics within NATO, the cold war was diminishing in intensity. But something could still be said for the persistence of a Soviet military threat, which the authors rightly observe kept NATO intact despite the allies' clashing interests in theaters beyond the NATO perimeter. Stuart and Tow conclude that NATO can stay together if it continues to focus on the Soviet threat. Yet in a post-cold war context the strong implication of this study is that intraalliance disputes over out-of-area issues will be difficult to contain, and NATO may well go the way of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

The Limits of Alliance is a study of centrifugal political forces that have tugged at the NATO alliance since its beginnings. The allies' common interests in standing together against the Warsaw Pact in Europe have been constantly strained by their differing interests beyond Europe. Washington's early desires to avoid "guilt by association" through involvement in British, French, Dutch, Belgian, and Portuguese efforts to maintain their empires were mirrored in NATO partners' desires to dissociate themselves from U.S. misadventures in Vietnam, the Middle East, Central America, and elsewhere. American objections to allies' puttering in its *domaine reservé* in Central America were matched by allies' resentments over U.S. interference in Egypt, central Africa, and the Caribbean. Belgium and France disagreed about the Congo; France and Britain about Iraq; Turkey and Greece about Cyprus; and Britain and Spain about the Falkland Islands.

A strength of the Stuart and Tow analysis is in the flow of insights into the true intensity of NATO's intraalliance conflicts such as French wrath over American aloofness during the siege of Dien Bein Phu, American consternation over the Suez invasion, Belgian anger over American domination during the Congo crisis, British fury over the American invasion of Grenada, Dutch and Belgian ire over Charles de Gaulle's proposal for a NATO directorate, or Italy's dismay with U.S. actions in the context of the *Achille Lauro* incident. Also important is the authors' identification of trends in intraalliance relations concerning out-of-area issues, as for example the evolution in European allies' interests in the Middle East, post-Gaullist redefinitions of French security; and Italian, Greek, Turkish, and Spanish relegations of East-West issues to lower priority.

While *The Limits of Alliance* is encyclopedic, there is very little in it that is unfamiliar. The authors use conventional documentary and secondary sources. Save perhaps for de Gaulle, they tend to underemphasize the influence of personalities on the course of NATO's colorful history. However Stuart and Tow are to be commended for almost completely managing to stay away from "collective goods" and associated social science paraphernalia that have recently rendered

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so many NATO studies opaque. Their book is a sound contribution to the NATO literature and to contemporary diplomatic history.

DONALD J. PUCHALA
University of South Carolina

The Cold War and Defense *edited by Keith Neilson and Ronald G. Haycock. New York, Praeger, 1990. 216 pp. $45.00.*

Although the essays in this volume first appeared as papers delivered to a symposium at the Royal Military College of Canada in March 1988—many months before the revolutionary developments that rendered the cold-war paradigm obsolete—the authors tell much that sheds light on how and why the cold war has given way so quickly to other worries. In the lead essay, Ernest May asks the question on which all discussions of American and western policy in the cold war must turn: How serious was the Soviet threat to western security? While May prudently declines to attempt a conclusive answer, his assessment of the various factors informing Soviet actions during the early years after 1945 indicates that the matter was more complicated than either the Truman-era originators of American cold-war policies or the Reagan-era recyclers of those policies understood. May hardly absolves Stalin of responsibility for the tensions that developed between the capitalist and communist camps; but with others of the postrevisionist school he argues that the Kremlin's policies reflected less a coherent drive for global or even regional hegemony than ad hoc adjustments to uncertain and shifting conditions along Soviet frontiers and in western capitals.

Several of the authors indicate, albeit obliquely, that western overrating of the Soviet threat was chiefly a function of politics, rather than of military strategy. Michael Dockrill, describing the evolution of British thinking about defense, notes that Britain's military planners deemed the Soviet military threat to Western Europe scarcely more than negligible. Bruce Kuniholm, in a chapter that goes far to explain how American leaders acquired their current interest in the affairs of the Persian Gulf, shows that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff largely discounted the possibility of a direct Soviet attack against positions in the Middle East.

Michael Hogan, analyzing the origins of the Marshall Plan, offers a reminder that is particularly pertinent in the context of the reunification of Germany: namely, that the Marshall Plan was not simply a design for rehabilitating the region west of the Soviet occupation zone; it was also a blueprint for tying Germany irrevocably into a larger framework of economic and political security. In this regard, George Marshall was the godfather of the integrated European Community of 1992.

Equally interesting, if somewhat less topical, are essays by Peter Dennis on Australia's contribution to western defense initiatives in Southeast Asia, and by David Bercuson and Denis Smith on the Canadian role in the Atlantic alliance. The three authors provide a useful corrective, if such were necessary at this late date, to the

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notion that the cold war was simply a contest between two superpowers. Neither Australia nor Canada wielded an effective veto in major decisions touching western security, but neither country could be ignored in the calculations of American leaders. The United States needed, or at least greatly desired, Australia's acquiescence in a lenient peace treaty with Japan; Washington required Canadian collaboration in creating a continental defense for North America.

Some readers might object to the unevenness of the volume's tone, which ranges from Hogan's scholarly detachment to Smith's "we, the Canadians" (p. 178). The different authors define the "defense" of the title to suit their separate purposes, so that the scope of each author's remarks is not always immediately evident. May's long essay occasionally tends to ramble. But taken for what they are—reflections on various aspects of western defense during the cold war, by authors with important and insightful points to make—the essays accomplish what their authors and the editors intended. The end of the cold war has not diminished the value of the accomplishment.

H. W. BRANDS
Texas A & M University

Rethinking the Pacific *by Gerald Segal. New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. 400 pp. $64.00.*

Gerald Segal has written an ambitious but curious volume on how to think about the nations of the Asia-Pacific region. He sets out by proposing to offer us "a broad, strategic analysis of the trends in the international relations of the Pacific" (p. 1). He undertakes to go about this in a manner that is impressively encyclopedic. He does have a second purpose—to provide a skeptical European gloss on what he sees as the unduly optimistic views of many Japanese and American analysts. This is a desirable corrective, although it leads Segal to judgments that are often unduly negative and occasionally downright peevish.

The questions with which Segal grapples in the volume are only gradually made explicit: To what extent is the Pacific a useful category for analysis? At what rate is Pacific regional integration occurring? And how does this compare with the European experience, with the Atlantic community, and with the speed of global integration?

As to the first of these, the author concludes that "there is no important cultural, ideological, political, economic, or even military sense in which it is particularly useful to talk of 'the Pacific'" (p. 377). As this comes only after one has read 376 pages of description and analysis about precisely these aspects of the Pacific, the reader is left to decide which Segal he prefers. But the statement is indicative of where Segal tends to come out on the other major questions he takes up.

The cultural dimensions of regional integration and differentiation are explored at length. Segal reviews data on patterns of language, religion, ideology, migra-

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tion, and communications, which lead him reliably to the conclusion that the Pacific is culturally fragmented—that its prevailing cultural patterns do not lend themselves to anything like the West European or Atlantic sense of community. So far so good, although why Europe or the Atlantic should be the standard of judgment for the Asia-Pacific is never made clear.

The author is at his best in describing and assessing the international security dimension of the Pacific. He finds major differences from the security situation in Europe: the region is of less interest to the United States and the USSR, the position of the United States is far more favorable, Japan occupies a position much different from that of Germany, China is a wild card, etc. Still, Segal does not give a name to the situation he describes and on the contrary denies that there is any pattern to it at all. Some readers may find this a valuable insight; others will find it a missed opportunity.

A final section of the volume describes the rapid growth of production and trade in the region; the rising levels of Japan, the newly industrializing countries, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies; and the political problems these changes have introduced, principally in relations between the United States and Japan. As the author notes, considerable economic integration has been taking place in the region. He nevertheless concludes that, given all the cultural and political differences, the future of the Pacific economies lies more in global than regional cooperation. This is probably so. At the same time, there is a strong disposition to place a low value on regional undertakings. The ASEAN deserves better than the author's "cynical" (his word) view of it. In addition, the prospects for Pacific economic cooperation, although the author is dismissive of the idea, have been considerably enhanced by the first interministerial meeting on the subject attended by representatives of a dozen nations in late 1989, apparently after the Segal manuscript went to press.

JOHN BRESNAN
Columbia University

Public Opinion, Polls, and Democracy *by Irving Crespi. Boulder, Colo., Westview, 1989. 148 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $15.95.*

In this stimulating and provocative little book, Irving Crespi draws upon his extensive experience as a pollster to explore the relationship between public opinion polls and democracy. He begins by contrasting the views of George Gallup and Lindsay Rogers as they assessed the potential of public opinion polls in the 1940s. Gallup "believed in the collective wisdom of ordinary people" (p. 3) and looked back nostalgically to periods of direct democracy. He saw polls as a means of attaining something like direct democracy. Rogers, a political scientist, argued conversely that polls undermine democratic government. He believed that policy should be set through a deliberate process and that leaders should rise above the narrow

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self-interest of their constituents. Polling the public on their opinions adds nothing to the policy debate, and it exaggerates the danger of short-sighted and base leadership.

Crespi assesses this debate in three substantive chapters. The first explores how polls are actually used. He demonstrates that most media polls are of the horse race type that tell us little more than what candidate or policy position is most popular at a given moment. Private polls tend to be more detailed, on the other hand, and have displaced local party organizations as the primary source of political intelligence used to shape tactics and strategies. They "contribute more to the manipulation of the public than to the meeting of its needs and wants" (p. 27).

Crespi shows that politicians such as Ronald Reagan can and do follow policies that do not have general public support and that they are likely to feel compelled to alter policies in the face of adverse public opinion only when public opposition to their policies is translated into a significant decline in their popularity and electability. He concludes, "There is no evidence that public opinion polls have become a decisive factor in the formation of public policy, as the early pollsters hoped and the early critics feared" (p. 39).

In a chapter on the methodology and meaning of polls, Crespi outlines many of their common technical shortcomings in a way that can be readily followed by a nonspecialist reader. He argues that if polls are to play a part in public debates about policy, we need more sophisticated polls and a more detailed and sensitive analysis of their findings.

It is to this last point that he devotes his final substantive chapter. Polls can play a significant role in public policy debates only if they are communicated to the public in an appropriate and meaningful way. That requires that the media treat polls not as hard news—the result of the horse race—but as background information that can help us to explore potential support for alternative policies. Crespi offers a number of useful suggestions on how both print and broadcast media might better meet this need.

Generally, Crespi's argument is that polls *could* make a positive contribution to democracy, but that they have yet to realize that potential. He wants "leaders in a democracy to know, although not automatically to conform to, the public's opinion regarding the issues of the day" (p. 94), so that policy debates will take the views of the public into account. It is not clear, however, that polls are likely to have that effect, even with the changes that Crespi recommends. It may well be that most political leaders would find in that situation, as they do now, that the most effective way of furthering their own goals is to use the results of opinion polls to manipulate the public.

TERRANCE CARROLL
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The United States and Egypt: An Essay on Policy for the 1990s *by William B. Quandt. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1990. 82 pp. Paper, $7.95.*

There is no higher praise for a policy essay than to say that it has affected policy. William Quandt's short essay, helped along by the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, has. One of Quandt's recommendations for solidifying the Egyptian-American relationship is to forgive Cairo's nearly $7 billion foreign military sales (FMS) debt. The interest on that debt, estimated for 1990 alone to be over $600 million, would consume a good portion of the U.S. aid commitment for the year. Shortly after Egypt organized an Arab League condemnation of Iraq and sent troops to help defend Saudi Arabia, President George Bush recommended to Congress the suspension of Egypt's FMS debt. Quandt's contention that the strategic value of the American-Egyptian relationship requires new thinking on the debt problem was borne out by events.

The crisis atmosphere in which the debt was forgiven (pending congressional approval, which is not guaranteed but probable), however, will probably obscure Quandt's other recommendations. Given the end of the cold war, Quandt assumes that there will be less foreign aid to distribute in the Middle East and therefore urges that FMS debt forgiveness to Egypt be part of an inevitable package of lower overall aid levels. He also counsels that more emphasis be put on economic rather than military assistance and that less of that economic assistance be tied to specific, American-approved projects. Helping the Egyptian regime make good on Anwar Sadat's promise of a "peace dividend" is as important for the future of U.S.–Egyptian relations as keeping the military happy. The American micromanagement of economic aid, through the enormous U.S. Agency for International Development bureaucracy that has sprung up in Egypt, causes frictions with Egyptian policy makers and gives the United States a dangerously high profile in the country.

The Iraq-Kuwait crisis has refocused attention on the continuing security risks to American interests arising from local Middle Eastern conflicts and the central role Egypt can play as an American ally in such conflicts. As a result it is unlikely that large-scale cuts will soon occur in American military assistance to Egypt. Given the interest of the American foreign aid establishment and American companies in the current structure of U.S. aid programs, it is also unlikely that Quandt's recommendation to give Egypt more discretion in the use of economic aid will be heeded. His advice that progress toward a solution of the Palestinian issue would also strengthen U.S.–Egyptian relations will also probably be taken less seriously in Washington, given the PLO's performance in the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. However, Quandt's warnings that the Egyptian relationship needs to be tended to, and that Cairo is not inevitably in Washington's "pocket," as President Ronald Reagan reportedly said during the *Achille Lauro* crisis, should be heeded by policy makers for the long term, not just during crises.

There is another important reason, which Quandt largely overlooks, why Egypt should be central to the American strategy in the Middle East. Egypt remains the

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intellectual and cultural center of the Arab world. Political and social experiments there reverberate throughout the region, for good or for ill. The Egyptian path—peace with Israel, greater freedoms politically, the introduction (however slowly) of market forces into the statist economy, and efforts to reconcile mainstream Islamic opinion within the political system—is one that the United States has a real interest in seeing succeed and spread throughout the Arab world. Support for Egypt, along the lines Quandt suggests, can serve both immediate and long-term American interests.

F. GREGORY GAUSE, III
Columbia University

The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948–1967 *by Peter Y. Medding. New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. 253 pp. $38.00.*

In this book the author seeks to explain the "baffling case" of Israeli politics so frequently noted by scholars of comparative politics like Giovanni Sartori. How can a state remain a relatively stable democracy when faced with overwhelming systemic challenges—wars, boycotts, massive waves of immigration of people of diverse backgrounds lacking experience with democracy, rapid economic development, etc.—and when saddled with a highly fractious political system characterized by deeply held ideologies, multiparties, and proportional representation?

Medding proceeds to analyze the Israeli case during its crucial, formative founding period (1948–1967) by utilizing the two models of democracy developed by Arend Lijphart: the majoritarian (or Westminster) and the consensus types. The former is characterized by structures that tend to magnify the almost unrestrained authority of the majority: a strong executive drawn from a single party that dominates a unicameral legislature, a two-party system, single major issues, single-member districts, central government, and particularly sovereignty. The latter ideal type seeks to restrain strong government and protect individual and minority rights. Among its features are power sharing among parties at the executive level, separation of powers, bicameralism, a multiparty system, multiple issue cleavages, a proportional representation electoral system, and other in-built restraints on the executive, such as a written constitution, minority vetoes, judicial review, etc.

Israel, Medding argues, is a unique hybrid, incorporating elements of both systems. It displays the unicameralism, parliamentary sovereignty, central government, and lack of elaborate written constitutional restraints characteristic of the majoritarian brand of democracy. But it also includes the coalition cabinets, multipartisan, proportional representation, cross-cutting cleavages, and a minority veto (at least in the religious realm).

During the founding period, the majoritarian tendency held sway, thereby enabling the government to cope—with a relatively free hand—with challenges that in other systems have often led to systemic overload and the end of democracy.

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The key to understanding how this was accomplished, despite the aforementioned institutional restraints, was the dominance over the system by a single political party, Mapai (the precursor of today's Labor party)—about which the author has previously written a major work—and by a single political leader, David Ben-Gurion, whom Medding views as a builder of democratic institutions rather than as the charismatic autocrat others have seen in him.

While not a majority party (there has never been one in Israel), Mapai, as the largest plurality party by far, occupied the pivotal central position on the political, economic, social, and ideological spectrums. There were no viable alternative leadership groups on the horizon—be they parties, interest groups, or otherwise. And since its representatives dominated not only the cabinet and parliament but also the Histadrut labor federation, such major quasi-governmental bureaucracies as the Jewish Agency and World Zionist Organization, municipal government, the military, and most other key sectors, real power resided more in it than in those other structures. Indeed, it was often in informal party bodies that conflicting interests were resolved, rather than in more formal governmental structures. Furthermore, its announced policy of *mamlakhtiyut* (roughly translated as statism) aimed at transferring to the state (hence to itself) any remaining sectarian pockets of power in the system.

It was precisely the relative success of *mamlakhtiyut* and the concomitant decline of ideologies and parties beginning in the late 1960s that have led both to the fall of Mapai from power and to the decline in the overall effectiveness of Israeli government in the post-1967 era, Medding argues. Whereas once parties and political parties held sway over social and economic forces, today social forces—ranging from benign ones such as consumerism, environmentalism, women's rights, ethnic rights, an independent media, etc., to potentially system-threatening ones such as the *Intifadah*, vigilantism, and religious fanaticism—have overwhelmed Israel's political system.

That system is now much closer in practice to the consensus model than to the earlier majoritarian one. But the structures of the system, Medding contends (by which we can assume he means the electoral system first and foremost) have not changed commensurately. The result is years of ineffective, wall-to-wall coalition governments.

Unfortunately, the author's discussion of the post-1967 period is confined to a brief afterword. One looks forward to a follow-up volume on the post-1967 period. While this is not a book for beginners, as it assumes a substantial basic background on the history and workings of the system, it does constitute a valuable analytical addition to the growing literature on Israeli politics.

GARY S. SCHIFF
Gratz College

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The Parties Respond: Changes in the American Party System *edited by L. Sandy Maisel. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1990. 363 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $19.95.*

Consisting of fifteen chapters written by twenty specialists, most of them well-known scholars, this book is a significant addition to the continuing discussion of the role of parties in contemporary American politics. Certain chapters include new research findings, others skillfully synthesize recent studies, and still others are thoughtful essays. Almost all are learned, interesting, and enlightening analyses of politics through the 1988 elections and the first year of George Bush's presidency.

The book is useful not only for subsequent scholarly inquiries but also for teaching political parties. Professors will find a mine of lecture material, or they may prefer to adopt the paperback version as one of several required works or even as core reading in an advanced course that can be taught without a comprehensive introductory text. Chapters are conventionally ordered, beginning with a historical survey and moving to extragovernmental party organizations, parties and voters, nominations and elections, and governmental parties. Only occasionally is the same material presented in more than one chapter, and then the repetition is justified by different perspectives.

Indeed, different perspectives of the several authors characterize the volume. Without explicitly debating each other, they vary substantially in their views concerning the present and the future importance of American political parties. The most pessimistic is Joel Silbey; his first chapter treats American parties as in almost continuous decline since the 1890s and now at an especially low state that looks irreversible. Yet the four following chapters are all modestly hopeful. John Bibby finds state party organizations stronger recently than a few decades ago, and Paul Herrnson provides data substantiating the increased campaign activity of national party organizations. Less directly supportive of party revival but potentially important to long-run party mobilization is the finding by Walter J. Stone, Ronald B. Rapoport, and Alan I. Abromowitz of an increased ideological polarization of Republican and Democratic state convention delegates in the two states (Iowa and Virginia) whose delegates they systematically surveyed in the 1980s. Then there is Warren Miller's cautionary treatment of the widely perceived decline in the electorate's partisan identification. Locating much of that decline among nonvoters and initially in a given age cohort, Miller is not ready to write off the continued significance of partisan identification. Next, however, Morris Fiorina's chapter demonstrates the growth of candidate voting and thus the diminished capacity of party identification to structure the vote especially across presidential-congressional offices.

A similar juxtaposition of perspectives is evident in two later chapters devoted to Congress. Barbara Sinclair, drawing on her participant-observer research, portrays the development since the 1970s of a stronger congressional party that now exhibits greater voting cohesion than in the recent past. On the other hand, David Brady treats such evidence as less important than the long-run weakness of Amer-

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ican legislative parties and the continuing need for crossparty coalitions. Most of the other authors are also doubtful about party revival. Two chapters make it clear that party organizations now play and probably can play no more than minor roles in nominating candidates, for president as well as for many other offices. Another points out the necessarily diminished influence of party organizations in helping presidents in their policy-maker appointments. And a chapter on campaign finance indicates the still and probably inevitably limited place that party organizations, apart perhaps for legislative parties, can achieve in our candidate-centered elections.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution *by Kenneth L. Karst. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989. 329 pp. $29.95.*

Drawing from social psychology and history, Kenneth Karst urges that equal citizenship is at the heart of constitutional rights and that courts should use a concept of equal citizenship to decide both cases clearly arising under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and many other cases now thought to arise under different provisions. The basic insights from social psychology are that people have a strong need to belong, that membership in a community is central to identity, and that a sense of common belonging is often accompanied by exclusionary attitudes toward outsiders. Lacking many other common features, the American community has long been largely defined in terms of equal citizenship. American history can be understood as a continual struggle between an ideal of equality that is inclusive and one that excludes some persons within the country as outsiders or "the other." Our society has moved toward increasing inclusiveness, and judicial interpretations of constitutional law have contributed to that movement.

In its political theory the book presents an appealing mixture of liberal and republican elements. Karst's ideal of the nation remains decidedly liberal, emphasizing tolerance, diversity, and equality of status. But he recognizes that citizens need to feel something more about the political order than that it is a contractual device for reciprocal self-advantage. He thinks that people can feel community and care for fellow citizens in a large nation. Karst may be optimistic about the degree of community that can be attained in a very big and diverse political unit, but he does not suppose that feelings of exclusion and their effects can be easily eliminated. Formal legal equality is far from sufficient for full participation in the community; economic opportunity is crucial. The dispiriting circumstances of poor black Americans draw much of Karst's attention.

Although the books' main value lies elsewhere than in its recommendation of specific legal results, the degree to which Karst's approach would shift focus from traditional modes of analysis is its most challenging feature. For equal protection

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analysis, he recommends that courts concentrate on whether a disputed practice interferes with the aim of equal citizenship. This inquiry would substitute for present emphasis on the nature of classifications, different levels of scrutiny (rational basis or compelling interest), the intent of government officials, and standards of state action. Thus, programs of affirmative action would be upheld as promoting equal citizenship; preferences for veterans would be struck down as impeding equal status for women; choices to save welfare funds by reducing payments to classes of recipients regarded as outsiders would be treated as impermissible discrimination; racial discrimination by private clubs with liquor licenses would be invalidated as contributing to inequality of status. In respect to issues not usually seen in equal protection terms, he urges that state use of the death penalty and police use of chokeholds should be forbidden, at least against blacks, if the recipients are disproportionately black; restrictive abortion laws should be regarded as denying equal status to women (men, he says, would never adopt them if the male gender happened to be the one that became pregnant); crèches on public property should be regarded as a symbolic exclusion of non-Christians. Some readers may understandably be troubled by the openness and vagueness of Karst's basic constitutional standard. For Karst, this is not a defect. One of the most astute and sympathetic male interpreters of feminist writing, he embraces as a positive virtue an idea of legal decision that rests on very broad principles rather than more precise standards. Like most books built around previously published essays, this one suffers from some discontinuities and repetition, but the repetitions end up highlighting the central themes with unavoidable clarity.

R. KENT GREENAWALT
Columbia University

The Money Chase: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform *by David B. Magleby and Candice J. Nelson. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1990. 227 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $10.95.*

After lamenting the relative inattention to matters of reform by most recent books on campaign finance, the authors early declare that reform will be the primary concern of theirs. Fair enough. There is more than enough room for a book that would "evaluate possible reforms of congressional campaign finance in light of experience, the judgment of key participants in the current system, and political realities." (p. 5). Sad to report, however, the authors have fallen short of their goals.

The plan of the book is puzzling. Well over half of a short book (123 of 213 pages of text) is occupied with a survey of the status quo in congressional campaign finance. Most of this—the history of the present regulation, the sources and levels of getting and spending, the roles of political action committees (PACs) and parties, and the travails of the Federal Election Commission—has been done with greater thoroughness and lucidity elsewhere. Specialists will find little here that

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they do not already know; neophytes will, but they will not find the prose very helpful.

The proposals for reform occupy the remaining pages. After a discussion of the major options, the authors propose their comprehensive reform plan; it includes, inter alia, partial public funding, indexed limits on campaign spending, relaxed limits on individual and party contributions, restrictions on soft money and the bundling of contributions, subsidies in the form of free or reduced-cost direct mailings, and a strengthened Federal Election Commission. Most parts of the package are familiar, but there are a few surprises and creative turns—for instance, by counting independent expenditures against a PAC's or individual's contribution limit despite the Supreme Court's holding in *Buckley* that all limits on campaign spending are unconstitutional.

The reform plan stands, however, in political isolation. There are brief discussions of the politics of reform at several points, but they do not go beneath generalities about the interests of incumbent members of Congress and the interest of the two parties. There is nothing of interest-group involvement, of House and Senate differences, of leadership or personalities, of wings or factions within the parties, of the history of reform in the last decade—little, that is, that would help one understand the byzantine politics that has lead to policy deadlock. As policy analysis, moreover, these last chapters have little detailed discussion of the likely results of the proposed reforms; in fact, the one attempt at trying out the effects of specific dollar sums in public subsidies and spending limits is relegated to an appendix. Nor is sheer exposition any stronger than it was in the first part of the book; the nonspecialist will, I'm afraid, find topics like soft money as mysterious as ever.

In sum, we have here a well-informed discussion of the status quo and a thoughtfully justified plan for reform. But there could and should have been more from two capable scholars with extensive Washington experience. What went amiss? As to the persistent problems of prose, perhaps there were too many authors or too few editors or both. The timing of the book was certainly awkward, coming in the middle of a massive but inconclusive attempt at reform. Certainly too, the restricted length of the book works against the exploration the topic needs. Above all, a book that dug more deeply into the policy issues, the political difficulties of doing anything about them, and the consequences of the proposed reforms would have better served both the authors and their readers.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

Governors and Legislatures: Contending Powers *by Alan Rosenthal. Washington, D.C., CQ Press, 1990. 223 pp. Paper, $16.95.*

Many who regard Alan Rosenthal's *Legislative Life*, published a decade ago, as the best single book on what makes state legislators tick, urged him to revise and

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update that out-of-print work in recent years. He steadfastly refused. It is a good thing that he did. For instead, Rosenthal, who is among those few political scientists with both a command of the scholarship on state politics and government and a visceral understanding of the subject, was able to spend a portion of his time and energy writing this new book. It promises to be an essential starting point for those who wish to understand the operation of the separation of powers in the states as the United States enters the third century of its experiment in federalism.

Rosenthal's thesis in this work is not new. Others have observed, as he does here, that state legislatures over the last several decades have recaptured coequal status with governors in state governance. Both their capacity to act as independent institutions and their will to do so has grown immeasurably during this period. Moreover, the likelihood of governors having their way with state legislatures has declined as power within them has been dispersed, as divided government has become more common, and as the significance of parties in state politics has generally diminished.

But three things here are new. The first, characteristic of Rosenthal's work, is the comprehensiveness of the analysis. Carefully weaving together systematic comparative evidence and incorporating a rich selection of examples drawn from well over half the states, the author examines the governor's role and resources in lawmaking, the development and operation of the modern state legislature, gubernatorial style in approaching the legislature, and executive-legislative relations in policy making, budgeting, and overseeing the day to day operations of state government.

The second is a reformulation of the categories in which the subject is approached. The analytic framework devised to examine the governor as chief lawmaker, for example, is especially creative. Here Rosenthal incorporates but does not focus upon a conventional treatment of formal powers, choosing instead to organize his discussion around such factors as governors' "power of initiation," "power of provision," and "power of publicity."

Finally, the author is most effective in drawing out the implications of the new institutional balance of power for state governance. According to the plan of those who crafted the modern governorship during the era of progressive reform, the governor was to be the center of energy and initiative in state government. His or her role was to propose, the legislature's to dispose. But legislatures are no longer satisfied with being reactive. Their members and leaders, increasingly professionals in politics, have their own agendas, their own need for political achievements to assure survival and facilitate advancement. Roles are thus often reversed, with governors left to dispose, to say "no" to legislation they regard to be the result of "unbridled entrepreneurship of legislators" (p. 202).

Thus one consequence of legislative resurgence, Rosenthal notes, is greater institutional conflict. The danger is that ever higher levels of conflict can lead to the kind of stalemate and deadlock in the states that is all too often seen in the national government in Washington. It can also lead to the bypassing of the governor and legislature, either through ever greater use where the option is avail-

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able of the initiative and referendum, or through excessive reliance on the courts for deciding core political questions.

Governors and legislators, Rosenthal concludes, have a mutual interest in acting cooperatively. Only in this way may they meet the twin goals of governing effectively and preserving their roles and powers in the state political system. To solve the extraordinarily difficult problems that now face virtually all the states, the author concludes, governors must respect legislative prerogatives, while legislators must recognize the importance of strong leadership, both in the governor's mansion and in the legislative chambers. I agree.

GERALD BENJAMIN
State University of New York–New Paltz

Black Entrepreneurship in America *by Shelley Green and Paul Pryde. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Publishers, 1990. 194 pp. $29.95.*

Contemporary discussions of culture in African American society today may be located within two broad categories. First, there are those who argue that black culture as it has evolved in the United States has been and remains an important basis of group identity and a critical, if not widely recognized, force in the Afro-American freedom struggle. The second category includes those who contend that black culture, or at least elements of it, as constituted today is a barrier to dealing with the unresolved problems of the race. Consequently, partisans of this view argue for a kind of cultural reconstruction in black America as a precondition to social, economic and political change. Shelley Green and Paul Pryde, specialists and consultants on economic development, are clearly in this latter category, because the principal thesis of *Black Entrepreneurship In America* is that blacks lack a "cultural predilection for entrepreneurship." Given adherence to this thesis it then follows in their view: "Black America must begin to address its chronic problems of unemployment, welfare and low capital accumulation by adopting entrepreneurial approaches with which it is neither familiar nor comfortable. Government expansion has reached the point of diminishing returns" (p. 11).

Green and Pryde acknowledge that there is an alternative structural explanation (in terms of racial barriers) to black entrepreneurial success, but acknowledge is all they do. That is, instead of designing the study in such a way as to test for the relative explanatory power of cultural versus structural explanations of the phenomenon, they ignore structural theories in single-minded pursuit of the cultural thesis. This is a major flaw of the work. A second problem is that even if the cultural thesis could be demonstrated, it would not necessarily follow that "government expansion has reached the point of diminishing returns" or that the adoption by blacks of "entrepreneurial approaches" would have any significant effects on the employment or welfare problems of the community (p. 11). This notion about the efficacy of black business as a means to deal with the employ-

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ment and related problems of the ghettos is, of course, largely ideological; but it nevertheless ought to have been systematically argued, since there are a number of scholars (including proponents of black entrepreneurship such as former Federal Reserve Governor Andrew Brimmer) who question the capacity of internal black economic development strategies to alter in any fundamental way the employment and welfare problems of blacks.

But the major problems with the book are theoretical and methodological, not ideological. Given their failure to design a study to test systematically for the structural alternative, Green and Pryde's pursuit of the cultural theory is itself methodologically flawed. What is required to explore this thesis is identification of those cultural attributes that facilitate entrepreneurship and development of instruments to test for the relative absence/presence of these attributes among blacks and some comparison ethnic group or groups. This the authors do not attempt. Rather, they identify four highly abstract qualities—resilience, creativity and innovation, initiative, and diversity. And then, in their words, "descriptively" apply them as "yardsticks of entrepreneurial culture to black families, schools and voluntary associations" (p. 14). But the chapters on the family, education, and community-based entrepreneurial institutions are theoretically superfluous, being no more than descriptive reviews of the literature.

Green and Pryde also present findings from three sets of data—a survey of black youth, "in-depth interviews" with six owners of black family businesses, and a series of vignettes on three black voluntary associations. There are two problems with these data. First, criteria for selection of the family businesses and the voluntary associations are subjective and cannot yield anything but anecdotal and idiosyncratic information. Similarly, the survey of black youth is not drawn or executed in a way to be generalizable to any known universe. Second, the findings are presented in highly descriptive fashion without import for the theoretical concern about cultural attributes and entrepreneurship. (The long vignette on the voluntary association called "The Majestic Eagles" reads like a propaganda statement for the group and its leader). In sum, the empirical data collected are not adequate for the limited theoretical tasks the authors set for the study.

A competent work dealing with the theoretical problem raised by Green and Pryde is badly needed. It would be an important contribution to the literature of ethnicity, economic culture, and race and public policy. This book, however, does not satisfactorily meet these important scholarly needs.

ROBERT C. SMITH
San Francisco State University

Race, Redevelopment and the New Company Town *by Daniel J. Monti. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1990. 250 pp. $17.95.*

Like many other American cities, St. Louis has shared similar experiences evoking dramatic changes, not all positive: the loss of its industrial sector, a serious de-

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cline in the number of jobs, the increasing importance of a service economy, the rush of whites to surrounding suburbs. Left behind in the city's core are large numbers of poor minorities, general deterioration downtown, housing decay. However, unlike many of its sister cities, St. Louis has undergone urban redevelopment, which, the author concludes, warrants a rather optimistic scenario.

Throughout his short monograph, Daniel Monti hits hard at the critics of urban redevelopment, particularly the ecologists and the Marxists. He criticizes the ecologists for depicting city redevelopment as mainly the work of private enterprise—setting goals and shaping the process, leaving to government only the task of coordinating the efforts. The Marxists, he decries as moored too stubbornly to their ideological assumptions. They see urban redevelopment as the mainstay of big business, which decides where and when a city shall redevelop and who is to benefit from its impact. Government, Marxists believe, is little more than the handmaid of these economic notables. Monti finds that neither version fits the St. Louis experience. In practice, the public sector prepared much of the groundwork—not all good, necessarily—to which the private entrepreneurs were brought to the city's projects. In fact, there were areas designated for redevelopment that had little strong potential or even a sponsor. At times, private institutions had to be pushed into working an area. Government officials had to cajole developers to pursue a particular type of rebuilding. They often went after sponsors by actually creating a redevelopment industry—putting together the pro-growth coalition necessary for the realization of the projects.

The book covers five projects, each a study of different actors, goals, programs and experiences. From these accounts Monti concludes that redevelopment reflected a pluralistic character. It was government that played the biggest, most active role and pressed developers to find ways for providing for the needs of low-income populations in their plans. While low-income and minority groups did not always get all that they wanted, their interests and concerns were not ignored and in fact were reflected in the St. Louis projects, admittedly modified by compromise. Thus the city's rebuilding efforts reflected a more democratic outcome than either the ecologists or Marxists would have believed possible. In essence, government was not simply manipulated by the business elite but operated independently as an important element, collaborating with the business sector, medical establishment, minority organizations, and neighborhood groups. It responded to their different requests by negotiating, compromising, and modifying the projects to suit these numerous claimants.

This is a provocative book and will take its place with other redevelopment studies. Together these will help answer the question those of us sought to answer for urban renewal policies and projects: whose interests did redevelopment serve?

JEWEL BELLUSH
Barnard College

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Supremely Political: The Role of Ideology and Presidential Management in Unsuccessful Supreme Court Nominations *by John Massaro. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1990. 272 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $16.95.*

Massaro's analysis of recent unsuccessful Supreme Court nominations is an anatomy of failures. He demonstrates that there is much to be learned from the failed nominations of Abe Fortas, Clement Haynsworth, G. Harrold Carswell, Robert Bork, and Douglas Ginsburg. Most studies consider ideology, party, and timing important factors that determine the success or failure of a nomination. Massaro is particularly interested in assessing the relative importance of ideology and presidential management, which includes the selection of a nominee and the strategy for confirmation. He compares senators' votes on nominees with their ratings on a Liberal/Conservative ideology index. He also uses generally unpublished presidential papers to provide insights into the actions of presidents, senators, and White House officials. These papers reveal the political webs that surround Supreme Court nominations.

Massaro differentiates between the senators' legitimate concerns about a nominee's ethics, competence, and judicial temperament, and their use of these concerns as convenient cover for opposing a nominee for philosophical reasons. Massaro maintains that nominations are political because the Court is a political institution. But Massaro does not consider legal politics something that infects the Constitution and the Court. Therefore, it was not inappropriate for conservatives to oppose Fortas because of his political, judicial, and legal philosophy. Massaro's perspective is refreshing, because it acknowledges the legitimate role that political philosophy plays in staffing the Court.

Massaro concludes that presidents bear much of the responsibility for the failure of their nominations. Fortas's nomination was "a failure in presidential management" because Lyndon Johnson made "serious misjudgments" about the Senate (p. 77). Richard Nixon's nominations of Haynsworth and Carswell did not fail simply because the well was poisoned by the ideological battle over the Fortas nomination. Haynsworth was vulnerable for nonideological reasons *and* the White House strategy was flawed: it was initially too passive and subsequently too aggressive and confrontational.

The book does have its shortcomings. Chapter One begins with some confusing sentences, but fortunately the problem disappears from the rest of the book. The book would also be strengthened by using the literature on presidential appointment as a framework of analysis. Recent studies refer to the rise of an administrative presidency that is characterized by a recognition of the importance of staffing in order to control policy.

Finally, the concluding chapter does acknowledge that a nomination may be especially contested because it is considered pivotal. The nomination of Bork was risky, because it meant that "a pivotal centrist justice" would be replaced by "a pronounced conservative" (p. 190). This insight should be incorporated into the analysis, since Massaro's case studies occurred during an era when political change

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was expected to produce a conservative counter-revolution. This book examines conflict management, and it would benefit from E. E. Schattschneider's observations about controlling the scope of conflict in order to determine its outcome. These failed nominations demonstrate that conflict is dynamic and presidents must develop flexible nomination strategies. Overall, the book is a very useful addition to the literature on Supreme Court nominations and legal politics.

TIMOTHY O. LENZ
Florida Atlantic University

City Choices: Education and Housing *by Kenneth K. Wong. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1990. 218 pp. Cloth, $44.50; paper, $14.95.*

Kenneth Wong has explored how Milwaukee and Baltimore implemented developmental and redistributive programs in housing and education in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The redistributive programs were the Section Eight Subsidy Program for rental housing and Title I Compensatory Education funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act; the Community Development Block Grant program and federal vocational education funding provided the developmental examples. As a student and collaborator of Paul Peterson's, Wong's study addresses the central questions raised by Peterson's work, namely whether economic constraints require localities to favor developmental activities, whether developmental and redistributive programs have different political dynamics, and how much difference local political structures and cultures make to program outcomes.

At the theoretical level, Wong enters a partial dissent from Peterson's views. Wong agrees that economic constraints are "particularly useful in explaining sharp policy differences between development and redistribution" (p. 141) and are "particularly applicable to economically declining communities where local tax revenues suffer from precipitous decline and where intergovernmental transfers have increased significance." But he argues that "the fact that city choices are made under structural economic constraints does not displace the importance of political factors" (p. 143). In this respect, Wong joins scholars who have criticized, to my mind convincingly, Peterson's assertion that urban politics is non-politics on the crucial issues of development.

Wong then seeks to specify how political factors influence local choices made in the face of economic constraints. His two case studies would seem to suggest that the primary determinant was the degree of professionalization and autonomy at the implementing agencies, which in turn was a function of local political culture (reform Milwaukee versus machine Baltimore) and the politico-administrative strategies pursued by two long-time mayors (Henry Maier and William Schaefer). He also concludes that client participation and the degree of black political incorporation had little impact.

In his final chapter, however, Wong turns not to his case studies but to the broader

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literature to develop a theoretical alternative to Peterson. He emphasizes how community-based activism, black political representation, reform institutions, retrenchment, and mayoral skill at coalition building promote program expansion or contraction. While this discussion is plausible, it is not as convincing as it might be, because it is grounded in a selective reading of the literature rather than his own case studies. Wong does not address the complexity of this literature—for example, multicity studies that assert black mayors make little difference to the redistribution of program outcomes. Nor does he consider the extensive debate on these same issues by scholarship on urban political economy and the theory of the state.

It would also have been exceedingly interesting for Wong to have directly addressed black political subordination. He tends to downplay the issues, though it might have had just as much impact on the observed policy outcomes in Milwaukee and Baltimore and the economic constraints on them. Black client groups and politicians apparently did not make much headway in either city. This might be understandable in Milwaukee, where blacks constitute a permanent minority, but not in Baltimore, where black voters constitute a majority but whites dominate the government and the city council. Wong gives us hints, such as Schaefer's use of federal resources to bind machine-oriented black political leaders to his cause. But a more extensive discussion would have been invaluable.

Wong nevertheless gives us an empirically rich and theoretically informed comparison of two kinds of policies in two arenas in two declining cities. If he lacks the degrees of freedom necessary to arrive at firm conclusions about what theory is right, he skillfully uses his case material to show the weaknesses of Peterson's model and to point us in the right direction for future theory building.

JOHN MOLLENKOPF
City University of New York

The Politics of Plant Closings *by John Portz. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1990. 214 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $12.95.*

In this study of plant closings in Louisville, Kentucky; Waterloo, Iowa; and Pennsylvania's Monongahela Valley, John Portz shows that comparative case studies provide a highly useful tool of analysis. Acknowledging that localities are constrained by the flow of private capital and by accompanying legal, organizational, and ideological factors, Portz explores the range of responses that local governments can make to counter economic decline. While market forces are powerful (Portz embraces the view that business occupies a "privileged position" in the American political economy) and officials are reluctant to take actions opposed by businesses, local governments also face popular expectations that employment opportunities be protected. Conflicting considerations thus come into play.

The Politics of Plant Closings explores three forms of response: the "bystander"

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approach in which government officials are passive and decisions are left to the private sector, including labor-management bargaining; the "offset" approach in which government officials act to counter decline, often in partnership with management and labor, by devising rescue packages intended to restore profitability; and the "player" approach in which government officials assert a public voice in the economic decision-making process. The player role has two variants, a corporate one in which government and the business firm cooperate closely and a populist one in which local officials are allied closely with labor and community groups and may be in an adversarial relation to business.

A short review cannot convey the full theoretical depth of Portz's typology. Drawing on John Mollenkopf's treatment of structure and action, Portz employs three levels of analysis— consisting of the system of economic accumulation, the institutional system as an arena for conflict and decision making, and the process of mobilization and alliance formation. Through these levels of analysis he explores how political choices are shaped and constrained by economic conditions, institutional arenas, policy tools and skills, and the encompassing context of capitalism. In this way, Portz is able to show how and why the populist player approach is difficult, but not impossible to carry off. In his words, plant closings allow "creative action within an environment of constraints" (p. 174). Moreover, constraints are not fixed, but can be modified by such actions as community mobilization behind aggressive forms of government action. The Pennsylvania experience shows, however, that community support can itself be quite tenuous. Pressure against plants closings is thus quite limited by the set of constraints within which it is, in Portz's term, "nested."

Portz captures nicely the complexity of public policy making in a political-economy context. He gives full weight to the "privileged position of business," but sees that a variable public role is possible, depending on the nature of political mobilization, institutional capacities, leadership skills, and the variety of policy tools available.

The Politics of Plant Closings is a valuable addition to the literature on urban political economy. It is readable enough to be accessible to undergraduates, and it is theoretically rich enough to provide stimulating discussion in a graduate seminar. As the process of economic restructuring continues, John Portz will be a valuable source of enlightenment about the role of local government in responding to industrial decline.

CLARENCE N. STONE
University of Maryland

Coping with Mandates: What Are the Alternatives? *edited by Michael Fix and Daphne A. Kenyon. Washington, D.C., Urban Institute Press, 1990. 110 pp. Cloth, $22.75; paper, $11.50.*

In recent years, government regulation has acquired an important intergovernmental dimension as federal and state governments increasingly impose restrictions and

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responsibilities on constituent jurisdictions or seek to employ them as agents for regulating the private sector. This book is a compact and valuable addition to the emerging literature on intergovernmental regulation, and it will prove useful to scholars and students interested in federalism, state and local government, and regulatory policy.

According to the editors, *Coping with Mandates* has two objectives: to provide an overview of the issues and concerns raised by intergovernmental regulation and to examine and evaluate federal and state attempts to ameliorate the problems caused by mandates. Both aims are effectively addressed by the chapters in this volume. Distilled from papers delivered at an Urban Institute conference in 1988, the chapters are unusually well written and well integrated for a collection of this sort. Several provide convenient and accessible summaries of Government Accounting Office (GAO) and other specialized reports on mandate issues.

The book begins with two excellent brief essays that place the issues of regulatory federalism in historical and intergovernmental perspective. The editors of the volume, Daphne Kenyon and Michael Fix, carefully define the scope of the mandate problem and provide a useful discussion of the conflicting values and interests that both give rise to intergovernmental regulations and that shape their implementation and effectiveness. Although the most frequent state and local complaints about mandates focus on their monetary costs, Fix and Kenyon also draw attention to important but frequently overlooked issues of legal authority, political legitimacy, and distributional equity. The second introductory essay, by David R. Beam, deftly addresses the historical origins of the mandate issue and the rise of regulatory federalism. Beam argues convincingly that the regulatory dimension of American federalism now deserves attention equal to the traditional focus on intergovernmental grants and subsidies.

Most of the remaining nine chapters in the book discuss various federal and state attempts to address the problems caused by unfunded mandates. One important approach has focused on improving legislative decision making. Procedures have been established in Congress and in forty-two states to estimate anticipated mandate costs prior to final legislative consideration of new regulatory statutes. Chapters by Theresa Gullo and Ann Calvaresi Barr do an excellent job of summarizing the processes and pitfalls of cost estimating procedures at both the federal and state levels.

Additional chapters discuss state experiences with mandate reimbursement. Richard Horte provides an overview of the subject, summarizing the findings of a GAO report on mandate reimbursement practices in fourteen states. This is followed by individual chapters that describe in more detail the varied approaches employed in South Carolina, Massachusetts, and Connecticut.

None of the authors is excessively sanguine about the effectiveness of the mandate relief strategies discussed above. Yet the need for drawing attention to the issues discussed in this book is demonstrated by the author of chapter seven on the federal Safe Drinking Water Act. Arnold Kuzmack, the director of the Environmental Protection Agency's Drinking Water Program Development and Evalu-

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ation Division writes that he "became aware of the mandates problem . . . only a couple of months ago" (p. 69). Yet his office had already spent years, not months, devising standards for community water systems that Kuzmack estimates will cost nearly $2 billion annually to comply with! If *Coping With Mandates* helps to increase such awareness among other federal and state officials at an earlier stage in policy development, it will have provided a valuable service.

TIMOTHY J. CONLAN
George Mason University

The Justice Juggernaut: Fighting Street Crime, Controlling Citizens *by Diana R. Gordon. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1990. 355 pp. $24.95.*

This book describes the current dimensions of the criminal justice system and examines why it has taken the shape that it has. One detailed section describes the growing scope and intensity with which the system monitors peoples' activities. The scope of the system has widened in several ways: through the explosive growth of jail and prison populations; the increased popularity of "intermediate sanctions" like home detention; and the development of computerized information and automated fingerprint identification systems. These have brought an increasing proportion of the population (now perhaps 3 percent of all adults) under some form of correctional supervision, and many more into computerized criminal history and "hot" files identifying people to be suspected. The growing intensity of the system is reflected in crackdowns on career criminals, lengthening jail sentences, intensive supervision of parolees and probationers, the extension of new forms of custody to include people who previously would have been warned or fined and then released, and the growing percentage of criminal justice agencies linked nationwide to these intelligence files.

Gordon ironically makes good use of one of the fruits of all this troubling "net-widening": detailed, recent, good-quality, and usually national data on crime, offenders, and the activities of various elements of the criminal justice system. She skillfully weaves this data into descriptive portraits of the system in action that are based on field research in several states.

The main purpose of the volume is to explain why "the juggernaut" has taken its present form. Part of the explanation lies in the current balance of power between several contending factions: criminal justice conservatives (who believe the crime rate is the sum of individual moral choices); liberals (who focus on the economic and social arrangements that structure those choices), politicians (who typically shift with the wind, but who do not want to spend enough money on the problem from either ideological perspective); and criminal justice professionals who have to make day-to-day sense of those demands and resources. Gordon is particularly good at conveying the frequent fair-mindedness and professionalism of the latter and how they can play a significant role in making the actual opera-

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tion of the system less oppressive and mean-spirited than it may appear to some critics.

Ultimately, however, Gordon is deeply pessimistic. Her answer to the "What can be done?" question is "very little," and she thinks that Americans will have to live with present levels of criminality for the foreseeable future. Demographic and economic projections through sometime in the 21st century portend more crime rather than less. Gordon exhibits a sensible modesty about the ability of the criminal justice system to make much of a dent in that. (One chapter takes what we know about the deterrent effectiveness of the system and projects this into a scenario of what a criminal justice system that "works" would have to look like; few readers of any persuasion would like to live with the result.) Gordon's own view is that solutions can only come through shifts in political and economic power that restructure the context of individual moral choices. However, she points out that the conservative view of criminal accountability accords with popular theories of individual motivation and public policy that are politically ascendent in policy areas ranging from abortion to social welfare. They also conveniently correspond to the current belief that "nothing works, and we couldn't afford it anyway." Instead, the racial and class distribution of street criminals legitimatizes the stance that the principal beneficiaries of more progressive public policies don't deserve them.

WESLEY G. SKOGAN
Northwestern University

Rules for Rulers: The Politics of Advice *by Arnold J. Meltsner. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1990. 187 pp. $24.95.*

Rulers love rules. Every two years, just after the November elections, the nation's governors get together for their Seminar for New Governors, where the current governors educate their newly elected colleagues about how to govern a state. Much of this wisdom is conveyed in the form of rules. Rule: Always go to the scene of a disaster. Corollary: Never go to the scene of a prison disaster. Rule: Never screw up on a slow news day. Indeed, much practical advice seems to be conveyed through such rules. Practitioners like to give advice through rules. And they like advice that comes in that form. If that is true, rulers who need advice will love this book.

Arnold Meltsner offers twenty-six rules for how rulers should manage the process of obtaining advice or using advisers. Specifically, his rules are based on the experience of presidents of the United States, but they easily apply to a governor, a mayor, the manager of a state department of transportation, the director of a local welfare office, or the president of General Motors.

Meltsner's rules look simple enough: Keep the inner circle small. Know your advisers, but calibrate their advice before reacting. Indeed, the rules look too simple, too obvious. Do these rules really provide any meaningful advice? Are these two rules—plus the two dozen others—really worth a book?

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But the rules themselves, which are necessarily cryptic, do not alone convey the wisdom behind the rules. When the nation's governors get together, they do not just spout rules. They tell stories—parables, really, with morals attached. And it is the morals of these stories that are summarized in the rules. The rules themselves convey little; it is the governors' stories from which their rules are derived that capture and explain the meaning and depth of their rules. So it is with Meltsner's book.

Take his first rule: keep the inner circle small. In discussing this issue of access, Meltsner quotes President Jimmy Carter and provides examples from the Reagan administration (James Baker's legislative strategy group) and Presidents Lyndon Johnson's and Carter's national security advisers (McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, and Zbigniew Brzezinski). He also offers illustrations from the experience of European rulers—Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Cardinal Richelieu.

Or consider another of Meltsner's rules: know your advisers, but calibrate their advice before reacting. Before deciding whether to accept an adviser's advice, the ruler needs to make judgments about the adviser's general wisdom, knowledge of the issue at hand, and conflicting loyalties and ideological blinders. Meltsner calls this critical examination of advice "calibration."

But exactly *how* does a ruler calibrate an adviser? This, Meltsner admits, "is never as easy as it sounds" (p. 122). Still, he offers several suggestions. First, there is Rooseveltian "competition"—playing off the advice of multiple advisers on a single issue to see which advice is the most coherent. The ruler can also try education—becoming more of a personal expert on the issue so that he or she can probe both the advisers and their advice. And finally there is the simple method of just getting to know the strengths, weaknesses, character, and intelligence of every adviser.

"Calibration is comparison," writes Meltsner. Any effort at comparison takes time—whether it is between advisers, with an adviser's past advice, or with new knowledge. There are no simple rules—no shortcuts—for calibrating advice.

ROBERT D. BEHN
Duke University

The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means *by John D. Donahue. New York, Basic Books, 1989. 264 pp. $22.95.*

Privatization is a complex, controversial term used to describe a variety of strategies that entail the delegation of public responsibility to the private sector: selling state-owned industries to the private sector, contracting with the private sector for the provision of public services, charging fees for public services, cutting the government budget, deregulation, and encouraging voluntarism. Although privatization dates back centuries, the visibility and popularity of privatization increased markedly in the 1980s. Privatization has won support because it is viewed

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as a cheaper, more effective strategy to address public policy problems than government bureaucracies. In addition, the Reagan and Thatcher administrations aggressively pushed privatization to reverse the growth of government and encourage greater private responsibility for the economy and public policy issues in general. The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and many countries in South America are using privatization as a tool to dismantle inefficient industries, improve worker productivity, and halt the growth of subsidies and social benefits.

In short, privatization is at the center of the ongoing debate on the shape of the state and the proper boundaries between the individual, the community, the market economy, and the state. However, where are the boundaries? What activities are appropriate for privatization? What governmental duties are better left to civil servants? In the United States, these questions have assumed added urgency in recent years with the widely publicized scandals involving privatization such as the savings and loan crisis and the corruption in Defense Department procurement. Moreover, privatization is now being pushed for very sensitive and critical public services such as prisons and fire protection.

John D. Donahue's excellent book, *The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means* is centrally concerned with this public/private boundary problem. Donahue focuses on one of the most predominant forms of privatization—government contracting with private agencies. Government retains responsibility for financing the service; but private organizations provide the service. He views the privatization decision as a problem of agency: how do the principals (government officials) ensure that their agents (the private contractors) will provide services according to government expectations. According to Donahue, contractor compliance with the priorities of government is most likely when the service to be contracted can be specified in advance, subject to competition among suppliers, and capable of being monitored by government.

This agency pespective is applied to four different cases of contracting for public services: defense procurement, prisons, municipal services such as garbage collection, and job training. In a highly useful and readable way, the author reviews and analyzes the existing cost data on contracting in each of these areas and then succinctly and clearly presents the most salient issues for policy makers to consider when faced with the contracting decision in each of these services. The book concludes with some important cautionary comments on privatization. To Donahue, privatization is a worthwhile, cost-saving strategy that can enhance government performance and foster policy innovation. But he believes privatization is often used for the wrong services because of ideological and political reasons.

The book's focus and conclusions raise important issues for further research. The privatization decision in this book represents a choice between direct government provision or contracting with for-profit organizations. However, in service categories such as weapons research, municipal services, and social welfare, the privatization decision is often a choice between government, for-profit organizations, and nonprofit organizations. Indeed, in social welfare, contracting has proceeded largely through nonprofit organizations. The option of contracting with

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nonprofit organizations is particularly important because nonprofits—through the volunteer board of directors and community involvement—may offer policy makers a monitoring mechanism for services that is unavailable in for-profit organizations.

In addition, the principal-agent perspective tends to keep the analysis focused on the criteria of efficiency as a means to judge the merits of privatization in particular policy areas. This focus tends to diminish the importance of other goals that might affect the privatization decision. For example, we as a society may want government to provide certain information services even if it is cheaper to contract out this service to the private sector. Or we may want to contract with a community organization to provide services to troubled youth because of programmatic reasons, even if it is more expensive than governmental provision.

By writing the best book on the privatization decision, Donahue has also set the stage for future research that looks at the macroconsequences of privatization. How does privatization affect citizen support for government spending or citizen perceptions of government and its role in society? What is the symbolic importance of government programs? These are difficult questions; but fortunately we have this book to provide a guide to the stakes involved in privatization as we strive to answer them.

STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH
Duke University

Tar Heel Politics: Myths and Realities *by Paul Luebke. Chapel Hill, N.C., The University of North Carolina Press, 1990. 238 pp. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $10.95.*

This book reflects quite well—perhaps too well—the fact that the author is at once a political sociologist (University of North Carolina at Greensboro), a frequent contributor to newspapers and periodicals, and an activist deeply committed to neopopulism. It is clearly and interestingly written, mercifully free of jargon, calm in its rhetoric, and focused on important issues. Books on the politics of single states are sufficiently rare as always to be welcome, but this book earns additional credit by what it offers to general readers, partisans, and activists; scholars will probably benefit less.

On balance, Luebke is not altogether successful in attempting to characterize Tarheel politics. He is most effective at the descriptive level, as when reviewing North Carolina political history, sketching the status of trade unions, and reporting on Jesse Helms and his epic battle in 1984 against then-Governor Jim Hunt for reelection to the U.S. Senate. However, his conceptualizations are less satisfactory. This shortcoming is most easily seen in the chapter entitled "Dealignment in North Carolina Politics" in which the concept of partisan dealignment gets a hopelessly inadequate explanation in two sentences and equally unsatisfactory applications in the pages that follow.

The author's attempt to reconceptualize the lines of political cleavage also gives

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one pause. Some North Carolinians may be surprised to learn that battles there are not fought along liberal-moderate-conservative lines. Instead, according to Luebke, the conflict is between "modernizers" and "traditionalists," with a few "neopopulists" on the periphery. While the distinction he urges is insightful and deserves to be taken into account, it hardly seems to warrant abandonment of the familiar ideological continuum (the words "liberal" and "conservative" are conspicuous by their absence) and the recasting of history and contemporary politics, particularly since, by Luebke's own admission, "'traditionalists' can usually be termed 'conservatives'" (p. 28), and modernizers closely resemble moderates. The latter, it turns out, dominate the Democratic party, while traditionalists are more Republican-oriented.

This book also creates doubts with its interpretation of political dynamics. I have no way of knowing whether Luebke is correct in his complaint that "modernizer" politicians such as Jim Hunt and Terry Sanford pursue moderate policies not because of electoral constraints but because that is where their hearts are. But, even if that is true, the real question is whether Hunt and Sanford could have been elected to the state's highest offices had their politics been substantially further to the left. One does not have to be a North Carolinian to see the improbability of such outcomes.

There are other indications of the author's subjectivity. For example, he offers the imposition of the sales tax on food by then-Governor Sanford and other modernizers in 1961 as proof that they were not liberals. In so reasoning, Luebke seems to be unaware that many certified liberals in the 1960s, though concerned about the regressivity of sales taxes, nevertheless supported their adoption or extension in order to get the revenues necessary to fund the major increases they sought in state welfare and social service expenditures.

The evidence presented seems to warrant the conclusion that North Carolina remains the Progressive plutocracy described by V.C. Key, Jr. almost fifty years ago. However, in downplaying the force of electoral considerations in the perpetuation of that undesirable state of affairs, blaming it instead on modernizer politicians' indifference to liberal and radical goals, Luebke calls into doubt his understanding of mass as well as elite attitudes and behavior in North Carolina.

CLIFTON MCCLESKEY
University of Virginia

The Cause That Failed: Communism in American Political Life *by Guenter Lewy. New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. 359 pp. $24.95.*

Despite his title, Guenter Lewy has not written a comprehensive, reflective history of the American Communist party, chronicling its appeal and ultimate failure. His narrative is at best a cursory survey that offers neither new insights nor new information. Lewy's derivative monograph, written from an avowedly anti-communist perspective, relies exclusively on the earlier work of other critical

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scholars, notably Theodore Draper, Harvey Klehr, David Shannon, and Irving Howe and Lewis Coser.

Lewy's principal interest is not to recount the history of the American Communist party. His motivation in synthesizing this earlier critical scholarship is to offer a counterpart for analyzing those intellectuals and political activists who in the post-McCarthy era adopted what he terms anti-anticommunist perspectives. Deeply disturbed by this anti-anticommunism, Lewy offers less an analysis of this writing or these movements than a polemical tract to alert his readers to this new internal security threat, despite the demise of the American Communist party and the decline of Soviet international political and military influence. His thesis can be capsulized by a quote from his prefatory comments: After conceding that Communist party membership had declined to approximately 3,000 by 1957, Lewy claims that nonetheless the party "was rescued from oblivion by a significant change in the attitudes toward American Communism on the party [sic] of an influential segment of the intellectual community" (p. viii). In a series of chapters, he proceeds to condemn the "deceitful tactics" (p. 292) and "hidden agenda" (p. 298) of a variety of organizations (including the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Committee for Sane Nuclear Policy [SANE], anti-Vietnam war movement, Students for a Democratic Society [SDS], National Lawyers Guild to the U.S. Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador) and Marxist and left-liberal intellectuals. Lewy does not document his contentions from research in relevant primary sources. With the exception of limited research in the records of SANE, his narrative is again derivative, but in this case his analysis is based on a highly selective and distorted reading of the secondary literature. Let me cite one example to support this critical assessment. In a paragraph decrying what he asserts is the failure of revisionist scholars to take account of Communist espionage, Lewy cites as definitive the conclusions of Ronald Radosh and Allen Weinstein as to the guilt of the Rosenbergs and Alger Hiss. He then observes: "Books and film documentaries that argue for the innocence of Hiss and the Rosenbergs are praised no matter how flimsy their factual base" (p. 121). As a recent example of this unwarranted praise he cites the reaction to the biography of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover cowritten by this reviewer. In point of fact, we do not even discuss the Rosenbergs' case and our only reference to the Hiss case involves a discussion of the FBI's covert assistance to Congressman Richard Nixon during 1948. Lewy's research is not always this shoddy; there are, however, far too many similar examples of misreading or misrepresentation. Nonetheless, the above example is representative of Lewy's research methodology. Authors and political movements deemed politically correct by Lewy are omniscient; those authors and political movements he deems politically suspect are misguided and essentially traitorous. The result of such an effort not only is not a work of serious scholarship but adds little to an understanding either of "the cause that failed" or of "Communism in American political life."

ATHAN THEOHARIS
Marquette University

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Nicaragua's Other Revolution: Religious Faith and Political Struggle *by Michael Dodson and Laura Nuzzi O'Shaughnessy. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1990. 244 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $12.95.*

Experienced specialists with years of research on Nicaragua's politics and the role of religion in the revolution, the authors document the extent and complexity of religious involvement in the struggle against both the Anastasio Somoza Debayle dynasty and the Sandinistas. Dodson and O'Shaughnessy carefully examine the complex role of religion (both Catholic and Protestant) in the anti-Somoza insurrection and the revolution of 1979–1990, argue that "from the standpoint of religion . . . the English and American revolutions provide more interesting parallels to the Nicaraguan Revolution than do the French, Mexican, or Cuban revolutions . . . [because in the former] religious belief was a strong catalyst to political action" (p. 7).

Part 1 of the book focuses on religion and modern democratic revolutions and includes chapters on the Nicaraguan revolution and its antecedents, the broader Central American crisis, the religious origins of U.S. politics, and political development patterns in the Americas (emphasizing in particular the role of religion in the development of political culture and institutions). Part 2 explores the "traditional church"/"prophetic church" schism, especially the changes that swept Latin American Catholicism after the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). It includes chapters on tradition and change in the churches, institutional response to Vatican II and the 1968 Medellin conference, and the effect of religious renewal on mobilization against Somoza. Part 3 examines religion in Nicaragua's revolution and includes chapters on religion and the churches in a revolutionary society, in the contra war, and in the Reagan administration's anti-Sandinista policies.

The authors draw upon their own extensive field experience in Nicaragua, as well as a rich mixture of primary sources in both Spanish and English, public and church documents, secondary sources on the role of religion in the English and American revolutions, and both published interviews and numerous personal interviews by the authors themselves with many actors in the struggles and movements discussed.

Dodson and O'Shaughnessy make important contributions in this book: Their careful analysis cuts through the propagandistic cant and distortion that has characterized much discussion of the Nicaraguan revolution and the relations between the Sandinistas and the churches. They considerably enrich the study by their attention to the base-level clergy and laity, rather than concentrating heavily on the hierarchies of the Catholic and Protestant churches. The explicit comparison of religion in the Nicaraguan revolution with the experiences of other Latin American revolutions (Mexico and Cuba) and of the U.S. and English revolutions brings invaluable insight. Inclusion of the less known role of Nicaraguan Protestantism in the revolution finds important parallels to the experience of Catholicism.

The volume explains how theological and doctrinal currents of Catholicism and liberation theology have informed religious resurgence in Nicaragua since the 1960s, and explains how this sparked anti-Somoza activism, pro-revolutionary fervor,

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and anti-Sandinista struggle. It most usefully sets these trends within a larger historical and comparative context, giving the book a sweep and vision far superior to other previously published studies of religion and politics in Nicaragua and Central America. All this is accomplished with a prose style (and paperback price) accessible to undergraduates. The book also has a theoretical and comparative richness that will inform scholars and specialists. This is an excellent and useful book appropriate for courses ranging from Latin American politics to religion and politics. I expect it to become the standard treatment of religion in the Nicaraguan revolution and of the effects of liberation theology on Nicaraguan politics.

JOHN A. BOOTH
University of North Texas

The Political Economy of European Integration *edited by Paolo Guerrieri and Pier Carlo Padoan. Savage, Md., Barnes and Noble Books, 1989. 302 pp. $42.50.*

Since the end of the Bretton Woods system, the international economic order has gradually changed its structure from primarily hegemonic to oligopolistic. According to Guerrieri and Padoan, West European integration is a typical example of this present system of oligopolistic interdependence. In accordance with this fundamental diagnosis, all the contributions to this volume analyze the process of European economic integration as an outcome of the interplay between the policy preferences and strategies of the major West European countries (France, West Germany, and Italy). This approach to European economic cooperation makes extensive use of game theoretic concepts and their applications to international economic integration as developed in recent years by the international political economy literature.

In their own contribution, the two editors show how the behavior of each national government with respect to European integration can be formally described as a two-stage game in which the political leaders of a given country try to maximize both their influence in shaping international regimes and their domestic popularity. In maximizing national power in order to impact an international regime, national leaders operate under the constraint of the domestic political system. On the other hand, the maximization of domestic popularity has to take into account the rules of the game imposed by a given international regime. This analytical framework can be used to model some key aspects of the actual West European integration process during the 1980s. First, it shows how West Germany was able to impose its own preference for low inflation on all countries participating in the European Monetary System (EMS). Second, it enables the analyst to demonstrate the way in which the other players in the European monetary game could gain from adhering to the system.

However, as the contributions of L. T. Katseli, L. Tsoukalis, and M. De Cecco

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make abundantly clear, such an interpretation of West European monetary stability as a public good provided by West Germany is not shared by all analysts of European economic cooperation during the 1980s. Instead, Katseli blames the "protracted deflationary bias" of macroeconomic policy in Western Europe for high rates of unemployment (p. 43); Tsoukalis critically discusses the asymmetrical nature of the EMS resulting from the leading role of the Federal Republic of Germany in it; and De Cecco denounces the allegedly excessive gains of West Germany from the working of the European Monetary System. Unfortunately, the chapters by Katseli and De Cecco suffer from an uncritical ideological bias in favor of neo-Keynesian economic policies and a polemical style ill suited for scholarly discussion.

More analytical substance can be found in B. J. Cohen's chapter on European financial integration in the context of national interests in France, Germany, and Italy, and in J. Pelkmans's inquiry into protectionist tendencies within Western Europe. E. Thiel and P. Petit devote their chapters to analyses of West German and French economic policy preferences and the role of external constraints in the determination of policy strategies. J. B. Goodman and P. A. Gourevitch contribute two informative analyses of the "Monetary Politics in France, Italy and Germany" (Goodman) and the "Politics of Economic Policy Choices" (Gourevitch) in postwar Europe.

The ten chapters of this volume provide an excellent overview of current issues central to the debate about European economic integration. They also include some insightful applications of analytical concepts developed by the international political economy literature.

JORG BOCHE
Johns Hopkins University

Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights *by Hurst Hannum. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990. 503 pp. $44.95.*

A right of autonomy within international law might help resolve intrastate conflicts between ethnic groups before they escalate into civil war and demands for secession. So Hurst Hannum argues in this excellent book. The purpose of the right is to integrate the principles of diversity and tolerance, the demands by central governments and most majorities for national unity and territorial integrity, and the felt need of many minority groups for continued identity.

In nine major case studies and seventeen minor ones, which are presented clearly and concisely, Hannum shows that widely varying and complex conditions require a flexible understanding of this right. In some cases, central governments already have tried to accommodate the ethnic groups by guaranteeing their right to use their own language, operate their own schools, own land communally, profit from

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natural resources within their region, and with certain limitations govern their own affairs. In other cases, the right might offer a solution to intrastate tensions.

To develop the right, ideas of sovereignty and self-determination, which sometimes have been influenced by an emphasis on free and equal individuals, need to be revised, he argues. Each state is legally the same; each is independent of others and able to govern all the people within its territory. Individuals within a state enjoy the right of self-determination if their government accepts the republican principle of one person-one vote.

Individual self-determination has often competed with national self-determination. Many individuals identify themselves as members of a nationality that perhaps has a common language, religion, or ancestry. Each nationality is said to be able to determine its own affairs, maintain its identity, and provide for its security only if it has its own sovereign nation-state. With the principle of one people-one state, minorities have an uncertain status at best.

After World War II many colonies demanded independence. They claimed a right of anticolonial, territorial self-determination. The territory was defined by the colonial borders that had been drawn by Europeans, who often lumped various ethnic groups in the same colony or divided the same one among different colonies. Indigenous leaders from the colonies did not contend that each ethnic group should have its own state. Once independent, the new state tried, often futilely, to build a nation.

Since the 1960s almost the entire world has been politically organized within one of some 160 sovereign states. In many cases, minority ethnic groups have not felt that they sufficiently determine their own affairs. Nor have they in many cases favored resolution of ethnic strife through integration, which assumes the idea of individualism. If they can realize their right to self-determination only by seceding from established states and creating their own sovereign state, there may be endless civil wars and then the chaos of thousands of states.

The right to autonomy might offer a brighter prospect by allowing minority or indigenous groups to carry out certain religious, linguistic, or cultural activities; to be treated equally; and not to be discriminated against. In addition to these more traditional minority rights, it would also incorporate the principle of self-determination by providing for a degree of economic and political self-government by ethnic or religious groups within a region of a state. This is not federalism, which is a political relationship between a central government and geographically defined sub-units of the state. These are important suggestions about how to use a flexible approach to sovereignty and the right to ethnic self-determination to create a just and ordered multination-state system.

LOWELL S. GUSTAFSON
Villanova University

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Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension *edited by Cranford Pratt. Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990. 176 pp. $32.95.*

Almost as frustrated as developing country officials in their failed efforts a decade ago to secure a New International Economic Order (NIEO), were the sympathetic (mostly Social Democratic) leaders of a number of like-minded middle powers – Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Canada. *Middle Power Internationalism* represents the work of four senior scholars of North-South relations who are at various stages of coming to terms with this frustration.

Editor Cranford Pratt introduces and closes the volume with a sustained plea for what he calls "humane internationalism" and an expression of his regret about the decision of the Great Powers to reject this approach throughout the North-South debates of the 1970s. Pratt bemoans the continuing preference of citizens in rich countries (including some middle powers as well as great powers) for national over international policy objectives. Pratt's own prescription is for a quantum leap toward cosmopolitan values. This is a view that he admits sets him somewhat outside the mainstream of descriptive economic and political science.

Asbjorn Lovbraek contributes a highly useful retrospective on the diplomatic efforts undertaken (beginning in 1974) by Norway and the Netherlands to form a Like-Minded Group of middle powers to promote a more generous northern position in the NIEO debate. Lovbraek admits this effort was a failure and perhaps even counterproductive to the extent that it deceived the South into thinking that the views of developing nation officials were getting a serious hearing in the North. Lovbraek gives us a nice account of the simple analogy (from their own successful social democratic economic policy interventions at home to a comparable NIEO abroad) that encouraged the leaders of the Like-Minded Group to launch their mediatory efforts. Missing from this problematic analogy, he might have noted, was an appreciation for the decisive role played by oftentimes flawed domestic social and policy structures inside the developing world.

Bernard Wood contributes an essay that provides some useful thinking about the unique characteristics and interests of middle powers, including most of all their interest in multilateral institutions. Middle powers should do more, Wood advises, to act on this interest.

The final essay by Raphael Kaplinsky is something of a departure, inasmuch as it calls into question the assumed harmony of interests between middle powers and developing countries, especially the rapidly growing Asian newly industrial countries (NICs). Employing a somewhat idiosyncratic analysis of the global spread of new microelectronics technologies (he says this will bring a shift from "machinofacture" to what he calls "systemofacture"), Kaplinsky anticipates more than transitional threat to existing employment or wage levels in middle power countries. His analysis is more a speculation about the future than it is a careful review of recent wage and employment trends. As such it may underestimate the ability of international society, both North and South, to continue making mutually advantageous use of productivity gains from technological change. But the

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anxieties raised in this final essay are a useful corrective to the 1970s-era assumption (a bit too prevalent elsewhere in this volume) that without a NIEO all the economies of the South will remain at a perpetual structural disadvantage.

ROBERT L. PAARLBERG
Wellesley College

Sweden: Social Democracy in Practice *by Henry Milner. New York, Oxford University Press, 1989. 260 pp. $39.95.*

Henry Milner has made an excellent contribution to the literature on the Swedish model. What distinguishes his effort from other enthusiastic treatments of Swedish Social Democracy is his characterization of Sweden's political economy as an interrelated, functional system, the parts of which complement rather than conflict with one another. Furthermore, Milner emphasizes the capacity of the system to "deliver the goods" economically as a fundamental requisite of its success and indeed of any rational commitment to Social Democratic principles. As a disappointed Canadian supporter of the Parti Québécois politics of left-wing nationalism, Milner seeks in the Swedish experience a confirmation of the possibility of a hard-headed economic basis for radical reformist politics.

Milner portrays a system in which equality does not undermine efficiency and social solidarity does not stifle economic growth. The solidaristic market economy encourages market forces as a spur to enhanced productivity. It places these forces in a context of social solidarity that reduces information costs and transactions costs, makes trade unions proponents of industrial rationalization, and secures citizens against the costs of capitalist dynamism. The coexistence of market competition with social solidarity is facilitated by the broad distribution of economic benefits and by a buffer zone between the two sectors.

The buffer zone, Milner's most novel concept, refers to the area between the market and the public sector. Concretely it refers to the public activities performed by private organizations on public boards, agencies, and commissions. Milner also includes not-for-profit organizations in the buffer zone. Here private interests cease to be special interests and are incorporated into broader social purposes. The hazards of corporatism foreseen by Mancur Olson are transformed into the benefits of concertation. The notion of the buffer zone remains too metaphorical, but its explanation of the nature and workings of benign corporatism merits further comparative investigation.

The bulk of the book consists of an effective depiction of Swedish Social Democracy in the 1980s, particularly its economics. Milner rightly stresses the waning tradition of centralized, collective bargaining; the Rehn-Meidner model of economic policy and its limited application; the successes of active labor market policy; and the development of collective capital formation. He provides a good account of the wage-earner funds and of the less widely reported renewal funds. He out-

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lines the industrial democracy reforms of the 1970s and notes their contribution both to labor power and an improved work climate.

Milner concludes with two chapters on the social domain. He properly emphasizes Social Democratic efforts to spread education and knowledge, as well as economic well-being. The inclusion of everyone within the society's cultural and educational institutions serves to break down class barriers and to create a society of informed consumers and skilled producers. Milner commends both the educational system (from preschool to adult education) and the strongly universalist system of social welfare, but notes continuing problems with educational inequality and housing and new problems with limited public resources. He minimizes concerns that high taxation and redistribution have undermined incentives. Above all, he cites the system's continued flexibility and responsiveness to challenges.

Some aspects of Milner's work need elucidation. For example, Milner gives little attention to the problems of inflation and stagnant productivity, which threaten Sweden's competitive position and Social Democratic hegemony. He underestimates the contribution of Swedish business to the country's success and thus underplays the importance of business cooperation in an increasingly international and individualistic environment. After numerous accounts of the crisis of the welfare state, however, Milner's description and explanation of how Sweden's welfare state continues to function is more than welcome.

TIM TILTON
Indiana University

The Indochinese Refugee Dilemma *by Valerie O'Connor Sutter. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1990. 256 pp. $27.50.*

The communist victory over South Vietnam occurred fifteen years ago, and yet refugees continue to leave Vietnam today. Hong Kong is now host to more than 58,000 Vietnamese refugees, and every day there are new arrivals there and in other Southeast Asian countries. Along the Thai-Cambodian border, several hundred thousand Cambodian refugees stagnate in crowded and inhumane camps while awaiting a political solution to the over a decade-long conflict in their home country. At the same time, the pace of resettlement in third countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, France, and Great Britain has slowed down. Western governments now question the acceptability of refugees whom policy makers perceive may be leaving their homes for economic reasons without direct threat of persecution. Consequently, first asylum countries such as Hong Kong, Thailand, and Malaysia are burdened with a refugee problem for which the only solution appears to be repatriation to Vietnam.

This study of Indochinese refugees provides us with a useful historical and political context to view these pressing humanitarian problems. Although it has been obvious for some time that refugee problems are intensely political issues, until

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recently policy analysts paid scant attention to the relationship between the refugee issue and national, regional, and international politics. It is equally true that the determinants of refugee policy and the conditions that create politicization of what is generally perceived as a humanitarian problem have not been studied systematically by political scientists. Valerie Sutter, on the other hand, quite correctly focuses on the foreign policy and domestic interests of the countries most immediately involved in the Indochinese refugee crisis and on the relationship between national interests and humanitarian efforts to assist and protect these refugees.

The author begins with an examination of the international response to the 1956 Hungarian refugee crisis. By making explicit the cold war origins of American refugee policy and the continuing influence of ideological and strategic concerns on U.S. admissions policy, Sutter goes some way toward explaining the extraordinary generosity of western governments to Indochinese refugees. Since 1975, over thirty countries have permanently resettled 1.8 million refugees from the region, and the United States alone has admitted over 900,000. In no other situation has a nation taken in such a large number of people from a distant culture for whom it felt a dramatic responsibility.

As the author makes clear, it is not only ideological and strategic factors that motivate American decision making on this issue. Humanitarian motives, memory of the totally inadequate western response to the Holocaust, and America's long-felt sense of responsibility for events in Indochina are also important factors. What is missing in Sutter's account, however, is the key role played by domestic pressure groups (such as the International Rescue Committee and the Citizens' Commission on Indochinese Refugees) and middle-ranking state Department officials with past Indochina experience in galvanizing support for a generous admissions policy for fleeing Indochinese among top policy makers in the State Department and in the White House, particularly during the Carter administration and the early Reagan administration. Equally significant and neglected in this study is the role played by local government officials, particularly in California and other heavily impacted states and counties across the country, to curb Indochinese refugee admissions levels.

The book concludes with a chapter on the effectiveness of the international agency mandated to protect and assist refugees, the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Although the UNHCR is criticized for its inability to provide protection for all groups of refugees in all instances, the author recognizes the political limitations under which that agency operates especially in a region for years a cockpit for regional and international rivalry. Despite the limitations of the international response to the Indochinese refugee crisis, this book demonstrates that when humanitarian efforts coincide with the national interests of policy makers international organizations and governments can at times be effective in rescuing refugees. If there is a final lesson to be learned from the Indochinese refugee crisis, it is that the protracted nature of this problem is the direct result of governments' unwillingness until recently to make foreign policy adjustments and concessions in order to bring into effect cease-fires and national reconcilia-

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tions in the region, to end sanctions and trade embargoes, and to resume trade and diplomatic relations.

GIL LOESCHER
University of Notre Dame

The Political Unification of Korea in the 1990s: Key to World Peace *by Young Jeh Kim. Lewiston, N.Y., Edwin Mellen Press, 1989. 208 pp. $39.95.*

Korea remains as the lone cold war island in the sea of changing world politics. The 155 mile-long DMZ (demilitarized zone) that separates the peninsula into two halves of the DPRK (Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea) in the North and the ROK (Republic of Korea) in the South is heavily fortified and impassable as ever. Whereas the collapse of the Berlin Wall in Europe ushered in a new era in Europe and reunification of East and West Germanys, the prospect and possibility of North and South Korea coming together under a single roof with the collapse of the DMZ is remote as ever and unlikely at best for the foreseeable future. The deep scar of the internecine Korean War (1950–1953) has kept the two sides of divided Korea mutually suspicious and distrustful.

How to bring about political unification of the communist North Korea and the capitalist South Korea is the focus of the book under review. The author discusses the various unification plans and official policies of the respective Korean states in the 1980s and identifies several scenarios that he claims would apply to the unification process in the 1990s and beyond. The book is organized into three substantive parts: theoretical aspects of unification (chapter 2), practical aspects of unification (chapter 3), and future prospects of unification (chapter 4). Although timely in focus and ambitious in speculation, the book does not examine the assumptions underlying each of the possible models and scenarios examined in the book.

A number of theoretical models are enumerated, for instance, without giving due attention to their applicability and relevance to the case of the Korean reunification. Included in the list are: confederation model, (national) liberation model, absorption (or subversive) model, functionalist and neo-functionalist model, coexistence model, and commonwealth model.

By "practical aspects of Korean unification" the author has in mind specific official "unification policies" pursued by North and South Korean states. In discussing North Korea's DCRK (Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo) plan put forward in 1980 by President Kim Il Sung during his report to the Sixth Congress of the Korean Workers' Party, the author describes rather than evaluates critically each of the confederation schemes, including North Korea's ten-point unification proposal. He then moves on to discuss South Korea's UDRK (United Democratic Republic of Korea) plan put forward in 1982 by President Chun Doo Hwan during his address before the National Assembly. The latter UDRK plan

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which reflects the official unification policy of the Fifth Republic, has now been superseded by the Korean National Commonwealth Plan of the Sixth Republic of President Roh Tae Woo as put forward on 7 July 1988 and 11 September 1989.

The book does not give adequate analysis and evaluation of the assumptions underlying the claims as well as merits and demerits of these and other official plans of Korean reunification. For unconvincing reasons, the author adds biographic sketches and background for North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and South Korea's former President Chun Doo Hwan. This information adds little substantively to the discussion. Also, to claim that Chun's UDRK plan is South Korea's unification policy in the 1980s is not only misleading but inaccurate as it pertains to the pre-1988 era of the Fifth Republic.

On the subject of future prospects of Korean reunification, the author indulges in highly subjective and misleading speculation by presenting a series of what he calls "the present," "the medium-range" and "the long-range" future scenarios. Instead of guiding the readers step-by-step about how and why each type of these future scenarios is both "necessary and justifiable," the author arbitrarily relies on what appears to be an interactive model of an organization (that is, Korea unified) reacting to the environment of the international system. Thus, a comparison of the two Korea's unification formula, (that is, South Korea's UDRK and North Korea's DCRK) will somehow give rise to the "organizational structure" of the "Union of Koreas" in the future (pp. 133, 153). This ultimate shape of Korea's political unification, according to Kim, will maximize the "common core threads" (p. 133) and the dynamics of "internal-horizontal and external-vertical aspects" of the two unification plans (p. 139).

The author should be credited for his self-assuredness and naive optimism of bringing about Korea's political unification by various schematic designs. Yet there is a quality of surrealism that borders upon futility. The book is also full of typographical errors and inaccuracies in spelling. To illustrate, ex-President Chun Doo Hwan entered the Korean Military Academy in Chinhae, not in China (p. 63); "Sae Sidae" rather than "Sei Shi Dae" (p. 64). The value of the summary tables throughout the book would have been greater if the time frame and base years had been given. For instance, Table 3, which compares South and North Koreas' military capability, is obviously as of the mid-1980s, and so is comparison of two Koreas' unification formula in Table 9. Without specifying the year, most of the charts and tables shown in the book lose historical value and significance. The topic of unification of Korea, however, continues to warrant careful attention by scholars.

YOUNG WHAN KIHL
Iowa State University

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Entangling Alliances: How the Third World Shapes Our Lives *edited by John Maxwell Hamilton. Washington, D.C., Seven Locks Press, 1990. 204 pp. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $12.95.*

Hamilton wants to let Americans know about the "interdependence" linking them to people in the Third World and about how it could work better. The book succeeds admirably, even though Hamilton could have made his argument stronger but perhaps less immediately acceptable to much of his audience. The book contains three case studies. The first two, focusing on the Philippines and Costa Rica, are by Hamilton. The third, on Kenya, is by Nancy Morrison, and there are short essays by Third World journalists to provide a counterpoint to the main text.

Hamilton argues that advances in transportation and communication have created the Third World's new significance to the United States. His discussion of a data-entry company in the Philippines drives the point home: communication satellites and rapid air freight systems mean that computer keying for everything from the daily billing of hospitals to university library catalogs can be done by low-wage labor in the Third World, just one example of the "global putting-out system" that has begun to characterize most manufacturing and service industries (p. 43).

Morrison's story of tourism in Kenya comes back to the same sources of interdependence, transportation, and communication. The Costa Rican story differs, but still centers on the consequences of industrial society. Costa Rica's great biological diversity helps assure that high technology agriculture and medicine can continue to find the genetic raw materials.

The case studies demonstrate that what happens in the Third World may have profound effects in the United States. Hamilton goes on to argue that these links are at present inadequately managed. They are too unpredictable. To improve the management of interdependence, Hamilton proposes that American schools do more to prepare citizens to understand the world. He praises a program for "citizen diplomacy" that "gives expression to views that are excluded by elite policy makers" (p. 165). He promotes multilateralism and derides *Realpolitik* as outmoded.

I agree, but I doubt if this book will convince those who argue that the United States does well in its relations with the Third World by avoiding multilateralism and negotiated agreements to global problems. For example, the laissez faire, unmanaged world of international telecommunications services could be seen as in American interests. Furthermore, while an argument that the U.S. government needs to remain knowledgeable about the world certainly makes sense, the argument for increasing citizen knowledge is harder unless we believe that there are things that the U.S. government has been doing that are not in its citizens' interests.

Hamilton is reluctant to make this argument, even though his case studies give him ample opportunity. The developments he discusses tie the necessary expansion of capitalist industry to increasing the international pool of cheap labor. He might have contrasted this with the logic of the American economy in the mid-twentieth century. That is, industry expanded to satisfy the mass consumption

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demands of a well-paid labor force able (unlike the keypunchers in Manila) to buy what they made. Or he could have pointed out that multilateral management of environmental issues may be needed to stop the United States from promoting industries that destroy environmental diversity.

Hamilton may have ignored these issues to avoid being disregarded as another anti-American, pro-Third World do-gooder. His case studies are clear and compelling enough that once his readers have started to think about the real links between north and south, they may automatically raise these questions about U.S. policy.

CRAIG N. MURPHY
Wellesley College

Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society *by Ronald Inglehart. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1990. 484 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $16.95.*

This book continues Inglehart's long-standing analysis of the socioeconomic transformations in advanced industrialized countries. His central thesis that the unprecedented affluence of the postwar era has led to a shift from material concerns to postmaterial aspirations (for example, environment, feminism, Third World) has proved popular. Fellow quantitative analysts have used it in further empirical studies, while political theorists incorporated his findings. Inglehart uses new cross-sectional and longitudinal data to address the criticisms that have arisen from this extension of his argument. He convincingly defends his claim that the rise of new postmaterial values reflects a permanent, intergenerational change rather than a temporary effect of life cycles or historical circumstances. His thesis is generally insightful and convincing whenever it tries to explain the more recent aspects of political behavior in and outside the electoral process (for example, partisanship, political protest, left-right cleavages).

But as the title indicates, Inglehart's theoretical ambitions are more far-reaching. He uses or implicates his thesis to explain a larger cultural shift that includes changed attitudes towards nationalism, religiosity, subjective well-being, economic growth, and NATO. For the explanation of these changes, his thesis is highly problematic, for it is never clear whether postmaterialism is part of or drives this larger cultural shift. He attributes, for example, the decline in religiosity to the rise of postmaterialism. In the actual argument, Inglehart discusses how the postwar affluence and the welfare state superseded the function of religious traditions in providing individuals with a sense of security. He explains secularization in terms of political (welfare state) and economic (growing affluence) factors rather than the cultural ones (changing values) that his theory stipulates. In short, his failure to show how postmaterialist values are causally related to secularization, or any other element of the larger cultural shift, continuously forces him to fall back on economic growth as his only viable explanation.

The theme of culture permeates this book and reflects Inglehart's attempt to

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redeem the political culture approach. This self-proclaimed renaissance is irritating for a variety of reasons. First, his audacious resurrection completely ignores the criticisms brought against earlier political culture explanations. Second, his approach claims to redress the economic reductionism of the predominant "rational choice theories" (p. 15–16). Given that rising affluence contributes crucially to the rise of postmaterialism, I fail to see how his approach constitutes an improvement. He also wrongly equates the rational choice theories with those few quantitative analysts who study the impact of economic conditions on voting or policy making and overlooks consequently the interesting contributions actual rational choice theorists have made to the understanding of the origins and nature of value changes—for example, those originating from microeconomics and psychology.

I dwell on these mistakes largely because they are symptomatic for other shortcomings. The exposition of Inglehart's material is often unnecessarily redundant, and he cites in his argumentation entire works rather than relevant passages. He constantly raises "important" objections to his argument without ever answering them.

MARKUS KREUZER
Columbia University

REFERENCE BOOKS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST RECEIVED

American Housing Survey for the New York-Nassau-Suffolk Metropolitan Area in 1987 *compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., Bureau of the Census, 1990. 175 pp. Paper, $11.00.*

The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950 *by Arthur B. Darling. University Park, Penn State Press, 1990. 509 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $17.50.*

Directory of History Departments and Organizations in the United States and Canada: 1990–91, 16th edition, *compiled by the American Historical Association. Washington, D.C., American Historical Association, 1990. 776 pp. Paper, $35.00.*

The President in the 20th Century: Volume 2—The Presidency in Crisis From Lyndon B. Johnson to Ronald W. Reagan *edited by Louis Filler. Englewood, NJ, Jerome S. Ozer, 1990. 347 pp. $35.95.*

Summaries of Leading Cases on the Constitution, 13th edition, *by Paul C. Bartholomew and Joseph F. Menez. Savage, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 1990 558 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990, 110th edition, *compiled by the U.S Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990 1017 pp. Cloth, $34.00; paper, $28.00.*

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



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

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